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Abstract 
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This thesis explores my work as an internal organisation development (OD) consultant in a national 
body that oversees health and care services in the UK. It makes contributions to practice theory and 
current debates on the nature of expertise, and provides a new way of thinking about the role of 
shame and respect as part of ethical OD practice.  
Over the last two years, I have been inquiring into narrative accounts of what I do as a researcher-
practitioner, as a means to understanding more of what OD actually involves in my workplace. This 
has included my work leading a culture and leadership project, and facilitating large groups. As I 
have progressed in my work and in my research, I have become increasingly aware of the 
uncertainty involved in human interaction and how routinised relational performances – or practices 
– might be involved in managing the anxiety associated with uncertainty, as well as the production 
and reproduction of identities and social order.  
This perspective that combines ideas from pragmatic philosophy, practice theory, group analysis, 
and the complexity sciences, provides very different approaches to understanding many concepts in 
organisational life. In particular, I explore how expertise can be regarded as a relational practice 
involving experts, their lay audience and (where appropriate) relevant professional bodies, and how 
this practice is part of the ordering of contemporary societies. This argument adds to the literature 
on the nature of expertise, challenging the perspective that it is a property of individuals. This is 
through a concrete example of how social order emerges paradoxically from self-organising local 
interaction, which is a key principle in understanding human interaction as complex responsive 
processes. 
I have also found myself increasingly intrigued by the bodily experiences of not knowing what to do 
when my expectations about the world fail to predict what actually happens. How these mismatches 
– or breakdowns – bring the contingency of social orders and identities into view, and their 
involvement in learning processes, has been widely explored in the academic literature. Some of this 
literature also considers related bodily experiences; however, my research focuses particularly on 
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reflexively inquiring into shame and (self-)respect because I have found these to be very useful in 
exploring the conflict of competing ‘goods’ in social life as embodied processes.  
My research suggests that shame arises when the fragility of social norms is highlighted in ways that 
puts at risk our ongoing membership of real and imagined communities that are important to us. I 
argue that taking shame – and therefore the moral agency of others – seriously, paradoxically means 
taking our own moral agency seriously because selves are social. This accords with G.H. Mead’s 
position on morality, which sees ethical judgement as a fallible process of purposeful action with as 
many perspectives as possible in view.  
This position confirms the relatively common view that OD practitioners can never be ‘outside’ the 
social figurations they are tasked with trying to change, but challenges the ideal of practitioners as 
neutral guides who can avoid asserting their own agendas as they try to facilitate change. It also 
contributes to our understanding of human interaction as complex responsive processes by adding 
further dimensions to the specific concept of social selves in G.H Mead’s theory of human 
interaction. 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis accounts for a reflexive encounter with myself spanning more than two years. I came to 
the Doctor of Management (DMan) programme in October 2016 with what I thought was a firm 
grounding in philosophy and critical theory, and a vague sense that the more prevalent ways of 
thinking about what we are all doing at work didn’t quite work for me. Somewhat separately, I also 
saw myself as quite self-aware, appreciative of diversity and good at my job, though perhaps a little 
intolerant of those who didn’t seem interested in making intellectually rigorous arguments for their 
positions. I was eager to start researching what I was doing, to see what I could find out about what 
was actually involved in working on culture and leadership, facilitating groups and learning about 
organisation development (OD) in an arm’s-length government agency in the UK. I was excited about 
where my research might take me.  
I was not prepared for the extent to which inquiring into my practice through the four projects I 
have completed would be emotionally and ethically disturbing. As I engaged with new theoretical 
perspectives – especially from social anthropology and psychoanalysis – as part of analysing 
autobiographical accounts of my work, I found myself at times stuck, exhilarated, bored, elated and 
even embarrassed by what was emerging in my research. What might these conclusions say about 
how I go about my work, about my identity, and how I was perhaps habitually perpetuating some of 
the organisational patterns I was coming to see as problematic?  
Encountering more and more ways of thinking about what I was doing, I also started to appreciate 
the vastness of the field of organisational research and became preoccupied with the question of 
how we could ever work out what to do – in work or in research – when there were seemingly 
infinite plausible interpretations of events to consider (e.g. Gergen and Gergen 1991; Andrews 2008) 
and an essential uncertainty about experience in general (Mead 1934; Gadamer 1975). Accepting 
those premises seemed to make the notion of being able to know what to do little more than a 
comforting fantasy. Further, as someone interested in moral conduct, this raised the specific 
problem of how I could do right by others if definitive meanings of what I was doing were no longer 
available. 
Paraphrasing the social anthropologist, Clifford Geertz (1973), the loose threads of the intricate web 
of interpretive tendencies I had been spinning and suspending myself within over my professional 
life, which I had rarely noticed, were becoming increasingly visible. As my research progressed, 
accelerated through dialogue with the DMan research community, I started to become a stranger to 
myself, just as I saw others in the research community becoming strangers to themselves. For many 
2 
 
of us, initially at least, encountering ourselves anew, and bringing aspects of our practice into view 
that we might have preferred not to engage with, created a sense of unease that in ordinary life we 
might have consciously or unconsciously tried to avoid. This was both individually, as processes of 
maintaining a sense of self – which has been called the maintenance of ontological security (Laing 
1969; Marris 1996) – or through group processes, involving inclusion/exclusion, of maintaining social 
figurations (Elias 1978; Elias and Scotson 1965; Stacey 2003). Over the course of my doctorate, I 
have come to see these as aspects of the same process if individuals are understood as social 
through and through (Mead 1934).  
As a researcher, however, I increasingly tried to stay with these disturbing experiences as a way of 
confronting the limitations of my interpretive web. Though this was often challenging, I hoped to 
find new ways of thinking about how I work that might change what I felt able to do, and be of 
interest to others. It is these experiences that I seemed to be writing about more and more explicitly 
as my research progressed. In my earlier projects, I found that recourse to metatheory alleviated 
some of the anxiety I was experiencing as a result of my research; and over time, the question about 
what we are doing when we are engaging with or avoiding these anxiety-provoking occasions, when 
our expectations of the world fail to match what actually happens, became a second preoccupying 
theme.  
I now see these two main themes as a single emergent question that has animated my research:  
In the context of an essential uncertainty about social life, how might researching disturbing 
breakdowns in everyday practice be a process of moral development? 
My thesis seeks to respond to this research question using ideas from pragmatic philosophy, process 
sociology, the complexity sciences, psychoanalysis and group analysis, which taken together help us 
to understand human interaction as complex responsive processes (Stacey 2003, 2009, 2012; Stacey 
and Mowles 2016). This is the perspective taken up by the DMan research community and informs 
its research method. In my project work, I found experiences where breakdowns involved shame to 
be particularly rich and so this became a further focus for my research.  
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Thesis structure 
After this introduction, this thesis has the following structure: 
• Chapter 2: My research projects. This section contains the four research projects I have 
undertaken over the course of the doctorate programme.  
• Chapter 3: Synopsis of my research. In this section, I reflect on my project work, drawing out 
the emergence of my research question and the key arguments I am making.  
• Chapter 4: The DMan method. My method section sets out the approach to research 
undertaken by students on the DMan programme, and I also consider research ethics here. 
• Chapter 5: The contributions of this thesis. In the final section, I articulate my contribution 
to theory and practice, explain how I am planning to share my work, and suggest areas for 
further research.  
• References. I have listed all sources cited in my thesis, and a small number of other sources 
that I have found helpful in my research. NB. Where I cross-refer to my projects throughout 
my thesis, these are denoted as ‘P[project number]: [page in this document]’, e.g. P3: 60. 
For orientation, however, I will now provide a very short overview of the DMan research method, 
and explain my occupational context as I now understand it, to situate my project work.  
Outline of the DMan research method 
The DMan research degree is a professional doctorate, equivalent to a traditional PhD. All students 
undertaking the DMan use the same research method, which is a type of qualitative inquiry in which 
researchers explore puzzling aspects of their own work through a series of four projects and a 
synopsis that, together, comprise a doctoral thesis. Students are also obliged to participate in the 
DMan research community, which involves attending four weekend residentials per academic year, 
and being part of a learning set of up to four researchers and a supervisor who read and comment 
on each other’s work.  
Through their projects and subsequent analyses, DMan students seek to identify new contributions 
to theory and professional practice. With Alvesson and Kärreman, I see this as aiming to draw 
attention to ‘a new angle, a new connection which breaks with established knowledge and ideas and 
… challenges established assumptions’ (2011: 49) that may be relevant to their professional 
communities and, by the end of the programme, of interest to the organisational research 
community more widely. I will explore the DMan method in detail in Chapter 4, and in particular 
explain how I see its design as taking up some of the key ideas involved in understanding human 
interaction as complex responsive processes (Stacey and Griffin 2005; Mowles 2017a, 2017b).  
 
4 
 
Occupational context 
Over the two years during which I have undertaken my project work, I have been working for an 
arm’s-length government agency in the UK that oversees the health and care sector. National bodies 
have been part of the architecture of the health and care sector since health and care services were 
nationalised in the 1940s, but the extent to which they intervene in the organisations providing and 
commissioning care has varied over time. Currently, performance against key care standards in the 
sector is declining, which is generally attributed to rising demand from an ageing population with 
multiple co-morbidities; workforce shortages; and the ongoing effects of economic austerity 
following the financial crisis of 2008 (e.g. NHS England 2015, 2019). As a result, national bodies are in 
a particularly interventional phase, regularly sending their teams out to help struggling front-line 
organisations; while this pooling and deployment of experts may seem an appropriate response to 
dealing with some of the sector’s more intransigent problems, and promoting self-reliance among 
those front-line organisations, paradoxically, it could also be seen as a mechanism by which the need 
for overseers and external experts is perpetuated, and perhaps strengthened.  
My organisation is ostensibly a traditional bureaucracy, formally working according to calculable 
rules that define how the organisation’s duties are discharged through the functional division of 
labour (Weber et al 1958; Townley 2008; Bauman 1989). As I explore in my projects, the ideologies 
of new public management (e.g. Hood 1991), experts as authority figures, and mechanical 
conceptions of cause and effect appear to be produced and reproduced through many of our 
organisational practices – from our internal schemes of delegation, committee structures and 
decision-making processes to the annual strategic planning rounds and operational approaches used 
for sector oversight.  
Despite the continuing decline in service performance, these ways of thinking seem to prevail. 
Indeed, the response to noticing deterioration seems to be to do more of the same rather than 
review the validity of long-held assumptions. For example, despite workforce planning having gone 
on for decades, a recent parliamentary review’s proposed solution to current shortages in key staff 
groups was simply more and better planning (Parliament, House of Lords 2017). Clearly, planning is 
important; but, as I explore in Project 2, perhaps there is a different way of thinking about what 
people are doing when they are planning, that may lead to different approaches. I wonder if these 
kinds of responses, which reflect the ideals of strategic choice theory (Child 1972), arise because 
reconsidering some of the key assumptions about how health and care workforce planning is 
conducted, as an instance of wider assumptions about how to provide effective services, might 
mean reconstructing identities and power relations across all aspects of the health and care system. 
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Given that many of the senior leaders within the sector have spent most of their careers in this 
mode of working, one can imagine that a different kind of approach may be too anxiety provoking to 
contemplate, leading to the reproduction of existing practices. 
At the same time, the organisations we oversee are becoming more fluid, with public-sector mergers 
and joint ventures appearing increasingly frequently as responses to a new focus on integrating care 
services (e.g. NHS England 2015, 2019) and system leadership (e.g. Timmins 2015). The landscape of 
national oversight bodies is also evolving in response; and for me and many of my colleagues, the 
next reorganisation is always either on the horizon or anticipated soon. We are therefore constantly 
pre-emptively building and rebuilding relationships and explaining why we are doing the things we 
are doing. On the one hand, this is no bad thing because we are forced to make sure that our 
taxpayer-funded activities are responding to the changing needs of the sector. Perhaps as a result, 
we tend to talk about our primary motivations as being related to doing work we think is important; 
as I describe in Project 3, this is also a deeply socialised public-sector norm (e.g. Committee on 
Standards in Public Life 1995; Perry 1996; Feldheim 2007) that is consciously and unconsciously 
perpetuated. 
On the other hand, riding the waves of change in organisational priorities and key stakeholders, 
membership of the leadership team and our own teams has consequences. Perhaps in response to 
feeling cast as dispensable or interchangeable bureaucratic functionaries (Bauman 1989), there is a 
noticeable degree of psychological withdrawal among my colleagues. I see this manifest as, for 
example, an air of cynicism about reassurances given by our most senior leaders about the value of 
the latest reorganisation, how it will lead to better service outcomes, and so on. While there is 
undoubtedly a rational basis for the changes that are made, it is perhaps not surprising that people 
find ways to cope with being obliged to bear the anxiety that comes with the uncertainty of working 
in this sort of environment (Marris 1996). This may be through keeping our heads down; or making 
new alliances in the organisation according to who is assumed to be in the frame for senior roles; or 
by seeking new jobs.  
Perhaps as an example of a wider pattern in my experience of avoiding some of the emotional 
volatility that comes with engaging with more existential concerns, my response in the last two years 
has been largely to focus intensely on my work; this has two main components. One involves 
developing national policies around leadership and governance for the organisations we oversee, 
and working on projects and programmes that build capability in these areas. In the other, I am an 
internal OD consultant. This generally involves working with teams on development, running action 
learning sets, designing and facilitating away days or workshops, and helping managers think 
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through the design and execution of their projects. I sometimes work with the central OD team on 
the development plan for the whole of the organisation; in my first year on the DMan, I led a year-
long project on culture and leadership development.  
Though I have been doing this kind of work for nearly three years, I still feel relatively new to OD, 
and some of what I write about in my thesis reflects the conflicts I have encountered in gaining 
confidence as an OD practitioner. This has involved learning about the theory of OD by reading the 
contemporary literature (e.g. Jones and Brazzel 2006; Cheung-Judge and Holbeche 2015; Bushe and 
Marshak 2015) and through practical experimentation with facilitation techniques and ideas. It is the 
internal OD aspects of my role that I have used as the basis for my research projects, but I do not see 
my conclusions as limited to OD practice specifically: as I will describe, I think my arguments are 
generalisable to any aspect of practice, in organisations and beyond.  
Beyond these aspects of my role, I am often called on to help with work outside either of my formal 
remits, which is partly because I bring a set of skills from my background as a project and strategy 
consultant that are not shared by many others in the organisation. I think it is also because of the 
alternative perspectives I have started to provide on how we are working, based on my DMan 
research – perhaps what people see and call upon is my tendency to notice different things about 
what might be going on, and to speak up in ways that they do not seem able to themselves, much as 
we do at the DMan residential weekends (described in Chapter 4). In some ways, I liken my role to 
that of corporate jester (Welsford 1935; Riveness 2006; Otto 2007; Firth and Leigh 2012), occasional 
parrhesiastes or speaker of truth to power (Foucault and Pearson 2001), or bricoleur (Simon 2015). I 
mention this because a role like this being possible in my organisation alludes to some of the 
informal ways in which we work, which perhaps conflict with the aspirational formal bureaucratic 
(and I think rather impersonal) structures I described above. Indeed, I see many of my colleagues 
working in similar ways, and this is arguably part of a more general pattern of organisational life 
(Scott 1990; Jackall 2009). 
 
This is the context in which my project work has been undertaken. As a summary, it reflects how I 
have come to see how my organisation through my project work, which the next chapter now 
presents. These four projects are included as they were written as I progressed through the DMan 
programme, and so may seem a little raw or unsophisticated, particularly in the early stages as I was 
trying to understand some of the ideas involved in the complex responsive processes perspective.  
As stipulated in my Ethics Committee submission, all names and some contextual features of specific 
events have been pseudonymised to protect the identities of the people I describe.  
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2. My research projects 
PROJECT 1:  
Engaging and distancing as processes of managing my sense of self 
Introduction 
In this project, I try to give an account of my professional development, focussing in particular on the 
ways of thinking that have come to inform how I work. In developing my argument through research 
and conversation with my learning set, two main themes have emerged; I will cover these briefly in 
this introduction, and then explore them in more detail. I end the project with some reflections on 
how doing this work has itself been developmental, and then indicate the areas of inquiry that I 
would like to pursue in Project 2. 
The first dominant theme arises from noticing that I appear to try to manage my emotional states 
through repeating patterns of engagement and distancing from my environment, both within and 
between the situations in which I find myself. At times, these dynamics have been volatile and 
accompanied by emotional instability, but they are becoming less extreme as I now find myself 
distancing in order to engage. Further, I appear to oscillate between two main types of activity: 
socially motivated work, and academia. For me, the former relates to ideals of doing something 
worthwhile – I am drawn to connecting with others around social purpose, working in teams to get 
things done and making a difference to people’s lives. Charles Taylor might describe this as a 
romantic expressivist application to higher meaning and purpose (Taylor 1990: 495ff). This is a 
process of engaging that leads to a sense of interdependence with others, but also the entanglement 
in everyday politics and conflicts of power that go alongside being in groups. Whenever I have found 
myself unwilling to engage with these politics or power dynamics, or when they cause me 
unhappiness or distress, I have sought to distance myself from them. I have always felt more 
comfortable in the academic world, with its emphasis on abstract hypotheses; perhaps speaking to 
Taylor’s idea of a naturalism of disengaged reason (ibid), I feel more autonomous, more in control of 
my context and perhaps therefore of my emotions.  
The second theme is about how I establish and manage my own credibility in any of these contexts. I 
think I am dealing with the legacy of an apparently deep-rooted assumption that knowledge is 
somehow causally linked to success, however that is measured in the context. So, to be recognised 
as someone to be taken seriously, by myself and by others, I have felt the need to be able to 
demonstrate factual knowledge of the relevant information to earn my right to contribute. While 
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this assumption has been challenged a number of times over the years, it has only been through 
writing this project that I have been able to bring it into critical focus.  
There has been a lot to write about in relation to these themes, and initially the process of choosing 
what to include was difficult – not least because I was acutely aware that our understanding of the 
past is constantly being reconstrued based on our understanding of the present with a view to our 
hopes for the future (e.g. Stacey and Mowles 2016: 331). What I included would therefore reflect my 
ideology and assumptions too, and so I needed a way to explain how I would make these choices, or 
risk being trapped in an unreflective loop. 
In Truth and Method (1975: 364), Gadamer describes ‘insight’ as arising when our expectations are 
confronted by something that thwarts them; this leads to learning, which (following Aeschylus) often 
involves suffering (ibid: 365). When writing the earlier drafts of this project, I found that my most 
interesting experiences seemed to be where the factors described above – involvement and 
distance, establishing and maintaining credibility – come into conflict, resulting in some degree of 
emotional distress. Following Gadamer, I imagined that new insights may emerge from exploring 
and reflecting upon these experiences; and, through repeated iterations of my narrative, this did 
happen. Accounts of these experiences therefore form the greater part of the project; however, I 
start with an attempt to explain why academia has played such a prominent role in my 
development.  
 
Establishing the importance of learning 
When I was a child, I remember being scolded by my mother for stepping on books: this showed 
great disrespect to Saraswati, the Hindu goddess of knowledge and wisdom. Like many Indian 
families, we held learning in high regard – primarily as a means to getting a good and (importantly) 
well-paid job. The stories in our immigrant community were all about achieving more than your 
parents by doing well at school, working hard in your job, and earning lots of money so that you 
could acquire material goods as a tangible display of status. Knowledge and wealth went hand in 
hand, and extended family members of my generation were all encouraged to go to university: not 
just to realise a dream that would have been beyond the reach of our parents, but also to enhance 
our earning potential.  
Conversations at family gatherings would centre on expensive cars, bigger houses and the latest 
gadgets, all of which I found terribly boring. However, unlike my family, I appeared to see learning 
and education as intrinsically important, not just as a means to an end – perhaps because studying 
helped me to cope with being severely asthmatic and therefore unable to participate in things that 
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others my age might have been doing instead of schoolwork. Being academically bright and easy to 
get along with, I was identified early on as ‘the clever one’ in my extended family – the one who 
would ‘go far’ and so on.  
This confidence in me was borne out by the good grades I achieved throughout my school years with 
minimal effort; I read voraciously, and was always slightly bemused by those around me who 
weren’t interested in learning or found school difficult. The head of my school year group insisted 
that I try for a place at Oxford to read mathematics – an option that I had never considered before 
perhaps because going to ‘Oxbridge’ had never been something that I thought was for people like 
me: however clever I might be, these universities were never mentioned in my family, except as a 
mysterious place where people we didn’t know went. My head of year’s suggestion therefore 
opened my eyes to new possibilities – a first widening of my horizons – but as soon as I met the 
other applicants during the interview process, I realised that my grasp of higher mathematics was 
less advanced than theirs and that my schooling had been very different. Perhaps reflecting a belief 
in absolute, objective and logical criteria for the way the world worked that was coherent with the 
science I was studying at school, not to mention the assumed causal link I made between knowledge 
and success, I had no high hopes of gaining a place. So I was astonished to find myself offered one, 
and spent that summer in excited anticipation of going up to Oxford.  
Over the summer, I started reading more widely and was amazed at how little of the world I had 
come across. Laclos’ Les Liaisons Dangereuses marked a particular turning point: surprised to find 
such fresh and relevant insights into human nature in a book written over two centuries ago, I began 
to seek out different kinds of fiction to see what else I could learn. I also started reading simple 
books about philosophy, and quickly regretted my choice of degree: I felt trapped by the impending 
world of cold, abstract mathematics and was curious about how philosophy and literature could 
impart new ways of thinking. In my first week of arriving at Oxford, the senior tutor at my college 
agreed to let me change school to jointly study mathematics and philosophy, which was lucky as in 
the end as I turned out to be rather good at philosophy and rather bad at mathematics.  
My first few weeks at Oxford presented some intellectually formative moments. I was in awe of all 
the history around me and acutely aware of feeling out of place; perhaps this was to be expected, 
given my background – no one I knew had ever been to Oxford or Cambridge; what was I doing 
there? Had there been some mistake? Not knowing the rules of how to be a student at Oxford, but 
open to new experiences, I thought I would stick to what I was good at – the work.  
However, my first philosophy tutorial essay, on the topic of Cartesian dualism, presented a problem: 
I had not written an essay for some years. Feeling a little out of my depth, I sought the advice of an 
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older student who suggested that consulting the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Blackburn 1994) 
was a good place to start. Following his advice, I was delighted to find a solid textbook to rely on – as 
I had so many times at school, where non-fiction (mainly science) books would describe a stable, 
regular, predictable reality that could be understood objectively. The problem arose when I went to 
the recommended reading list for the essay – a further five books to digest: I expected these to 
simply expand upon the Dictionary definitions in greater detail, so that I could then summarise it all 
in my own words. Yet, to my surprise, each book offered a completely different interpretation of 
Descartes and the mind/body problem. I wondered how on earth I would be able to make coherent 
sense of them: if these revered thinkers couldn’t agree on a solution, what chance did I have? 
My application of a correspondence theory of truth – which, broadly, assesses the validity of 
propositions by checking them against objective facts – to things that were far more abstract wasn’t 
working; I was being confronted with the possibility that my assumptions about the fixed nature of 
the world were wrong. I felt unprepared and fraudulent about being at Oxford, but decided to at 
least try to write the kind of essay I thought was being asked of me. In my first few tutorials, I 
withheld my own opinions in favour of reiterating the views I had read. I was a little uncomfortable 
with the approach my tutors took, which felt exploratory rather than didactic. Over those first few 
weeks, it gradually dawned on me that this was the true nature of philosophy (not just studying it): 
rather than finding ‘the correct answer’, I was required to arrive at my own view through critical 
appraisal of multiple viewpoints. But this concept was so new to me that I didn’t know how to do it. 
One day, discussing some aspect of metaphysics in a tutorial with my philosophy tutor, an elderly 
don, I offered a tentative suggestion that was initially met with silence; but after a few moments of 
reflection, he nodded, ‘Ah, I hadn’t really thought of that before – yes, I suppose you could look at in 
that way’. I was stunned to be taken so seriously by someone who had been teaching philosophy for 
far longer than I’d been alive. And here was perhaps a Gadamerian insight: my assumptions about 
the correlations between knowledge and success were unravelling, and with them the constraints 
that these assumptions had placed on my perception of my capabilities. The possibilities that this 
presented were hugely exciting. This interaction changed me: I suddenly felt bolder and more self-
assured about voicing my own ideas, instead of assuming them to be inadequate. The experience 
had challenged my expectations, but in a way that quietened some of my self-doubt and reinforced 
the self-image I had held before university. I was coming to understand the importance of something 
a tutor in one of our early meetings had said: we were at Oxford to learn how to be independent 
learners, not to recite facts – and this meant being curious about the questions you couldn’t answer, 
rather than simply reiterating what you already knew. Learning was therefore essentially wrapped 
up in overcoming the unknown. 
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Building on the work of George Kelly, Mildred McCoy (1977) analyses the quality of emotions as 
linked to the nature and extent of the challenge to one’s personal construct system. Experiences 
that affirm or validate some part of one’s structure result in positive emotions (e.g. love, happiness 
or self-confidence), whereas those that challenge or invalidate one’s structure result in negative 
emotions (e.g. sadness, anxiety or anger). Taking ‘structure’ in these terms to mean the entrenched 
patterns of one’s behaviour, the enhanced self-confidence I felt as a result of this experience could 
be explained as an ‘awareness of the goodness of fit of the self in one’s core role structure’ (ibid: 
121). And the effect has persisted: in many jobs since, I have found venturing into new areas of work 
with a tentative confidence in myself far more satisfying and professionally developmental, despite 
the associated uncertainty and anxiety, than doing the things I already know how to do. As a result, I 
have sought these opportunities, often telling my managers ‘I have no idea how to do this, but if you 
think I’m capable of it I’ll give it a go’.  
Alongside the kinds of experiences I have just described, some of the ideas I studied at university 
have also stayed with me. Nietzsche’s perspectivism, calling for intellectual honesty and denying 
objective moral truth, was particularly compelling and personally liberating. I found in the story of 
Zarathustra and the death of god (Nietzsche 1883) that I could start to explain some of the ways in 
which I felt my outlook was changing – I was starting to become much more circumspect, and 
(perhaps also partly because I was training to be a peer counsellor at the time) I felt I could relate to 
the perspectives of others in ways that I found my peers either not obviously able to or not 
interested in considering. Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘philosophers of tomorrow’ (ibid) inspired me to 
find my own way rather than seeking to fit in, and reassured me that non-conformity was potentially 
generative.  
I also came across Plato’s allegory of the cave1 (Republic 514a-515a), which also resonated: I took 
comfort in feeling that, through my more open outlook, I was gradually turning away from the 
shadows that others saw as reality, towards the intensifying light of the Sun, which in Plato’s analogy 
is the only means by which reality (the Forms) can be known. For me, however, what was being 
illuminated was that reality, rather than being the kinds of abstractions Plato described, was perhaps 
only a series of interconnected, context-dependent perspectives, strung together for this or that 
 
1 Plato allegorises the process of philosophical education as a physical journey of prisoners out of a cave. First, the prisoners 
are shackled to look only at a wall deep within the cave, convinced that the shadows of objects carried in front a fire 
behind them are real: only false statements can be made about these shadows because they are the objects of ignorance. 
The prisoners can imagine nothing other than what they can see until they are set free of their bonds, and turn to see the 
objects that are casting the shadows being carried in front of the fire – these objects are of the visible or material world 
and are the objects of belief and opinion. Those objects are then taken to be real until the prisoners are dragged from the 
cave and see the forms – these are of the intelligible world and are the objects of knowledge. The forms are illuminated by 
the sun, which is the highest form (or form of the good) that all other forms rely on for their perfection.  
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reason through narratives based on ideology (White 1975). I can see this as a move towards a 
coherence theory of truth, which relocates the problem of being able to know things from being in 
the world to being manifest in social interaction – or, as Nietzsche put it, ‘One is always wrong, but 
with two, truth begins – one cannot prove his case, but two are irrefutable’ (1882: §260). 
 
Finding meaning in work 
I left university with a good degree and a lack of clear direction about what to do next. Unlike many 
of the graduates in my year, who went immediately into to well-paid jobs in banking or law, most of 
my friends were considering further study towards careers in academia. I explored taking a Master’s 
degree in art history, mainly because I’d studied aesthetics and thought it might be an interesting 
PhD topic; but, having been a student since the age of 5, I was reluctant to continue in academia 
without a break and, in any case, had insufficient funds for further study at that point. By chance, 
knowing that I was looking for something flexible and relatively light that would enable me to do 
other things during my year out of academia, a friend mentioned that medical administration was 
the best-paid temping available in London at the time. So, I ended up taking on temporary contracts 
in the National Health Service (NHS) to earn some money to fund whatever I might end up doing, 
and looked forward to a relatively relaxed year. 
Initially, the work largely involved typing clinic letters from doctors’ audio dictations and arranging 
appointments for patients. In many ways, the work was extremely tedious, but there was something 
fascinating about glimpsing the intricacies of these people’s lives through fragments described by 
this orthopaedic surgeon or that neurologist in a letter, or as I spoke with them on the telephone. I 
found, perhaps for the first time, being able to make small, tangible differences to people’s lives was 
hugely satisfying and I enjoyed the everyday challenges of trying to make people’s experiences of 
getting what they needed as simple as possible for them, often when they had been struggling for 
some time.  
Theory was still important to me and I found myself in social situations defending a quite pure 
relativist position – at least in relation to morality, values and beliefs. I would argue heatedly with 
friends about why none of us could be objectively right about these kinds of things and how little 
justification we had for criticising the practices of other cultures as we were approaching the world 
from a Western rationalist, mono-naturalist position that didn’t allow for any other interpretations. I 
tried to be clear that I wasn’t advocating not making moral judgements about this or that particular 
cultural practice, but that all such judgements should to be acknowledged as socially conditioned. 
Perhaps arrogantly, I thought I was trying to turn my friends away from the shadows in Plato’s cave, 
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so that they too could start seeing the non-material world for what I felt it to be – essentially plural, 
relative and socially constructed. In many ways, however, these were intellectual problems – not so 
much about the tangible world, but more about my ability to argue a point; they made little 
difference to what I found myself doing each day – which was mainly being rather bored.  
To deal with this, as I moved from department to department and from one hospital to another, I 
would set myself little challenges – how fast could I type up a set of clinic letters? How quickly could 
I acquire the lexicon of a particular medical speciality? The people I worked with most days were 
long-serving medical secretaries who found me relatively easy to work with, but in general probably 
wondered why I was there. I occasionally came across people like myself who were earning money 
to finance other things (opera singers, trainee therapists, medical students) and we would see each 
other in different hospitals in London as we all moved around following the work that came up. Over 
time, I found friends, many of whom I still have now; what I think brought us together was a mutual 
recognition of being similarly educated, on the fringes of the organisations in which we found 
ourselves, and seeing the work as a means to achieving other things rather than doing what we 
really wanted to do. Especially when we ended up working in the same hospitals for longer periods, 
we deliberately set ourselves apart from the permanent administrative staff, whom we talked about 
as unambitious for staying in roles that we would only entertain on a temporary basis, and 
inefficient or lazy for not being able to cope with the workload that had occasioned our temporary 
positions.  
Occasionally, this could play out quite overtly. During one contract, I was working in an 
administrative role in a hospital and shared an office with three older women who had been in their 
jobs for a long time. I noticed that they complained bitterly about having so much typing to do, and 
so many phone calls to deal with; but from what I could see, they spent most of their time chatting 
and going out to smoke cigarettes. Over time, I became increasingly indignant about their wasting 
time (and therefore the public money spent on their salaries) and found indirect ways to call this 
out. For example, on one occasion, another temporary member of the team and I conspired to 
completely clear one of our permanent colleagues’ work while she was on holiday for a few days. 
We were amused to observe the excuses the other two secretaries made to explain why their 
returning colleague was so busy, not to mention the returning secretary’s resentment at finding her 
work already done. Thinking about the group’s dynamics, our actions were undermining the existing 
paradigm and so not surprisingly were taken as an attack – I wonder to what extent the permanent 
staff would have acted to restore the power balance if my friend and I hadn’t been leaving to do 
other things. 
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In general, however, this opposition played out much less overtly; for example, we would socialise 
with each other rather than the permanent members of staff. We talked about how good it was to 
be working in the NHS and making a difference to people’s lives (a motive no doubt shared by our 
permanent colleagues), suppressing the acknowledgement that we needed these jobs to maintain 
the lifestyles we wanted, and that such opportunities could only have arisen through the inefficiency 
we disparaged in others (which was only sometimes warranted). In this way, our work identities 
were created and sustained through this opposition. Conformity and resistance to conformity have 
been analysed as being ‘fundamentally linked to the image of oneself that one wishes to present to 
others (and undoubtedly also to oneself)’ (Codol 1984: 317); a positive image (and self-image) for all 
of us relied on resisting and differentiation. This may be an early example of me trying to have some 
control over my sense of who I was by managing my context.  
As the year progressed, I secured a place at University College London on a combined Master’s 
programme in art history and critical theory. The programme took a year, during which – in addition 
to learning about Dutch and Italian painting and sculpture – I came across the work of people like 
Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes and Gilles Deleuze. Their thinking fell outside the analytical school 
in which I had been trained, and I found their emphasis on the social action that results from 
philosophical thought, as well as clear lines of sight back to Nietzsche, very compelling. These 
authors weren’t merely thinking about abstract problems, but instead were engaging with how 
societies worked and what people should do as a result of understanding more about what they 
found to be going on. I can now see a link back to my lack of enthusiasm for mathematics as the 
subject of my degree – perhaps I was inclined towards more socially motivated or practical 
endeavours, and these authors were helping me to start to articulate this. 
I found no problem entering this world, which seemed familiar: I had the credentials to give me 
confidence in my abilities, and I was happy to contribute my thoughts. I learnt a great deal – in 
particular, I enjoyed working on the question of the incommensurability of competing critical 
theories. In exploring this topic, I came across Paul Feyerabend, and his argument that a utilitarian 
pluralistic attitude could resolve the tension arising from the (in his opinion misguided) quest of a 
metatheory with which to unify other theories, and the apparent social or scientific value of praxis 
(e.g. Feyerabend 1987). These ideas resonated strongly with me, and I would now characterise this 
as the start of a shift in my thinking towards a more pragmatic perspectivism. 
I was deeply engaged in my work, and feeling intellectually ‘at home’ led to an urge to be playful. 
Building on the encouragement towards social action I was receiving from dead philosophers, and 
sensing that there was perhaps more to life than academia for its own sake, I took the opportunity 
15 
 
to see how far I could push the boundaries of what I was being asked to do in my papers. Many of 
the continental authors I was reading made clear (though often polemically) that scholarly writing 
itself was a tool of the academic hegemony that perpetuated power relations (e.g. Cixous et al 
1976). So, I thought I too should try to subvert the establishment, and started making potentially 
controversial stylistic choices for some of my papers. For example, I experimented with structuring 
my papers to make my points polemically or sub-textually rather than directly. While I wasn’t 
marked down for these subversions, I was eventually warned by one of my tutors to be careful: 
though he was supportive of what I was doing, he was having trouble defending it to his colleagues. 
It is perhaps understandable that the faculty would be naturally inclined to perpetuate more 
traditional academic approaches, as their power to some extent derived from being the arbiters of 
what was recognised as scholarly writing. If I acknowledged this as I went on to complete my degree, 
it did not dissuade me from continuing to tread a fine line at the boundary of the establishment in 
which I had been trained. On one side of this boundary was a reluctant submission to the dominant 
discourse, and on the other, a subversive, reflexive and exciting flirtation with the unknown. I can 
now connect this to the advice I received from the tutor at Oxford about doing the questions you 
couldn’t answer, which I now interpret as needing to feel outside one’s comfort zone in order to 
learn.  
Having to choose a career 
Re-entering the world of work after my Master’s was meant to be temporary. I found myself working 
at a children’s hospital, again on a short-term contract, while I applied for PhD programmes in 
continental philosophy schools. I wanted to write about Nietzsche, perspectivism and aesthetics and 
was offered a place to study part time at the University of Warwick the following year. I therefore 
set about preparing to try to survive in London as a remote, part-time student.  
My job at the hospital was to coordinate the work of a small, super-specialist surgical unit. Although 
my place in the hierarchy was fairly junior, my previous experience gave me confidence in my 
abilities; besides, based on what I’d seen others doing in similar roles, I assumed it couldn’t be 
particularly difficult. My role was to make sure that the unit ran efficiently, and that patients 
received their appointments and operations to meet NHS waiting-time targets. In practice, this 
usually meant working with people across the hospital to make sure that the correct 
multidisciplinary clinical teams, accommodation, and any requisite equipment were arranged for 
operations. I also managed a small team of administrative staff, most of whom were also on 
temporary contracts. 
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I was good at my job, contributed enthusiastically, and soon found ways to make our lives easier. I 
quickly became a valued member of the team, while also building an extensive network across the 
hospital. This made it easy to get things done, often in the face of considerable bureaucracy – my 
humble position in the hospital meant that I had little authority, so I worked largely through 
negotiating with those whose help we needed. I often relied on favours and goodwill to get things 
done, and as a team this meant that we were able to deal with most things that came our way even 
when these were, in retrospect, rather extraordinary. 
For example, late one Friday afternoon, after most of my colleagues had left, I received a phone call 
from the care team of a baby who was due to have simultaneous major operations involving 
multiple surgical teams on the Monday morning. Another urgent case was scheduled for the 
following Monday, for a boy whose dissolving jawbone needed to be removed to save his life. The 
team were calling to say that the baby’s lung had collapsed and that he wouldn’t be able to have 
surgery on Monday after all. At first, my heart sank as months of work fell apart; then I was 
overwhelmed by a sense of panic about what to do. I telephoned the lead surgeon, and we decided 
to try to swap the operations of the baby and the boy. After a blur of phone calls with the families, 
the different sets of surgeons, and various external equipment suppliers, the theatre teams 
confirmed at about 7pm that everything was ready. Somehow, in just under two hours, we had done 
it! I remember being completely exhausted, bewildered by what had just happened, but elated that 
we’d been able to do this for the children whose lives were at stake. The following week, as accounts 
emerged of the Friday evening heroics, I was thanked by my managers and the team, which was also 
very satisfying – particularly when it came from the surgeons. Such experiences forged strong 
relationships in our team, and I was happy to be identified with them. Revisiting this now, it could be 
explained as me again creating a self-image that aligned with my expectations of myself.  
Most of the time during this period, I felt quite settled. Sometimes I felt a little bored, but this was 
compensated by the immensely satisfying experiences of helping anxious families feel that someone 
was looking out for their interests, or seeing operations that were months in planning going 
smoothly. I enjoyed receiving praise for doing my job well, and at this point I became conscious that 
recognition from the surgeons meant much more than it did from my management colleagues – 
perhaps because I was proving something to myself about being able to pass muster with those I 
saw engaged in real, meaningful work.  
Some months after I joined the hospital, one of my directors, based on what she knew of my work, 
suggested that I might want to apply for the NHS Graduate Management Training Scheme. I didn’t 
know about the Scheme and hadn’t considered alternatives to further study until this point, but also 
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had a growing sense that doing things that were somehow important or useful in the world meant 
something to me. Thinking back to the authors cited above, the idea of social action being the end 
point of philosophical thought was becoming increasingly preoccupying. I had a growing doubt that 
what the academic world required of me wouldn’t be satisfying in the way that I was finding the 
world of work, which often involved making moral choices and therefore opportunities to act 
according to my personal ethics. I kept an open mind and applied for the Scheme.  
At this point, I spent a great deal of time considering, alone and with others, what I would do should 
the opportunity arise to move away from academia. I could now characterise this as a struggle over 
what I thought was a binary choice: an academic life, where I could be like my friends from Oxford 
and continue the path I had embarked upon; or a step into an unknown that I had only glimpsed 
briefly during my work in the NHS, but found emotionally fulfilling. Did I want to be seen, or indeed 
see myself, as someone writing about being in the world, or someone living his philosophy through 
his actions? 
I chose to join the Scheme and pursue a career in the NHS, and found much by way of affirmation of 
my choice in terms of the satisfaction I gained from my work. While undertaking a Master’s degree 
in healthcare management and leadership, much of which was interesting but not particularly 
difficult, I managed an emergency department, worked for a national commissioning organisation, 
and had a policy role in an ambulance service. These were all rewarding experiences in one way or 
another, but by far the most influential aspect of the Scheme for me was being part of a learning set: 
we would meet for a whole day, every two months or so, focussing on reflective practice and 
personal development. In the mornings, we would explore particular topics, or discuss the results of 
various personality profiling tools; in the afternoons, we participated in action learning. I gained 
many insights at the time, although perhaps not the ones that I would now take. 
I found the various personality profiles interesting, but saw them rather like horoscopes – 
sometimes helpful, sometimes not, but all ways of describing ourselves using a particular set of 
linguistic shortcuts that made it easier to be confident that what we were saying was being 
interpreted as we intended it to be. I remember being particularly taken with the Myers-Briggs 
Personality Type Indicator (Myers et al 1998), which highlighted some of my less helpful patterns of 
behaviour that I was then better able to spot and manage in the workplace.  
The action learning sessions were usually comfortable experiences for me – I was happy to 
participate in the problem-sharing activities, although don’t remember finding them particularly 
revelatory. I put this down to having had previous experience of working in the environments that 
were being described, and therefore being a credible contributor compared to my colleagues, most 
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of whom had come to the Scheme directly from undergraduate study. The insights about our group’s 
dynamics were much more interesting. In particular, the huge lack of congruence between how we 
each interpreted what each other said and behaved became clear over time as we got to know each 
other better. For example, I recall one colleague in particular talking about how she had only felt 
able to share anything remotely personal after three or four learning set meetings – I and a few 
others in our group had interpreted this lack of confidence as a lack of interest and found her new 
contribution a powerful demonstration of how easy it was to misunderstand each other at work. 
Reflecting on both of these activities now, I am struck by how, despite my theoretical standpoint 
around social constructionism and perspectivism, I hadn’t meaningfully connected the theory I had 
studied to my daily practice, or questioned the underlying assumptions with which we were working. 
For example, in the learning set I describe, I happily assumed a sender–receiver model of 
communication (Shannon et al 1949) where it is possible to transmit information that may or may 
not be interpreted correctly, rather than seeing meaning as arising in the interaction itself (e.g. 
Barthes and Heath 1977; Mead 1934). Further, in engaging with the personality profiles, I assumed 
that there was a stable reality that could be assessed and reported upon and paid no attention to 
the way in which discussing the results of these various profiles changed us individually and as a 
group through each interaction (e.g. Barthes and Heath 1977; Elias 1978).  
Towards the end of my time on the Scheme, one of the directors at work became my mentor. At 
that time, she was in her first year of the Doctor of Management (DMan) programme at the 
University of Hertfordshire, and we often talked about her studies. As a result of our discussions, I 
started to explore the literature on complex responsive processes in relation to work I was doing on 
the final project for my Master’s – a reflective narrative on my development over my time on the 
Scheme.  
I attended the Complexity and Management Centre’s conference in 2008 and was intrigued to find 
myself with people who saw the world completely differently than most of my colleagues to date. I 
remember the tacit banning of the word ‘system’ and the large group meetings each day. So much 
of what was discussed resonated with me, and I thought at that stage that I might want to pursue 
the DMan myself at some point. The conference came shortly before I was due to submit my 
reflective narrative, and I ended up writing a section on my interpretation of what taking a complex 
responsive processes perspective meant. This included taking our actual experiences seriously rather 
than relying on abstractions and reifications to make sense of our working lives; seeing meaning as 
continuously emerging through interaction, rather than something that can simply be conveyed 
from one person to another; and seeing leadership in terms of influence that is built through the 
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ability to interpret, shape and re-shape the collective reality in a way that engages and inspires 
others rather than simply being about positions in an organisational chart. 
As I re-read my narrative from 2008, I am struck by how enduring the principles I articulated at that 
point have been for me. I have had at least four more jobs – as a commissioner of urgent care 
services in the NHS, as a consultant to the NHS in a boutique healthcare consultancy (which 
comprised multiple assignments over a period of just over four years), as a senior manager in a 
commissioning group, and now as an adviser in one of the national health and care oversight bodies. 
In most of these I have found expressions of the central themes of uncertainty in organisational life 
in some form, though they have been more or less prominent at different times. Much of this work 
has been unremarkable from a Gadamerian insight perspective, but there are two episodes that are 
worth recounting as they illustrate quite clearly how the dynamics of engaging and distancing are 
linked to my emotional states, this being one of the dominant patterns that undertaking this project 
has illuminated. 
 
Changing contexts (1): engagement, crisis, escape 
In one of my healthcare consulting assignments, I was supporting a hospital director to set up a new 
function within his organisation. Our stated purpose was exciting – to provide flexible support to a 
number of the hospital’s departments in order to increase the speed and scale of transformational 
projects, many of which were already underway. Initially, I had two other colleagues, who were also 
consultants, and we quickly became the director’s trusted aides. I think none of us were completely 
clear about what we were supposed to be doing, and so the way we worked in the early days of the 
assignment, although always purposeful, sometimes felt reactive and haphazard. We also found that 
our attempts to be helpful were often met with resistance from the department teams we were 
meant to be supporting; they seemed to see us as interfering with their autonomy, and as a symbol 
of didactic central control. 
The power dynamics I was directly involved in, at one level, were relatively simple: my consultant 
colleagues and I were contracted capacity that the director could control, and we took on 
programmes of work as he directed. At another level, our relationships were very complicated: the 
director could be quite unpredictable, treating us sometimes as his employees and sometimes as 
part of an ‘inner circle’. He was always very busy and so often delegated work to us, and we took his 
authority with us to meetings with senior stakeholders as a matter of course. This all gave us status 
and influence in the organisation that would have been difficult to get otherwise.  
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As the team expanded over time, in addition to the programmes we were running ourselves, the 
more important part of our role became informally inducting people to the rules we found ourselves 
working to, ostensibly to make their lives a bit easier. And we seemed to be able to do this in a way 
that simultaneously perpetuated the exclusivity of the inner circle quite adeptly, though we wouldn’t 
have described it in that way at the time. For example, when a new colleague joined our senior 
team, we tried to create a sense of unity with him to help us all withstand the demands of our work. 
We did this through sharing stories of good and bad experiences, what appeared to work, and so on. 
In one of our first meetings with the director, however, when our new colleague challenged how 
some of our work programmes were being run drawing on his own considerable experience, as the 
original team, we found ourselves obliged to side with our director. The atmosphere became very 
tense and after the meeting ended, rather than call out the tensions we had just experienced, we 
tried to explain them away, acting as though this was just part of how the team worked. Our new 
colleague appeared baffled by this attempt to discipline him, however gently, and after a few 
episodes like this, ended up leaving the team earlier than planned.  
This pattern recurred. About a month into the assignment, we contracted another consultancy firm 
to undertake a significant and high-profile piece of work. Our team’s and the director’s personal 
credibility was therefore tied up in this contract and I was given responsibility for managing the 
work. For various reasons, things weren’t going to plan and I found myself having both to show 
solidarity with my director in performance managing the project team, and at the same time 
sympathising with the consultants because I knew that much of what was happening was outside of 
their control. Speaking to these different attitudes, sometimes I found myself in meetings saying 
things that were deliberately open to multiple interpretations – something James Scott might 
describe as one of the ways in which the hidden transcripts (the narratives of the oppressed) can 
emerge in public (the domain of the oppressors) from the inherent tensions that arise from power 
differentials between the groups (Scott 1990). In the situation I am describing, the client–consultant 
relationship contained an analogous power differential: the public transcript was about the 
completion of a conceptually simple project that would demonstrate the value of the new 
department; the hidden transcript was more concerned with the messy politics of trying to work 
with the departments we were meant to be supporting, who in some cases seemed to be actively 
sabotaging the work. The consulting team was having to manage all of this in a way that maintained 
their own credibility, while also trying to complete the assignment with integrity. 
Scott’s analysis of the junctures where the hidden and public transcripts meet is a helpful lens 
through which I can understand what happened next. Scott suggests that these touch points can 
result in genuine transformation or annihilation of the transgressor and in the case I am describing, 
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attempts to challenge the public transcript were generally dismissed. For example, initial attempts 
by the consulting team to raise concerns were closed down with responses like ‘but that’s what 
we’re paying you to manage’, thereby disempowering them and perpetuating the view of our 
department as unhelpful. This effectively strengthened the hidden transcript and made things worse 
for us.  
Internalising these kinds of conflict, I felt increasingly mentally torn as I was pulled in different 
directions. For example, on one particularly bad day I found myself reassuring my director that a 
report he was due to present a few hours later would be sent over by the consulting team in the 
next few minutes, and at the same time having no idea whether this was true or not. As the report 
continued to fail to materialise and everyone became increasingly anxious, the only thing I could 
think to do was telephone the consulting team every few minutes demanding the report and telling 
them how bad it was making them (and me) look, knowing full well that this was pointless and that 
they were doing their best. In the end, the report wasn’t presented and I was sure that I was going 
to be dismissed from the secondment; however, surprisingly, the converse happened and the 
director seemed to want me to do even more. As these kinds of experiences went on for more than 
a month, I eventually found myself in a quite fragile emotional state from which I could see no way 
out. Having explained this as best as I could at the time to my manager, noting that I also needed to 
focus on some exams I was taking, it was eventually agreed that my involvement in the assignment 
would end. 
This is probably the clearest example I can give of how my sense of self is highly context dependent 
and linked to my emotional state in a very immediate way. Finding myself in a position I could no 
longer endure, I forced a change in the environment that I felt was causing my emotional distress by 
(in this case almost literally) escaping to academia.  
As I returned to work and new assignments, things settled down and I returned to a much more 
stable pattern of work. Despite everything going about as well as I could have hoped and being on 
course for a successful career as a consultant, over time I found myself becoming restless, feeling 
that I wasn’t able to see things through and that I wasn’t responsible for much that meant anything. 
I felt I was able to ‘do’ the kind of consulting work our firm tended to undertake, which was largely 
change management based on a combination of strategic choice theory (Child 1972) and Peter 
Senge’s formulation of learning organisation theory (e.g. Senge 1990). While there was always more 
to learn about the content of what people wanted, and about people, the consulting cycle itself as 
we ran it had become mundane and I didn’t feel that I was learning enough. Ultimately, this 
restlessness became unhelpful, manifesting as an increasing impatience with people and a growing 
sense of distance from the firm.  
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I tried to find ways to make the work more meaningful, but taking these kinds of feelings as an 
indication that it was time to move on, I found a new job working for an ex-colleague in a senior role 
in an NHS commissioning organisation. I left the consulting firm on a positive note, buoyed by my 
good reputation and a narrative about how, having spent a few years advising rather than delivering, 
I was going to find out what kind of leader and manager I could be. 
 
Changing contexts (2): engagement, conflict, distancing 
I joined the commissioning group as it entered a period of increasing pressure to progress a large-
scale service reconfiguration strategy, which had been developed some two years earlier. The 
intention of this programme was to make the local NHS sustainable, based on a business case which, 
when printed and bound, sat two feet tall and, in many respects, had taken on the characteristics of 
a religious text: it was understood to contain all the answers, and could not be questioned. I was 
personally very motivated by the responsibility I was taking on for the team of 20 people I would be 
managing, but also for the local population for whom our commissioning group had responsibility. 
As I had previously worked with this organisation as a consultant, I expected that I would be able to 
just get on with the job; that I would pick up the good relationships I had previously enjoyed; and 
that I would be able to bring my wider knowledge and insight to move things on.  
My first few months in the organisation went by quickly – there was lots to do based on my 
assessment of where the team was in terms of planning, working together, role clarity, capability, 
and so on. I quickly got my team onto my much stronger analytical footing, refreshed our 
programme management approach, facilitated some difficult meetings, and made some good 
connections across the organisation. I felt connected to the work in a way that I hadn’t as a 
consultant and was fully on board with the changes that needed to happen with the service 
transformation strategy. I was making sense of the scale of what needed to be done so that we as a 
team could deliver it and I started to highlight my findings in meetings, which were largely well 
received.  
I felt credible with the executive team, partly because I had worked closely with some of them 
previously, and I was keen to demonstrate this credibility despite suggestions from my peers that 
the tacit rules of working at our level in the organisation were to ‘keep your head down and quietly 
get on with the work’. So, perhaps feeling that my previous track record gave me some kind of 
privileged position, I readily spoke up in meetings with what I thought were useful and insightful 
contributions. To my surprise, though in hindsight entirely consistent with the advice I had been 
given, my input was met with an adverse reaction from the executive team: one executive director 
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told my manager that I was speaking out of turn; in a meeting with another executive director, I was 
admonished for presenting an analysis of why our delivery targets didn’t seem to make sense. At the 
time, I couldn’t understand why I was being stifled: I saw myself as trying to do a good job with just 
intentions and logic on my side, drawing attention to things that I and others knew to be wrong.  
These turns of events felt unpredictable at the time – however, much of what happened can be seen 
as consistent with Bion’s analysis of what happens in groups (Bion 1961). I can see how my actions 
could have been taken as a direct challenge to how the organisation’s leaders saw themselves – by 
saving my team from what I thought were incorrect targets, I was also attacking the validity of the 
transformation programme the leaders had created, which was supposed to save the NHS locally. 
Further, my colleagues and I as a group were potentially a particular instance of a wider anxiety 
within the organisation about whether or not the transformation strategy could ever be delivered, 
despite the confidence with which it was regularly presented. If the executive team couldn’t rely on 
their own staff to believe the story, what risk did this pose to the programme, and perhaps even 
themselves? In Bion’s terms, this would be consistent with how groups with a dependent basic 
assumption operate as uncertainty increases: we were threatening the ‘bible’ that the organisation 
had created as its ‘leader’, which sustained the activities of the organisation by providing jobs, work 
and so on. My team and I could be characterised as an emergent pairing basic assumption group 
presenting a hopeful vision of a more realistic future that threatened the wider dependent basic 
assumption group, and this resulted in feelings of hostility. The executive team were now 
aggressors, and so my team became a fight/flight basic assumption group at first fighting back.  
Further, over time, my team and I grew increasingly indifferent to the organisation’s leaders; and 
even as we succeeded in progressing against our targets, we celebrated these achievements without 
thought of the executive team and only slightly acknowledged any praise that they offered. This is 
also consistent with Bion’s analysis that when the fight/flight group’s aggressors do not afford the 
opportunity to fight or fly, they are ignored (Bion 1961: 152). All of this would suggest a degree of 
predictability in what felt at the time to be wholly unpredictable; it is therefore a good example of 
how reflection on my experience widens my horizons and creates a more flexible disposition – 
understanding my experience in this way means I have new ways to think about experiences I may 
have in the future as they occur.  
At the time, however, none of this was clear. Though I had been in some difficult situations at work 
before, this was different: I was invested in the organisation’s work and saw myself as being able to 
make a meaningful contribution – it was why I had joined. And yet, the validity of these motivations 
was being called into question. As I failed to make sense of what was happening and therefore what 
24 
 
to do, for the first time in my life I entered a significant period of depression, which lasted some six 
months. In retrospect, what was happening was so different from anything I had experienced before 
that it must have challenged deeply held beliefs about myself. Returning to McCoy’s analysis of the 
way in which emotions are linked to challenges to one’s personal construct system (McCoy 1977), 
for me the challenge felt fundamental and so the emotions I experienced were similarly significant. I 
was aware that my behaviour affected others too as they experienced my lack of engagement; some 
sought to help, but I was withdrawn and found I couldn’t connect with those reaching out to me.  
This pattern of interaction persisted and intensified over time and eventually I settled into a 
narrative, which I came to share with others, of injustice and our team not being valued. This lasted 
throughout the time I was with the organisation. Given that the source of any praise seems to be 
important to me, it is perhaps not surprising that my depressive episode ended with a conversation 
with one of the senior directors who had previously admonished me. I reflected to him that I’d made 
a mess of joining the organisation and had been arrogant and dismissive of what was sound advice. 
We had quite an honest discussion and he was surprisingly supportive, recounting times when he 
had made similar mistakes and suggesting that I be less headstrong. 
In Moral Mazes (2009), Jackall’s analysis of what managers are doing in bureaucracies is another 
productive lens through which to view what happened, again suggesting that my experience was 
perhaps more predictable than I realised at the time. Jackall describes how being, and being seen to 
be, a ‘team player’ is a key survival mechanism in for middle managers. For Jackall, team play is 
based on a conformist psychic asceticism, which in the absence of any other objective purpose leads 
to a pervasive mediocrity and an attention to the ‘main chance’ of self-advancement achieved 
through political manoeuvring in circles of affiliation. I can see how, through my behaviour, I was 
differentiating myself from my peer group, challenging the dominant ideology, undermining my 
seniors and deviating from my assigned role. All of this inevitably led to not fitting in; using these 
terms to describe the conversation with the senior director, I was submitting to team play in order to 
survive. While I’m still not sure that I was wrong about what I had tried to do – a remnant of the 
hope for a better future that my team had created? – I can see that the way I went about it was 
incongruent with the organisation’s implicit rules.  
Over the subsequent months, I found ways to do work that I thought was important in ways that 
were more acceptable. Though I still felt somewhat sceptical about the transformation strategy, I 
was more circumspect about expressing this and was more guarded in my interactions with the 
executive team. We achieved some great things for the population we served, but I felt unable to 
really believe in most of what I spent my time doing. The most satisfying parts of my job involved 
bringing people together to make sense of some of the more intractable problems facing our 
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communities, and using the energy generated by having more honest and open conversations to do 
what we considered important. While I was doing my best to ‘play the game’ when I was at work, I 
also started distancing myself from it by beginning to discuss quite openly that I wasn’t sure what my 
next job would be, having career conversations with ‘safe’ members of the executive team, and 
getting more involved in pieces of work outside my immediate remit. I could now characterise this as 
reconstructing my circles of affiliation, thereby diversifying the contexts with which I identified so 
that I could be more resilient; this also avoided me having to submit to the changes that I would 
have needed to make in order to fully belong.  
Over a period of three or four months, I thought hard about what it was that I had enjoyed most 
about my jobs to date. People and change management emerged as common themes. Hearing an 
eminent OD practitioner talk about her work, I felt encouraged by her focus on the practitioner as an 
instrument that could be honed, and the apparent detachment with which OD consulting could be 
undertaken. Perhaps as a reaction to my most recent experiences, I started to look for jobs in 
development in the NHS, and found my current role in a national health and care oversight body 
working on projects and programmes to do with leadership and governance. I left the 
commissioning job on a very positive note, with a great leaving party, and a narrative about how I 
was going on to focus on developing myself as an OD practitioner. I think the underlying story of 
leaving behind the organisation that had for a time such a detrimental effect on my psychological 
well-being was also obvious to others, but it was never discussed openly. 
 
Where I find myself now: distancing to engage 
My personal narrative is now one of desiring greater independence from organisations to enable me 
to do the meaningful work of which I think I may be capable. Returning to Jackall’s analysis, I could 
characterise this as a rejection of having to submit to the NHS’s dominant managerial discourse, and 
a turning away from the path of dissatisfaction that I think may come with it. Implicit to this thinking, 
however, is an assumption that that by compromising on how I do my work, I am also impeded from 
realising my potential (whatever that might be). From a more social perspective, then, this 
distancing is perhaps also a way of increasing my emotional stability through weakening the 
entanglement with everyday politics that seems inherent to senior roles in organisations, and which 
appears to have been associated with emotional instability in the past. This process of distancing is 
therefore also a process of engaging. 
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Some conclusions 
A few things have struck me from this exploration of my professional development. Drawing from 
my own observations and from the literature I have explored, my more significant insights have 
mainly come from being able to see what had felt at the time to be unpredictable turns of events 
instead as particular instances of more generalised patterns of behaviour. Some of these 
observations have already started to change how I work. For example, noticing the pattern of 
engaging and distancing: a year into my current role, I began to see myself distancing myself from 
my work, largely because of some of the power dynamics in the organisation but also because of 
doubts I had about the usefulness of the work national bodies do. Instead of this feeling of 
distancing progressing towards wanting to leave, as it has before, I have been able to think about 
what I am feeling in the context of what might be going on in the organisation and sector more 
widely. This has led to a refocussing of my attention on finding ways to make my work more 
meaningful by managing my context; in other words, paradoxically, the distancing process has 
created new ways for me to engage.  
I could give further examples of changes in my practice, but perhaps a more significant insight comes 
from noticing that I am surprised at how illuminating I have found the process of writing this DMan 
project. In its first iterations, I was writing about different perspectives on my experiences as 
something of an academic exercise. As I have mentioned, I have done this before through various 
training and development programmes, and so I am comfortable writing about my experience, 
drawing connections, and relating these to relevant literature. Further, my pragmatic perspectivist 
standpoint and background in philosophy and critical theory make it easy to take the position of 
others and to recast this or that event from different viewpoints.  
I was therefore intrigued to find myself stuck when trying to create something that made overall 
sense to me, when I was having to recast each element of my narrative at a pace that kept up with 
my latest thinking based on what I had just read, or the feedback from my learning set. With this 
constant and rapid turning of the parts and the whole, and never knowing what I might come across 
next, I found myself wondering how I could ever complete the project. At times, this felt paralysing; 
yet I was compelled to persevere. I reflected on how this problem mirrors everyday life: if our ability 
to act is based on the sense we make of our experience in the context of the histories we construct 
for ourselves (what Gadamer might call a ‘fore-conception of completeness’ [Gadamer 1975: 305]), 
but this is constantly changing with each interaction, then how can we decide what we should do 
with any certainty about what the result will be? And yet we have to act all the time; so is anyone in 
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organisations really doing anything more than making a series of best guesses and seeing what 
happens? 
In thinking through what I was feeling, I found Gadamer’s definition of ‘experience’ in Truth and 
Method helpful: ‘experience stands in an ineluctable opposition to knowledge and to the kind of 
instruction that follows from general theoretical or technical knowledge. The truth of experience 
always implies an orientation toward new experience’ (ibid: 364). I take this to mean that knowledge 
of things is less important than a flexible disposition that sees uncertainty as generative. This 
captures well what I have found happening as I have written this project, and while this isn’t 
necessarily a new thought (after all, it is practically identical to what my tutors at Oxford told me 
about the importance of learning to learn, rather than just acquiring facts), something has changed 
in these last few months that feels important.  
Despite a firm grasp of the theoretical positions I have talked about for years, I have a new sense 
that I haven’t yet really integrated these theories with the reality of my practice. This is challenging 
my expectations about myself and my history. The self-image I have been building of myself over the 
years has implicitly assumed that my experiences are cumulative and stable, with bad work 
experiences arising from some form of hubris, or in some sense my having ignored my ‘better 
judgement’. For me, taking the perspective of complex responsive processes seriously perhaps 
means coming to understand more fully how my behaviour and choices are context dependent. This 
is a powerful observation for me, and I am excited about where it may lead.  
 
Emerging areas for further research  
I am now about to start an internal culture change project in my organisation, which will mean 
working closely with the executive team and people from across the organisation using a toolkit that 
the team I work within has produced. Taking up some of the themes that have emerged from this 
project, I am intrigued to explore the experience of undertaking this work as it occurs, focussing on 
the social processes involved in the ethics of managing competing goods. One aspect of this relates 
to the work itself: the approach I will be using has been chosen because of the political currency of 
its architects; while this is hugely valuable during initiation, the approach itself has a positivist 
theoretical basis that I find problematic. I anticipate being tempted to adapt the approach quite 
significantly, which could create some interesting dynamics with my team and the wider 
organisation. I am therefore interested to see how I will go about managing the public and private 
narratives that may arise, and the ethical implications of using a tool that I have doubts about.  
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Another related aspect is much more personal: the work to improve employee engagement and 
well-being in my organisation is important to me. In the past, this kind of investment has left me at 
risk of emotional instability, so I am interested to see how I reconcile the necessary entanglement in 
the kinds of everyday politics that I have found difficult in the past, with maintaining a distance that 
protects me from emotional distress.  
The key themes I am starting my second project with the intention of exploring are therefore 
politics, ethics, and emotions in organisational life.  
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PROJECT 2:  
Reflective practice and the ethics of uncertainty 
Introduction  
In this project, I explore what is involved in the practice of OD in a large public-sector bureaucracy. 
Starting from my own experience as a manager leading an internal culture and leadership 
programme, I examine different ways of thinking about what we might be doing when we are 
working with others on these aspects of organisational change, and how these are influenced by 
organisational ideals and the environments in which we find ourselves. I notice that the search to 
explain our actions never yields a definitive simple answer; instead, closer examination complicates 
our understanding by endlessly increasing the number of interpretations available. This also makes 
trying to ‘do the right thing’ more complicated. 
This suggests a link between processes of reflecting on practice and ethics; but if we understand 
meaning as a continuous social process of interpretation and reinterpretation, then normative moral 
philosophies – i.e. those that suggest ethical dilemmas can be resolved by application to immutable 
moral standards – appear increasingly redundant. So, if there are no definitive answers, and the 
meaning of what we do changes over time, how can OD practitioners go about deciding what to do? 
And can reflective practice, as a way of gaining more perspectives on what we are doing, itself be a 
way of being more ethical? These are the central questions that I explore in this project.  
 
Organisational context 
My current job is in a government body that oversees organisations in the health and care system in 
the UK. This is at a time when this system is felt by many commentators to be in decline. The 
growing demand arising from an ageing population with complex medical and social care needs, the 
ongoing impact of financial constraint, and workforce shortages all make the business of caring for 
people increasingly difficult. Due to the highly political nature of the health and care system, there is 
also relentless pressure from politicians to continue to provide high-quality services while at the 
same time increasing productivity so that those services can function within their allocated budgets.  
My organisation is ostensibly an archetypal bureaucracy – highly organised and highly rational in the 
sense that we appear to favour the discharge of business through clear divisions of labour, and 
according to calculable rules (Weber et al 1958: 214). Perhaps due to the context that I have just 
described us operating within, there is a sense of anxiety among us – manifesting most recently in 
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our staff survey results as lack of clarity of purpose, and overly bureaucratic ways of working that 
inhibit people’s sense of freedom to act. Partly in response to these findings, and also to address the 
noticeably high staff turnover rate, the executive team agreed to embark upon a culture and 
leadership programme, for which I am the nominated lead.  
This work isn’t my day job. It came about rather by chance because I became involved in various 
pieces of staff engagement work over a period of about six months, during which time an alliance 
formed between me and the Director of OD, Jerome. An overlap in our respective remits meant that 
we often met informally, and during one of these catch-ups Jerome asked if I would be interested in 
leading on this piece of work. I was initially both grateful to Jerome for the offer, and also reluctant 
to accept it: while I am interested in gaining experience in this area, I had doubts about the 
methodology that was being proposed and also perhaps my own ability to do the job well, given my 
lack of formal experience in the field.  
 
What is the work I am doing? 
In its first phase, the work involves the administration of a set of evidence-based diagnostic tools, 
carried out by people from within the organisation. It aims to illuminate how well the organisation is 
doing against a set of idealised leadership behaviours, which are themselves underpinned by the 
principles of distributed leadership. This is meant to inform, later, the development of a leadership 
strategy that will help to secure the organisation’s future success by guiding succession planning and 
leadership development activities. Or so the marketing goes. These tools have been developed by 
people with whom I work, primarily for the organisations within our oversight purview, and part of 
the reason for using the approach internally is to role-model the good practice we are 
recommending to others – for if we aren’t willing to use it, why should others be?  
The approach is based on a number of assumptions. One of these is a largely positivist epistemology 
that is evident, for example, in the assumption that a diagnostic which takes many months to 
complete can tell you enough about a stable reality to allow it to be changed in a planned way 
through a strategy. Such interventions inevitably change what people are talking about in the 
organisation and thereby influence the organisation as they are carried out, so there is also a social 
constructionist assumption involved. While acknowledged, this aspect is generally played down in 
favour of appealing to the business case which, in keeping with many approaches to OD, assumes a 
mechanistic and linear causal relationship between the use of these tools and improved 
organisational performance – indeed, this is the stated purpose of the whole initiative. The implicit 
principles of distributed leadership are humanistic ideals – emphasising the need for compassion 
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and empowerment, on the basis that people work more effectively if they are allowed to flourish. 
Such notions are evidence-based insofar as they refer to social sciences research that shows 
statistically significant links between employee engagement and outcomes in healthcare.  
The thinking about how to undertake this work has therefore largely already been done. The role 
Jerome had offered me was to coordinate the process, coach the internal change team running the 
diagnostics, and ensure that our senior leadership team were kept informed and involved in the 
work as it progressed. I spent a few days considering whether to agree to do the work, finding it 
difficult to reconcile some conflicting thoughts about what might happen if I took it on. On the one 
hand, I knew I was interested in exploring a career in OD, so this offered a chance to gain potentially 
valuable experience and credibility. Further, regardless of my actual position in the hierarchy I have 
often found myself enjoying working with the most senior leaders in my workplaces, and I welcomed 
the opportunity to get to know my organisation’s senior team. Last but not least, the broader 
motivation of working to improve staff engagement was closely aligned with my own values of doing 
something socially useful in the workplace.  
On the other hand, I had problems with the basis of the work as I have described it above: I find the 
purported causal link between compassion and empowerment leading to more effective 
organisations difficult to accept, as well as the use of diagnostic tools themselves. This is because of 
the implied positivist theory of change, which, as I describe in my Project 1, is a theoretical position I 
have long doubted. As I would be having to promote the use of such tools to my colleagues, I 
wondered if I would be compromising myself ethically by agreeing to take an approach I wasn’t sure 
about. I was also worried about the timing of the work: our organisation has recently undergone a 
merger and so the senior leadership team are still getting to know each other, and many of the 
negative aspects of the staff survey feedback were assumed to be related to the merger process. I 
wondered if another six months might offer a better starting-point, but was also aware of a need 
being expressed by some of the team who had developed the tools to start the work internally; this 
was so that we could strengthen the narrative about role-modelling as part of marketing the tools to 
their primary users – the organisations we oversee. I was therefore also unsure about the relative 
importance of the potential impact of this work in our organisation, versus it being a means to 
promoting the resources externally.  
Eventually, I decided to accept Jerome’s offer on the basis that I would somehow find my own way 
of doing it. At the time, I wasn’t sure what that would mean in practice; but I felt reasonably 
confident that establishing the support of key members of the senior leadership team, and a few 
others on whom I could rely for advice and help if and when I needed it, would mitigate my lack of 
experience. Jerome agreed to this, and buoyed by his confidence in me, I set about trying to mobilise 
the work.  
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I spent time meeting with senior leaders individually across the organisation to confirm their 
commitment to the work, and to check that they were happy for their staff to be involved. I 
considered this important because although the project’s aims were uncontroversial, I anticipated 
difficulties securing the necessary time and commitment from people when we already 
acknowledged ourselves as under-resourced. Fortunately, using this approach to tackle the 
problems highlighted by our staff survey was regarded by many as an obvious next step; these 
meetings generally went well. They all followed a similar pattern: each time, I would talk a little 
about the background to the project, in particular drawing attention to how we would be role-
modelling the good practice we were recommending to others; then I talked through a short 
document I had prepared, which included a rough but professional-looking project plan that covered 
the main activities we would be undertaking, identified key milestones, and highlighted the most 
important risks, which I had set out in a traditional risk register format. In particular, I made sure to 
flag ‘leadership buy-in’ as one of these risks, as I wanted to address head-on the likely problem of 
people realising later that they didn’t have enough time to participate. In this vein, I also highlighted 
that the chief executive and the people I had met so far had been supportive of the proposals. At the 
time, I thought that all of this would pre-empt questions that could arise given the bureaucratic and 
hierarchical nature of our organisation. 
Next, I usually put the document to one side, perhaps signalling that we were about to have a more 
honest conversation, and invited the director to tell me what they thought was going on for their 
teams, and in the organisation more widely. This tended to elicit many of the same comments that 
had been fed back in the staff survey; I noticed that – consistent with how we usually dealt with 
problems – people would talk about what the process that I was proposing needed to do, or what 
other people needed to do. Hardly anyone talked directly about their own roles in addressing some 
of the issues that had arisen in the staff survey and, as my agenda in these meetings was largely to 
secure each director’s support when it came to formally signing off the programme initiation, I didn’t 
feel the need to pursue these issues either – not least because the meetings tended to be very short. 
I was also interested in getting to know the senior team individually so that if, for example, problems 
arose, then we would have enough of a relationship to allow me to contact them directly about 
resolving them, without having to worry about the communication channels that are usually 
prescribed by the hierarchy.  
And things went largely to plan: almost everyone said that the work was important as they leafed 
through the document, that they were happy for their staff to be involved, and that they would like 
to contribute themselves too, if time allowed. The only meeting that did not go according to plan 
was with one of the directors of finance, Angela. I began the meeting with my rehearsed ‘pitch’ for 
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the project but instead of the usual acknowledgement of the problems we were trying to tackle, she 
quite aggressively questioned the proposals I was making. The tension between us rose and I 
increasingly found myself not knowing what to do. We ended up sitting together in a silent impasse 
for a few moments, until she finally asked me how much money the work would cost; when I replied 
that it was nothing more than the time of some internal staff members, the atmosphere completely 
changed and the meeting reverted to the course the others had taken.  
Ultimately, the paper I took to the senior leadership committee to formally initiate the work was 
accepted with little discussion, which was unusual as the team is known for extensive deliberation. 
 
Emerging ethical conundrums 
Initially, I attributed these ostensible successes and the readiness of the senior leaders to accept the 
proposals to my good planning and careful lobbying; but now, some months into the work, I find the 
initial questions I had resurfacing unexpectedly and in different ways. I notice that I am increasingly 
concerned by the ease with which people agreed to initiate the work. Even in the difficult meeting I 
described with the director of finance, the source of conflict appears to have been nothing more 
serious than a concern about money. Rather than feeling buoyed by this support as one might 
expect, I am finding it increasingly problematic; much of this unease has been catalysed by my 
research, particularly through discussions with my supervisor and learning set, and the DMan 
community more widely.  
I find myself wondering whether the culture change programme as I presented it has provided an 
easy answer to the difficult problems flagged up by the staff survey and in some sense encouraged 
an abrogation of personal responsibility for contributing to the patterns of interaction that have 
been occurring within directorates and across the organisation as a whole – this is the very opposite 
of what I had intended. I wonder further what investment the organisation’s senior leaders have in 
improving employee engagement – I suspect that in many parts, this may not be a high priority, and 
I base this upon the observation that responding to local staff survey issues seems in most 
directorates to be delegated to other members of staff to deal with, as the senior leaders 
themselves focus on more important external-facing matters. I feel that if the senior leaders were 
really interested, they would take more responsibility themselves; but I am also aware that I am 
perhaps underestimating the amount of pressure they themselves are under in their jobs. As a 
result, when I am interacting with the senior team, I find myself wanting to find out more about this. 
I sometimes try to provoke them into thinking about how they are participating in the organisation – 
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and this is easier with some than others, largely depending on the strength of my relationship with 
the particular individual.  
Further, as Jerome and I talk about the development activities that are being undertaken more 
broadly among the organisation’s leadership community, I find I am able to influence the design and 
content of events so that they more overtly address the issues about personal responsibility that are 
concerning me. I also find myself being increasingly vocal about my ethical concerns, especially in 
relation to the narrative about engagement being primarily intended to improve performance. I 
often find myself talking about how, while there is a sense in which of course employees are paid to 
do a job and by working on engagement we can hope for increased discretionary effort, there is also 
a case for treating people well as an end in itself, rather than just a mechanism for enhancing 
performance. While recognised by some, my insistence on this aspect of moral responsibility does 
not resonate with everyone: I am trying to be more aware that I can come sometimes across as 
sanctimonious.  
I now find myself at a point where I am not sure I have complete faith in the work I am leading on, 
but instead see it as an opportunity to interact with people across the organisation, and to influence 
other development activities that are going on. The way I am seeing my organisation is changing 
rapidly as I work on this project and the sense of things being unpredictable is itself becoming a 
theme that is structuring my experience of work. 
Looking back over the account I have just given, I have alluded to what I think I have been doing, but 
am curious to test the interpretations I have made by exploring other perspectives on my actions 
that have arisen through my research. The first aspect I will consider is my discomfort with the 
approach to working on culture that I have agreed to use. One could argue that creating and 
executing plans is a common way we think we can realise the changes we want make; in practice, 
however, there is widespread scepticism about this, even if it is only hinted at. So, what might we 
actually be doing when we are making strategic plans, including those to do with culture? 
 
Organisational development as the emperor’s new clothes  
Culture and OD are gaining increasing prominence in the UK health and care sector. Despite a long 
history of reliance on the structures of power and control that have tended to dominate managerial 
discourse, in the last five years, new national agencies have become involved in promoting ideas 
that have been prevalent in industry since the 1950s and 1960s (Cheung-Judge and Holbeche 2015). 
These are ways of understanding the people-aspects of what may be going on in public-sector 
organisations as a means to tackling some of the long-standing issues public services face. This may 
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simply be the public sector ‘catching up’ with industry, but I find it interesting that the emerging 
prominence of OD in the health and care sectors has coincided with increasing financial constraints 
within which these sectors have had to operate under the UK government’s successive austerity 
budgets since 2010. By many accounts, the impact of this restraint is having a negative effect on 
services (e.g. Guardian 2017); however, it seems unlikely that things will change in the near future.  
Given the widespread managerialism that has pervaded at least the health sector since the Griffiths 
Report which recommended general management to the NHS in 1983 (Department of Health and 
Social Security 1983), the approaches that I have experienced organisations taking to tackling the 
problems they face suggest a widespread regard for a mechanical or linear conception of how 
organisations work in all respects. This means that to change something, we need to decide what 
the future should look like, diagnose the current position in relation to that future state, and devise 
a set of actions to take us from one to the other. The tools and approach that my colleagues have 
developed to work on culture appear to be based upon the same assumptions.  
The prevalence of this kind of thinking can be seen in the way that central government agencies 
overseeing health and care endlessly mandate the production of various five-year strategies, plans 
on a page, annual or two-year operating plans, annual contracting rounds, and so on, all of which 
aim to set out very clearly the activities an organisation is going to engage in that will lead to better 
quality and more sustainable services. When things do not go to plan (which appears increasingly 
often to be the case), this is attributed to, for example, these sectors being subject to the whims of 
national and local politicians changing policy from month to month; or underskilled managers who 
may lose their jobs as a result; or the current model of health and care being out of date and 
therefore destined to fail; or, very recently, an absence of adequate long-term planning (e.g. 
Parliament, House of Lords 2017). Rather than exploring the value of the planning exercises 
themselves, additional swathes of exception reporting and recovery planning are initiated, as though 
somehow these plans will fare better than those produced perhaps only months before.  
The futility of these exercises does not go unnoticed: among those employed to undertake these 
planning activities, it is not uncommon to hear discontent and frustration voiced at the apparent lack 
of improvement, or the feeling expressed that their salaries could be better spent be employing care 
professionals. And yet these activities persist; and the same approaches are now being used to work 
on culture. To me, these views all point to the inadequacy of strategic choice theory to explain how 
change of any kind happens. Management science has for decades suggested that a small group of 
people at the top of a hierarchy can decide the right thing to do and then ‘cascade’ this to the rest of 
the organisation, whose members will then execute the plans as intended (Child 1972). Potential 
sources of failure may be documented in risk registers against which further mitigating plans can 
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made, though in my experience these are rarely kept up to date. If the approach fails, then blame of 
one sort or another is attributed to incompetent planners, or to a lack of information, a changing 
environment, or ineffective implementers; the utility of planning itself, however, is rarely called into 
question. 
What I see happening in my organisation now is that the traditional ways of trying to improve 
services or productivity – such as through savings plans and operational grip – are being 
supplemented with interventions addressing the people-aspects of change. While I agree that this is 
probably worth attending to, what is striking about the way that this is being approached is that it is 
based on the same theory of change that underpins the very ways of working that are being 
criticised as having been ineffective in the past. In other words, the problem is seen to be the 
content of what is being planned for rather than the process of planning itself. This theory of change 
is all-pervasive: in the account I have given of my work, the tools are to be run as a project; these 
lead to the development of a leadership strategy to be implemented; I meet with the senior leaders 
so that they can jointly decide to do the work; in the meetings themselves, I use the tools and 
language of projects. We do all of this almost by rote – as though there is no need to question the 
ritualistic behaviour we engage in, because that’s just how things are done.  
It is difficult to know what might happen if we rejected these approaches, and in many ways, as a 
government body expected to be accountable and to hold others to account in a fair manner, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that we find ourselves working in bureaucratic ways that are ostensibly 
rational, at least in the sense of being procedurally reliant on calculative judgement (Townley 2008). 
One explanation for this is that we are simply stuck in habits; however, it is not clear why we seem 
so reluctant to openly question them, especially if we have observed that such approaches often do 
not have the impact we expected. Perhaps, then, these habits are serving functions beyond their 
overt purpose; it is interesting to consider what these functions might be. 
 
Rituals as examples of power relating 
The anthropologist Stephen Lukes defines ritual as ‘rule-governed activity of a symbolic character 
which draws the attention of its participants to objects of thought and feelings which they hold to be 
of special significance’ (Lukes 1977: 54). He suggests that the purpose of rituals in political life is 
essentially to emphasise and reinforce the importance of some things over others; in his view, the 
Durkheimian position – that rituals are primarily about promoting social solidarity – does not 
account for how rituals can also promote social fragmentation or enable a proliferation of competing 
values. Taken in this broader sense, rituals are therefore instruments of social control, and so 
ultimately about power relating. Lukes therefore suggests that we can understand more about how 
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societies in which rituals take place function by considering, for example, which social groups have 
prescribed the performance of the ritual; which social groups define the referents of these 
performances; who holds those referents to be significant, and in what ways; and in whose interests 
acceptance of these ways of seeing operate (ibid: 68–69).  
The idea that these activities are symbolic in this context – by which Lukes means that they appear 
to be disproportionate to their intended ends – suggests a potential link with the planning activities I 
am describing, including my work on culture. It is unclear what the referents of strategic planning 
activities are, beyond the promotion of managerialism itself. The people whose interests are best 
served by the performance of these rituals are arguably the very people who mandate them, and 
perhaps those who then do the work that is mandated. Compliance with this or that deadline or 
adherence to technical or political guidance serves no overt purpose in the delivery of care, and yet 
is somehow taken as the thing which is important, regardless of what difference this may or may not 
make to the people who use services. 
It could therefore be argued further that the reason these activities persist is that they keep people 
in work; and in organisations which are not subject to any form of market competition (my 
organisation is constituted by statute), these jobs are both comparatively secure and well paid. So, 
despite the scepticism that is sometimes informally expressed, to reject these activities would be to 
advocate for one’s own obsolescence – or, proverbially, for ‘turkeys to vote for Christmas’. This 
would make the perpetuation of these activities a matter of individual and collective corporate 
survival, and probably a largely rational activity insofar as people are able to choose whether to 
continue with their work or not. On that basis, the initial round of meetings I had with my 
organisation’s senior leaders could be seen a way for us all to collude in acts of self-preservation, 
and the lack of resistance to the proposals I made could be evidence of this. 
This is not an uncommon view of bureaucracies in general. For example, as part of a wider critique of 
modernity, sociologist Zygmunt Bauman identifies two organising activities that occur particularly in 
bureaucratic organisations: first, the meticulous and functional divisions of labour, and second, 
substitution of technical for moral responsibility (Bauman 1989: 98–99). These processes combine to 
create the conditions where, through functional separation, the activities undertaken by individuals 
become decoupled from the final outputs or outcomes of the organisational endeavour and morality 
‘boils down to the commandment to be a good, efficient and diligent expert and worker’ (ibid: 102). 
Bauman argues that this leads to a gradual dehumanisation of the real objects of bureaucratic 
operations, which over time are replaced with quantifiable measures. And as only humans can be 
the objects of moral considerations (Bauman suggests our ethical concerns about the treatment of 
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animals is anthropomorphism), by dehumanising people, one can treat them with ethical 
indifference, which in this case is to say their personal values or interests can be legitimately ignored 
on the basis of rules. Bauman illustrates the potential seriousness of this indifference by highlighting, 
for example, how easily the producers of war materiel can regard themselves as free from moral 
responsibility for the destruction of people that they indirectly enable.  
To my mind, Bauman’s analysis of what happens to the ‘objects of bureaucratic operations’, as I 
have just described, could be naturally extended to the treatment of people within the bureaucracy 
itself – they too are treated as units of labour rather than actual people, and the same lack of 
attention to personal circumstances can be justified. Thinking about Lukes’ concept of rituals 
privileging particular social phenomena over others, it is perhaps ironic that the perpetuation of 
ways of working that idealise efficiency based on the ‘elimination from official business of love, 
hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation’ (Weber 
et al 1958: 216) might end up promoting those same interests in a different way: in my organisation, 
one can imagine how, regardless of employees’ abilities to technically fulfil their roles, it was 
perhaps the feelings of lack of fulfilment, or the threat of new teams coming and taking over, that 
may have been factors in the decision to leave that many people took following the merger.  
A criticism of Bauman’s perspective is that it presents the logical extreme of one aspect of how 
bureaucracies work, and focusses only on the negative consequences. There are other perspectives 
that are perhaps more in line with the complex reality of our experience of working in these 
organisations. For example, the line of argument so far could lead us to the conclusion that people’s 
motivations are rather binary: either people are mercenary and primarily motivated by self-
preservation and therefore prepared to accept the bureaucratic ways of working; or they are socially 
motivated or altruistic, in which case they leave to find a more tolerable environment. However, this 
does not match my experience of most of the people I have worked with for many years: while there 
are always some people whose primary focus does seem to be their own advancement, the vast 
majority of people I come across in my work do appear be socially motivated, and intent on making 
some kind of worthwhile difference despite the constraints of their organisational environments.  
Particularly in my current organisation, I have noticed these concerns and the resultant ethical 
questions being very much alive, and it has been argued that these kinds of conflicts are inherent to 
the roles of public office. For example, the fastidious adherence to rules that sometimes appear to 
disadvantage individuals because of their particular circumstances, also limits the potential for 
corruption (Du Gay 2000; Townley 2008); the exercise of discretion because of the absence of a rule 
to account for every particular circumstance means that part of governing is about making local 
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judgements (Stivers 2008). These kinds of arguments suggest that a more nuanced and contextual 
view of ethics is needed than offered by traditional normative approaches, the archetype of which is 
the Kantian thesis that what is ethical to do can be determined by the analysis of a particular action 
against the categorical imperative (‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law’ [Kant and Paton 1948]).  
My sense is that our actions are rarely so clear that they can be easily treated in this way and in 
thinking about my own work, there are numerous examples of this ambiguity. For example, on the 
one hand, the culture work could be regarded as an attempt to help my colleagues to feel happier 
and more fulfilled at work; on the other, it may be seen as simply another way to perpetuate existing 
power dynamics serving the promoters of managerialism. From another perspective, on the one 
hand, I was utilising methods that are appropriate for engaging with busy executives, which would 
make it easier for them to take a view on the proposals I was making: I arranged short meetings, 
used managerial tools and techniques, demonstrated that I had the support of my chief executive, 
and talked about the need to role-model – all of which are reasonable things to do; on the other, I 
was colluding in the practices which are themselves part of the bureaucracy that has been identified 
as problematic in our organisation, and perhaps even coercing the people I was meeting, for 
example, by invoking the authority of the chief executive and citing the support of others, in order to 
get what I wanted.  
This plurality of interpretations about what I was doing makes recourse to anything like the 
categorical imperative impossible in practice except in the simplest of cases; and yet, through this 
exploration, I am struck by a sense of regret about having taken this approach but am not sure how 
to account for it. I am also left wondering why, as mentioned earlier, I met with so little resistance to 
the proposals, when the people I was meeting are all very senior and experienced leaders who will 
have encountered numerous projects of this kind before. Even the one meeting that did not go to 
plan in the end turned out to have been complicated only by a rather straightforward 
misunderstanding about money. Perhaps they saw it as insignificant in the scheme of their other 
work, or were sceptical about whether it would come to anything – no doubt they have seen many 
projects start in earnest, only to quietly disappear. Or perhaps my tactics of persuasion really were 
more coercive than I thought at the time. But I do not find these explanations wholly satisfying; in 
particular, while there may have been elements of collusion and perhaps even coercion, these senior 
leaders are very experienced people who I would have expected to be much readier to push back if 
they felt they were being told what to do, or if they didn’t agree with what was being proposed.  
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A new line of inquiry opens up by considering a different aspect of what we might have been doing 
together. For example, my approach could be seen as the way I found to cope with my own lack of 
confidence or experience in doing this kind of work – I focussed my energy on the things I felt I did 
know about, which were to explain the rationale for and sequencing of the work and the evidence 
behind it using familiar approaches. Further, many of the conversations I had with the senior team 
were about things that weren’t to do with them as individuals, but instead about other people or 
systems and processes – perhaps these displacements of responsibility were ways we found to cope 
together with not knowing how to fix the problem we found ourselves working on. These 
observations could suggest that we were finding ways to cope with anxiety, which leads us to 
explore the unconscious motivation that might have been in play. Staying with the idea of ritualised 
activities, psychoanalytical theory offers a way to explore this further.  
 
Rituals as defences against anxiety 
There are a number of psychoanalytical schools of thought, but they have in common the premise 
that the individual is primary and that individuals act on mental representations that make up an 
internal world (Stacey and Mowles 2016). A defence in Freud’s psychoanalytical theory is ‘a general 
designation for all the techniques which the ego makes use of in conflicts which may lead to 
neurosis’ (Freud 1926: 153) and arises from anxiety. Isabel Menzies Lyth, a psychoanalyst in the 
Freudian/Kleinian tradition, extended this concept to include how unconscious processes can lead 
groups to collude consciously in creating mechanisms that help individuals to ‘avoid the experience 
of anxiety, guilt, doubt and uncertainty … [through] eliminating situations, events, tasks, activities 
and relationships that cause anxiety’. She argues that such mechanisms help people to avoid the 
‘personal disruption and social chaos’ that may result from acknowledging and dealing with their 
anxiety (Menzies Lyth 1988: 63).  
Menzies Lyth’s seminal study of the work of student nurses (Menzies 1960) illustrates these points 
clearly. There, she argued that the structures and cultures resulting from the unconscious processes 
of managing anxiety enabled these nurses to cope with the stress that arose from the strong and 
conflicting feelings involved in the care of sick patients. This essentially involved splitting up contact 
with patients into a series of depersonalised and ritualised tasks which meant that no single nurse 
had to confront the stressful totality of a particular patient’s care, and consequently an ‘elimination 
of individual distinctiveness in both nurse and patient’ (ibid: 444). This sometimes meant that 
patients were treated in an uncaring way and this was observed, for example, in the waking of all 
patients for ritualised medication rounds when it would be in a particular patient’s greater interests 
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to sleep – this uncaring practice being a defence against the anxiety that a more holistic approach to 
caring might evoke. Importantly, the performance of the ritual itself replaced the actual care of 
patients as the primary purpose of nursing, and it is this for which responsibility was taken rather 
than any individual patient’s recovery.  
One can see how in my organisational context, when managers are faced with the anxiety that arises 
from feelings of powerlessness, futility and unreasonable expectations of being able to ‘fix the 
problem’ of a system in decline, we might fragment the worthwhile activity of providing holistic care 
to people (which involves a degree of local planning) into isolated tasks, recombine these 
functionally as impersonal rituals, and then see the successful completion of these rituals as 
valuable, regardless of their ultimate outcome. It could be argued further that many of the activities 
undertaken by the people I work with are forms of social defence, and that these are ways of sharing 
out (or avoiding having to take) responsibility for the particular outcomes of poor performance in 
the sector, the consequences of which are ultimately experienced by people who require care.  
This perspective offers a compelling way of understanding what might have been happening in the 
meetings I was having with my organisation’s senior leaders. The managerial artefacts I employed 
could have been more than just a strategy to help me cope with my own anxiety. In following our 
organisation’s rituals, it is at least plausible that together we were constructing the culture work as a 
social defence unconsciously motivated by avoiding the shared anxiety generated by the actual 
experience of trying to lead teams in the environment we find ourselves in. Especially when 
feedback from the staff survey clearly identified hierarchy as a source of frustration – something 
which is perhaps in the immediate control of the people I was meeting – it was simply easier to 
assign the task of tackling these (often quite personal) criticisms to the process I was proposing. We 
could therefore recast these events as acts of mutual collusion in which the senior team and I helped 
each other to avoid having a stake in the outcomes of the work – if things didn’t improve, then all of 
us could avoid responsibility by blaming the process rather than our own choices and actions.  
Once again, I am struck by a sense of regret and perhaps even embarrassment arising from 
reinterpreting the way in which I approached the work. Again, however, these insights have only 
arisen through the process of inquiry I am undertaking in this project. I find I am slowly expanding 
the field of things that I know about and am bringing these new ideas into my practice. This is 
leading me to think differently about what I have said and done, and to act differently as a result.  
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In search of the static and stable; meaning on the move 
I am also struck by the sense that this process of finding new insights could well continue ad 
infinitum as I explore further alternative perspectives on what I have been doing. One 
characterisation of this process of inquiry is that it is the linear search for a conclusive explanation of 
what has happened, motivated by the desire to arrive at a definitive answer that finally settles the 
matter. This kind of thinking betrays an assumption about the availability of such fixed or stable 
realities, which can also be seen in both the anthropological and psychoanalytical perspectives I have 
presented so far, and no doubt many others.  
A very different way of thinking becomes available if we consider sociologist Norbert Elias’s 
observation that, in our speech and thought, there is a tendency to reduce dynamic processes to 
static conditions. In What is Sociology?, Elias uses the phrase ‘the wind is blowing’ to demonstrate 
this process-reduction: 
We say ‘the wind is blowing’, as if the wind were actually a thing at rest which, at a given point 
in time, begins to move and blow. We speak as if the wind were separate from its blowing, as 
if a wind could exist which did not blow. (Elias 1978: 112) 
Elias suggests that this tendency perpetuates the seeing of the changeless aspects of things as ‘most 
real and significant’ and that ‘anything which changes must be ephemeral, less important, less 
significant and in short less valuable’ (ibid: 112–114). So, for example, we tend to favour solutions to 
problems that provide universal or timeless rules over those which suggest more changeable or 
processual understandings of the matter at hand. And in the analyses provided above, there are a 
number of examples of this tendency: when we speak of ‘objects of thought and feelings’ in Lukes’ 
definition of ritual, the implication appears to be that these are static and can be referred to by 
symbolic activities. But if these objects of thought (as generalisations) evolve dynamically over time, 
being formed by and in turn forming the particular instances in which they are thought about, to 
what extent could rituals refer to them in any consistent or meaningful way?  
We can also think about what we mean when we talk about the ‘real work’ of caring for sick patients 
in Menzies Lyth’s example, or the ‘real problems’ in the health and care sector that I am suggesting 
people in my organisation might attend to instead of some of the more apparently futile exercises in 
which we engage. These examples, and the work of seeking a definitive answer in general, could be 
taken as attempts to find the static and stable in what is ultimately dynamic and unpredictable: no 
two patients are exactly the same and nor is the composition of groups of patients, which change all 
of the time in a hospital setting; the same could be said of the organisational and political players in 
the health and care sector, and we could go on to apply the same thinking to the terms ‘ritual’ and 
‘social defences’ themselves.  
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Now, it could be suggested that this line of thinking leads us quickly to the conclusion that if 
everything is continually changing, then it is impossible to identify the meaning in any of our work – 
and this may lead us to seeing our work as absurd. However, this kind of thinking is also based on 
process-reduction, which attempts to fix meaning itself as static and stable rather than seeing it as 
an ongoing temporal process. Sociologist, psychologist and philosopher George Herbert Mead 
argues for the latter in Mind, Self and Society (1934) in the context of thinking about human 
communication as an ongoing, social process involving gestures and responses.  
For Mead, communication involves constant and instinctive adjustment to the attitudes of the 
others involved in communicative acts, with meaning dynamically arising from this interplay. This is 
the same process of mutual adjustment as that, for example, in which we might imagine animals 
engage (Mead gives the example of a dog fight). The fundamental difference for humans, however, 
is that we are able to call out in ourselves the response that we call out in others because we can 
hear and understand ourselves, and further that we come to expect responses to our gestures based 
on our past experiences (Mead 1934). Meaning is then a triadic relationship between the stimulus or 
gesture, the response that we call out in ourselves as we gesture to others (i.e. the expected 
completion of the communicative act or idea), and the response that is actually called out in the 
other with whom one is interacting (ibid: 79). This is a dialectical process in that both the 
gesture/idea and the response (as another gesture/idea) are continuously transformed by each 
other, informing evolving interpretations of what has just happened and new expectations of what 
might happen next (ibid: 179); in other words, we are finding out what we are going to say and do as 
we are saying and doing it.  
This is very different from the more traditional cybernetic sender–receiver model of communication 
(e.g. Shannon et al 1949), which Stacey and Mowles (2016) characterise as iterative attempts to 
reduce the gap between what one intends to convey and how it is received. In this model, people 
transmit and receive fixed and stable thoughts to and from one another, encoding and decoding 
these using language, which would make meaning-making a largely individual activity. For Mead, as 
described above, meaning arises through interaction and therefore cannot be a purely individual 
activity, nor can it be known in advance or indeed fixed forever in the past.  
Meaning can, however, be anticipated, and this is what Mead describes as thinking: the ability to 
imagine possible sequences of responses that may occur through private role-play (Mead 1934: 
141). Mead argues further that humans are able to choose between alternative courses of action 
because we are able to delay our responses and through the process of reasoning, select the chain 
of responses that suggest the most adequate and harmonious end to the communicative act (ibid: 
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98–99, 118). In respect of the past, Mead describes one of the features of history (itself a meaning-
making process) as being that it describes how social reconstruction has occurred in ways that were 
not obvious to the people involved at the time – a process made possible only by temporal distance 
(ibid: 297). We could add to this that the ways in which these reconstructions occur are likely to be 
ideological: as many philosophers have suggested, the construction of narratives is subjective and 
based on power relating (e.g. White 1975; Jameson 1981; Foucault 1972). 
On that basis, strategic planning in general, including the way I started out on the culture work, can 
now be thought of very differently from the acts of designing realisable futures that they are often 
regarded as being, based on a strategic choice theory of change. While these activities may be rituals 
that perpetuate power dynamics, or ways to quieten anxieties, we can also see them as ongoing 
processes of recasting and anticipating meaning together – therefore of thinking and reasoning, in 
Mead’s terms. To be clear, the corollary of this observation is not some kind of total end to planning; 
rather, I am suggesting that it is worth considering how we become more sensitive to the dynamic 
plurality of purposes that these activities can serve because this may lead us to reconsider, for 
example, what we are doing when we hold people to account for delivering (or not delivering) upon 
agreed plans, or when we decide who should be involved in creating these plans in the first place. 
Mead’s perspective on dialectical ongoing processes of meaning-making leads us to a position where 
strategic plans are anticipatory interpretive processes, which perhaps should at best be held lightly 
with the expectation that things are unlikely to play out as anticipated.  
 
Emerging implications for the practice of OD 
This approach to looking again for the processual qualities of concepts that tend to be reified 
provides another way of critiquing the conception of organisational culture in its various positivist 
formulations (‘the way we do things around here’, for example, being the one used in the toolkit I 
am using in my work). In Elias’s terms, these could be considered to be process-reductions, which 
mask the inherently fluid nature of the interactions they try to describe. A more processual 
conception of culture would undermine the availability of something to be discovered – and this is 
the reasoning that, for example, social anthropologist Clifford Geertz uses to argue that cultural 
analysis is ‘not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of 
meaning’ (Geertz 1993: 5). What this means for practitioners working on OD is that the task at hand 
may be far less about uncovering underlying truths about an organisation that can then be changed 
through a series of interventions; instead, perhaps what we need to pay attention to and work with 
is the way that people interpret and make sense of what is happening – something that is inherently 
dynamic.  
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This line of thought to some extent underlies Dialogic OD, which has recently risen to prominence 
among the international OD community (e.g. Bushe and Marshak 2013, 2015; Cheung-Judge and 
Holbeche 2015). Dialogic OD takes a primarily discursive social constructionist approach to thinking 
about what happens in organisations, and its theorists suggest that transformational change occurs 
with a change in the conversations that people have about the challenges they care about. The skill 
of the OD practitioner is then to construct questions for the right mix of people in an organisation to 
consider together through dialogue, which enables them to engage with their work in a different 
way and the organisation to move to a more evolved state in a planned way (Cheung-Judge and 
Holbeche 2016: 43–44). While this does depart from previous approaches to OD that assume a more 
positivist standpoint, there remains an underlying assumption that engaging in this way will lead to a 
helpful change and therefore an implicit sense that cause and effect are linearly related. Taking the 
emergent quality of meaning that we have just discussed seriously means that we can make no such 
claim (Stacey 2015) – we can only find out what kind of change is taking place when people interact 
about a particular problem in its context as it happens; and this may be helpful or unhelpful, or 
indeed both, to different people or at different times.  
I do not intend to explore dialogic OD further here – the comments above are included to 
acknowledge that thinking about interaction as a basis for change in organisations is not new; 
however, what may be interesting in this is the argument that as practitioners engaged in 
developing organisations, we have to pay much more attention to what is happening in the moment 
and the contingency of the outcomes we anticipate. For me, it is not enough simply to ‘be present’ – 
this would feel too much like a denial of how we have come to find ourselves where we are and the 
prejudices we come with, as well as an abrogation of responsibility for the impact we inevitably do 
have. I suggest instead that we need to be more aware of how we are making sense in the moment, 
with our prejudgments or assumptions in plain sight, as this gives us the greatest scope for 
negotiating with each other. In the account I give of my work, I describe how this increasingly 
appears to be the way that I find myself thinking and talking about my work and, further, how I have 
noticed several times in the narrative so far that the way I am making sense of what is happening at 
work is changing as I iterate this project.  
This brings a thread running through my project into sharper focus: I find that, through this project, 
the exploration of each new perspective on what I have been doing in my organisation illuminates 
something about my work that I hadn’t noticed before; this in turn changes what I find myself saying 
and doing at work. Importantly, these new interpretations of my previous experience have a moral 
component: I have twice experienced feelings of regret at thinking that I have colluded in an activity 
I find ethically problematic, but noted both times that these insights have become available only 
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through the exploration I am undertaking as part of my research – I could not have known them at 
the time. I have a sense this could continue indefinitely as I find further interpretations of my 
experience, and I can imagine that this characterises the experience of many practitioners who 
engage in research about their practice or professional development.  
I noted earlier that one of the shortcomings of normative ethical perspectives is that our actions are 
too complex to compare against moral standards, except perhaps in the simplest cases. A further, 
more fundamental complication arises from the notion of meaning itself not being fixed: the very 
principles (as kinds of meaning) we would wish to test against are not static. How can I then account 
for the feelings of regret that have come about because of my reflections on my practice? I will now 
explore this in more detail.  
 
Reflective practice as a social process 
The exploration of what we are doing when we are reflecting has been undertaken by numerous 
theorists; Pollard (2008) emphasises how the philosopher and educationalist John Dewey is regarded 
as a foundational thinker in this field. Dewey (e.g. 1933) describes reflection as a process by which 
humans deal with being confronted with a difficulty in experience that gives rise to perplexity. We 
tend to formulate a ‘way out’ based on past experience or prior knowledge, which Dewey describes 
as uncritical thinking if we automatically accept the most ‘obvious’ solution. This is by no means to 
disparage this kind of habitual thinking; indeed, it would be difficult to cope with everyday life if we 
were to consider every action from all imaginable perspectives (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015). 
Reflection, then, is what happens when we engage with the perplexity, considering matters further, 
seeking new evidence and evaluating the validity of the suggested course of action. In business and 
management theory, reflective practice tends to focus on the exploration of past events and one 
proposed definition is that it is ‘the practice of periodically stepping back to ponder the meaning to 
self and others in one’s immediate environment about what has recently transpired’ (Raelin 2001: 
11). In my experience, this is usually in order to think about what could have been done differently, 
to learn lessons, and to improve how one might approach a similar situation in the future.  
Organisational learning theorists Chris Argyris and Donald Schön are probably the most influential 
thinkers in this field, establishing the terms single-loop and double-loop learning to describe two 
main modes by which this kind of activity can lead to changes in practice (Argyris and Schön 1974). 
Tosey et al (2012) critically analyse variations of these concepts provided by range of theorists, 
concluding that there is broad consensus around Argyris’s formulation of the dichotomy as follows:  
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[S]ingle-loop learning occurs ‘whenever an error is detected and corrected without 
questioning or altering the underlying values of the system’, and double-loop learning occurs 
‘when mismatches are corrected by first examining and altering the governing variables and 
then the actions’. (ibid: 292) 
In other words, single-loop learning involves modifying an individual’s usual response patterns to 
suit new circumstances: as a way of honing expertise, it does not examine the suitability of relying 
on established ways of working as circumstances change. Double-loop learning therefore seeks to 
address this potential for ‘skilled incompetence’ by stepping outside the single-loop process, to 
challenge and adjust the assumptions that underpin habitual ways of working. It explores whether 
other approaches are available that better suit the circumstances, or at least keep these 
assumptions in sight (Stacey and Mowles 2016: 109–111). Both of these learning loops could be seen 
as being primarily intended to improve either personal or organisational effectiveness in the future, 
through the modification of mental models; they are therefore primarily individualistic, cognitivist, 
and firmly based in systems thinking.  
Tosey et al (2012) make this clear in describing how Argyris and Schön’s work can be traced back to 
anthropologist and cybernetician Gregory Bateson’s thinking on how higher levels of learning involve 
correcting lower levels of learning. Relying on Russell and Whitehead’s theory of logical types 
(Russell and Whitehead 1910–13), Bateson (1972) argues that levels of learning are logical classes:  
• Zero learning is immediate action, it is particular to the context and not amenable to 
correction;  
• Learning I (single loop) is then a corrective change in zero learning and can be the processes 
of, for example, habituation, Pavlovian conditioning, or rote learning; 
• Learning II (double loop) is a change in the process of Learning I, in which the set of 
alternatives from which choice is made is corrected;  
• Learning III is a change in the process of Learning II, whereby the set of alternatives is itself 
corrected.  
To support his theory, Bateson explicitly relies on and argues for the availability of repeatable 
contexts, and presupposes that we have the ability to stand apart from the experiences that are to 
be corrected. To me, this seems to imply that corrections can be somehow abstracted from the 
situations they are trying to address – and therefore from the temporal flow of experience 
(Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011). These kinds of approaches allow, for example, apparent 
contradictions to be resolved through both–and thinking, where plausible yet opposing answers can 
exist in different logical classes, or in relation to different contexts. These approaches perhaps 
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necessarily fail to acknowledge that we can encounter unresolvable paradoxes in experience, where 
plausible yet opposing answers can co-exist simultaneously because they are understood as 
temporal phenomena. Perhaps the appeal of both–and thinking is that it shelters us from engaging 
with the ambivalence inherent in our experience. 
Further, this emphasis on closed-off, individual entities takes insufficient account of 
interdependence of people, and the ethics, politics and power relating that goes with it. We see that 
Bateson himself struggles with moving beyond Learning II in practice when he admits that Learning 
III is ‘likely to be difficult and rare even in human beings’, occurring ‘from time to time in 
psychotherapy, religious conversation, and in other sequences in which there is profound 
reorganisation of character’ (ibid: 301), and Learning IV (change in Learning III), though theoretically 
possible, ‘probably does not occur in any adult living organism on this earth’ (ibid: 293). A further 
problem is that the notion of correction implies Bateson’s assumption of a ‘right’ way to do 
something, at least within a cybernetic system – which is clearly questionable, given our inability to 
predict the outcomes of our actions with any degree of certainty. 
Unless we accept these logical categories, Bateson insists, all learning would have to be regarded as 
zero learning: if each situation is unique, and we cannot move beyond our habitual ways of 
responding, then all that is left is genetically determined discrimination – that is, the playing out of 
innate predispositions. Bateson’s position is consistent with a systems perspective, which 
presupposes isolated individuals who learn separately – a view that overlooks the importance of 
intersubjectivity, context and personal history in how we make judgements, and our ability to 
intentionally develop our capacity to judge over time. 
A very different way of thinking about learning that can account for this tension between being both 
detached and involved at the same time scan be found by reconsidering Mead’s concepts of thinking 
and reasoning: from this perspective, reflective practice can be seen as an extension of the ongoing 
learning that is central to human development. This doesn’t require us to accept the notion of 
‘stepping outside’ on which Bateson and Argyris and Schön rely. Mead suggests that in early 
development, or the play stage, children are able at best to take on this or that specific role and so 
they play at being doctors and nurses, or mothers and fathers (Mead 1934: 150). Over time, as 
children progress to the game stage of development, they begin to understand the increasing 
complexity of their social interactions and so must imagine themselves in the positions of (or take 
the attitude of) the multiple others with whom they are interacting. They must respond as one 
aspect of this complex whole according to a sense of social rules (ibid: 152). As development 
continues, individuals become able to take the attitudes of not just those in their immediate vicinity, 
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but all those who feature in their experience – which is to say their relevant social groups, or society 
at large; and these attitudes are organised into a sort of unit that is imported into individual thinking 
as the sense of a generalised other (ibid: 154–155).  
Reflective practice, rather than requiring an appeal to metatheory, could therefore be seen as a 
further, more deliberate aspect of the same process of development that brings about the 
incorporation of additional perspectives into our thinking – increasing the possibilities we consider 
when anticipating the responses our gestures may invite from others. In other words, reflective 
practice is an intentional social process of enriching the field of our attention, and comes about 
through new experiences or exposures. Recalling our observations about meaning, on this basis, we 
cannot make any claims about whether reflective practice is of itself a good or a bad thing, because, 
as with meaning in general, we cannot know the impact of having these wider perspectives until 
they are called into use. We might like to suggest that having more perspectives in view is a good 
thing because it gives us more options, but this would be an ideological position – something I will 
come back to.  
To illustrate this unpredictability, on the one hand, in my most recent conversations with Jerome, I 
have found myself talking about rituals or social defences, and in so doing I appear to be influencing 
how Jerome is thinking about the wider programme of OD work in the organisation. So far, 
responses have been positive to the workshops and development sessions we have run together. 
However, other occasions when I have brought these new perspectives into play have gone less well 
– as I mentioned in the narrative earlier, sometimes people have found me sanctimonious or 
disruptive and I have had to rethink what I am doing. Further, in facilitating team development 
sessions, some have ended positively with participants feeling they have made progress in areas that 
were stopping them working together, and sometimes I feel I may have made things worse. More 
and more often I find myself feeling that I don’t know what I am doing, especially where there is 
conflict involved, though I am obviously still doing something in these situations. 
 
Ethics and uncertainty 
To cast the kinds of experiences I am describing simply as some kind of accelerated, value-neutral 
process of learning occasioned by new thinking I have encountered through my research for this 
project would be to trivialise something that feels important for a different reason: these 
experiences are generating a sense in me of having done things that I judge as morally good or bad. I 
also talk about the responsibility we have for what we are doing, however contingent the outcomes 
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may be. However, if meaning is not fixed, then how can practitioners ever decide what is ethical or 
unethical to do? 
Unpredictability is a fundamental problem for any normative ethical theory: if meaning is constantly 
shifting, emerging through interaction and potentially changing in hindsight, then any attempt to 
identify a testable principle underpinning the kinds of everyday action we are routinely engaged in 
at work is so contingent that it is next to meaningless in all but the simplest of cases. And this 
accords with my experience: in my work, although the experience I have accumulated over my 
career undoubtedly informs my actions to some extent, I no longer consider it such a solid and 
reliable basis for action as I once did. While the increasing plurality of perspectives I have available 
helps me to see new aspects of what is going on in my work, those same perspectives – and the 
process of writing this project – are making me increasingly less certain about the validity of any 
conclusions I might draw. In other words, I feel I am becoming more certain only of the 
unpredictability of what might be coming up – and aware of the contingency of the interpretations I 
make in the moment, given that a new perspective later may recast the meaning I attribute at the 
time.  
All of this could leave little space for ethics if we see morality as being about what we end up doing. 
Mead offers a very different way of thinking about morality that takes as its main focus the temporal 
and ongoing process of how we go about deciding what to do, suggesting that this process involves 
impartially taking account of all the interests involved in a particular problem (as far as this is 
possible, which makes the process inherently fallible), and then making a plan of action that 
rationally deals with them all:  
Our society is built up out of our social interests. Our social relations go to constitute the self. 
But when the immediate interests come into conflict with others we had not recognised, we 
tend to ignore the others and take into account only those which are immediate. The difficulty 
is to make ourselves recognise the other and wider interests, and then to bring them into 
some sort of rational relationship with the more immediate ones. (Mead 1934: 388) 
Implicit in Mead’s work is an ideological position that strongly encourages the integration of 
individual selves with their communities (ibid: 319ff). For example, Mead suggests that basic socio-
physiological impulses lead to cooperation or antagonism, and that ethical ideals arise from our 
consciousness of mutual interdependence within a community and the need to cooperate. Ethical 
behaviour is therefore that conduct which increases integration, as far as this is socially beneficial 
and conducive to the well-being of society. The antagonistic impulse plays out when individuals find 
themselves unable to adjust to the interests and conduct of other individuals in society, and Mead 
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suggests that this is how ethical problems arise. Unethical behaviour, then, is that which is socially 
harmful or disruptive to society. I read Mead as therefore suggesting that ultimately the aim of 
society is to find a way to integrate as a universal community, through which ‘conflicts can be solved 
or eliminated’ (ibid: 308–309). It could be argued that this sounds rather like the kind of systems 
thinking critiqued earlier; it need not be, however, as the process of dealing with conflict is not by 
application to a metatheory or position outside of the system in which the conflict occurs in order to 
resolve or explain it (e.g. Gödel 1986), but rather through social reconstruction achieved through the 
ongoing process of interpretation.  
I find this position compelling: as I described in Project 1, I have found myself inclined towards 
socially motivated work, and what I end up doing in these roles is creating communities in which 
individuals feel that they are being taken seriously as people, rather than just positions on 
organisational charts or as a means to an end. I also note that thinking in this way is problematic as it 
could be argued that I am simply substituting one ideology (strategic choice theory) with another 
(plurality and keeping options open); this is perhaps at odds with the arguments against normative 
ethics that I have made above. My sense is that this reflects a real conflict arising from a wider 
tension between logic and personal history: rationally, an argument can lead to a particular 
conclusion while personally, our inclinations and biases can lead to another. By holding both 
together rather than trying to resolve them, however, we are forced to notice the contingency of 
our beliefs and those of others, and also to acknowledge that these must be evolving over time. 
Mead’s conception of morality appears to contain a similar line of thinking when he suggests that a 
way towards greater integration is to enlarge the community through the introduction of new ideas:  
A man has to keep his self-respect, and it may be that he has to fly in the face of the whole 
community in preserving this self-respect. But he does it from the point of view of what he 
considers a higher and better society than that which exists. (Mead 1934: 389) 
So, the further complexity in Mead’s conception of morality is that ethical conduct is not some kind 
of blind submission to the perspectives of others, but rather an ongoing process of negotiation of 
social and personal interests, which, in the absence of firm rules, must rely on individual judgements 
made in specific circumstances by particular people. 
If we accept this position, then the implications are potentially important: reflective practice, far 
from being about finding out what we could have done differently so that we can apply some kind of 
better practice when the situation re-presents, is much more about increasing the things to which 
we are sensitive so that we may notice different qualities of our experience in the future. This may 
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lead us to speak and act differently than if we had not reflected; but we cannot know whether what 
we say and do is any better or worse as a result, either at the time or in hindsight.  
On that basis, time spent agonising over the possible rights and wrongs of different courses of action 
according to their anticipated outcomes (as I perhaps did when I was choosing whether or not to 
take on the work in the first place) might be better spent seeking out and making sense of the 
plurality of perspectives on the matter at hand, and then acting in ways that continue to leave as 
many further options open as possible. This may give us the greatest scope for continuing to 
participate ethically with others because ethics becomes an ongoing process of meaning-making, 
rather anything to do with adherence to static or stable rules. As Griffin (2002) suggests, this makes 
all of our conduct in some sense moral:  
Ethics becomes a matter of our accountability to each other in our daily relating to 
each other. What is ethical emerges as themes that organise our experience of being 
together. (ibid: 207)  
Importantly, this gives us a very different way to take responsibility for what we are doing – one that 
illuminates how practitioners might go about trying to make sense of, and cope with, the practical 
and ethical conflicts that arise in their experience of trying to develop organisations. This is 
potentially liberating because we are freed from having to predict and account for the ethics of a 
particular future; yet this creates a new burden – the ongoing need to consider the morality of the 
many possible futures to which our actions may lead, as well as tolerating the uncertainty that 
comes to characterise our outlook.  
 
Concluding remarks and areas for further research 
I began this project thinking that I would write about the way bureaucratic ideals and individual 
interests appeared to come into conflict in the context of the work I am doing on culture in my 
organisation. I considered two main perspectives that gave me new ways to make sense of what was 
happening in my work, and suggested that there were likely to be many others that would offer 
further insights. I examined our preference to look for the fixed and stable in our experience and the 
emergent quality of meaning, from which I concluded that strategic planning activities in general 
(including about culture change) are at best ways of temporarily making sense, rather than the 
prophetic interventions that we might like them to be. I acknowledged that, given the difficulty of 
predicting the impact of our actions with any certainty, the search for a definitive explanation of 
what I was doing at work was probably futile.  
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During this exploration, I also noticed the speed at which my attitude towards my work was 
changing as a result of my research, and in particular the ethical issues that became apparent in 
hindsight. This led me to consider how ethics and reflective practice might be related, and arguing 
against more traditional systems thinking–based conceptions of how we learn, I set out how these 
activities could be reconciled in Mead’s social behaviourist theory. I argued that morality, from this 
viewpoint, can helpfully be thought of as a process of taking in perspectives to inform tentative 
actions that keep options open. This is a very different way of thinking about how we take 
responsibility, and for what; I suggested that OD practitioners might see this conception of ethics as 
a way of engaging differently with uncertainty in their practice. 
At the end of this project, I notice how the progress of my research has been accompanied by a 
diminishing confidence in being able to predict the outcomes of my actions at work – in other words, 
to know what to do – and a growing sense of readiness to rely on my instincts rather than simply 
expecting things to rationally go to plan, as I may have done before. This has surprised me: as I 
described in my Project 1, being knowledgeable is part of my sense of self and a prominent aspect of 
how I find myself in relation with others. Further, in exploring psychoanalytical perspectives as part 
of this project, I notice that intellectualising is one of the ways in which I tend to deal with anxiety. 
To find myself at relative ease with not knowing, on the one hand, is therefore very destabilising; on 
the other, I am intrigued that I feel exhilarated by the way that I am now finding myself tolerating 
uncertainty. Despite this, I find it very difficult to describe what am I actually doing and feeling when 
I am acting in the moment; and so I am wondering if exploring knowing and not-knowing as social 
phenomena may help to deepen my inquiry about what OD practitioners are doing in their work, 
especially if they choose to do it in the way that I am suggesting.  
I am therefore starting my third project intending to inquire into the experience of what we are 
actually doing when we find ourselves knowing or not knowing what to do. 
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PROJECT 3:  
Exploring being stuck as a negotiation of social orders: preliminary 
thoughts on honesty as a way of coping with uncertainty 
Introduction 
My second project began with an exploration of my work as the lead for an internal culture and 
leadership project in my organisation. As I inquired into how I was going about this work, what I 
found most intriguing was the way my search for a satisfactory conclusion seemed to be repeatedly 
frustrated by the new ways of thinking I was encountering through my research and the feedback I 
was receiving from the DMan research community. These new perspectives seemed to be 
completely changing not only what I considered to be worth writing about, but also what I felt I was 
able to say and do at work.  
This led me to explore the processes of reflection and reflective practice, and while still inconclusive, 
I found this much more satisfying. This was in part because I felt released from the constraining 
pressure of normative ethical thinking, but also because I became able to articulate a small number 
of beliefs that I can see informing my own practice as I try to ‘do the right thing’. These are beliefs 
about the importance of social integration, attitudinal plurality, and acting tentatively to increase 
the possibilities for action. These feel irreducible because, though I seem to be habitually self-
questioning (and perhaps increasingly so), I am comfortable in accepting these as qualities of my 
experience that I feel less need to question. In the terms that Dewey uses about reflection (e.g. 
1933), they are part of my uncritical thinking which my experience rarely calls into question; in 
Gadamer’s terms (1975), they are prejudices that remain intact in the hermeneutic processes I am 
engaged in with others.  
I have found a similar process of evolution taking place over the course of this project. As I will 
describe, my initial iterations focussed on a clear and relatively contained experience I had at work, 
which I could then analyse from a number of theoretical perspectives. However, what I found most 
interesting was the movement in my own thought as the process of inquiry opened up further areas 
for exploration. Some of these felt quite uncomfortable, but engaging with this discomfort 
illuminated aspects of my experience at work that I appeared to be avoiding; this provided new 
possibilities for action.  
This project is therefore an account of the dialectic of my research and my work. It draws attention 
to the ways in which ideological tensions play out in unexpected ways, both in my work and in my 
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research, and highlights how the avoidance of uncertainty and discomfort based on power relating 
might get in the way of acquiring new perspectives. I consider how being stuck can arise from the 
competition of social orders, and how experiences of becoming unstuck can be thought of as 
particularly poignant instances of more general processes of social reconstruction. 
 
Organisational context 
I am working in the same organisation as I have been for the last two years, a national body 
responsible for oversight of the health and care system in the UK. My portfolio of work has remained 
largely consistent throughout this period; its main focus is on projects that contribute to the 
development of capacity and capability around culture, leadership, and governance in the 
organisations we oversee. These are unusual activities for the organisation: most of our work seems 
to be focussed on increasing productivity and managing the performance of services that are 
increasingly described by commentators as being in decline and in urgent need of a different 
operating model (e.g. Darzi 2017). Some say that, as an organisation, we are at best slowing down 
the rate of failure, but many remain optimistic that we are making small differences that perhaps 
will add up to some kind of meaningful transformation. 
Hanging over all of us is the spectre of reorganisation. Changes in primary legislation in 2012 (Health 
and Social Care Act 2012) dismantled key elements of the national and local oversight architecture, 
and more recent changes saw a further reorganisation of some of the remaining national 
infrastructure, aspects of which created the organisation I now work for. Two years in, staff have fed 
back through various routes, including the annual staff survey, that the operating model isn’t 
working; so our senior leadership team is actively exploring what improvements to this might look 
like. This includes closer working with other national bodies, and significant changes are expected 
with the recent arrival of a new chair and chief executive.  
Ostensibly, my colleagues and I are focussing on getting on with our work, talking in public forums 
about the importance of what we’re trying to achieve and challenging perhaps more mechanistic 
conceptions that something as complex as millions of people interacting in increasingly ambiguous 
conceptual groupings can be ‘fixed’ if only we could find the right tool. However, our staff survey 
results reflect a contrasting undercurrent, which is comparatively covert – while a very high 
percentage of those who responded said they cared about the purpose of the organisation and its 
future, less than half said they expected to be working for the organisation in two years’ time. The 
conversations hinted at here about moving into new roles happen far from the public stage, 
occurring instead around the photocopier or over drinks after work, or as anonymised feedback in 
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the staff survey asking for more transparency about plans for future mergers. Further, I increasingly 
hear people talking about union membership to make sure that, as a group of employees, we get a 
fair deal in any future changes. In response to the staff survey in particular, the senior leadership 
team have offered ameliorative responses in the form of reassurance that there will be no 
redundancies and that any changes will make us more effective; these are met with what seems to 
be resolute scepticism and mistrust among many of the staff I encounter. 
Contemporary British sociologist Peter Marris’s analysis of the politics of uncertainty based upon 
Bowlby’s attachment theory (Marris 1996) has much to offer in making sense of this dynamic. Marris 
argues that those with greater ability to make choices manage their need for security, which is 
innate according to attachment theory (e.g. Bowlby 1979), by placing the burden of uncertainty 
upon those who, because of unequal power differentials, are less able to make their own choices. 
This can be seen, for example, in the way that large corporations will stabilise their core functions by 
contracting with smaller companies who, because their existence is more precarious, have little 
choice but to hold the anxiety that uncertainty creates if they are to continue to operate (ibid: 103). 
By extension, this might also be seen in the way that, in the emergence of global value chains, 
Western capitalist economies exploit asymmetries of market, social, and political dominance (e.g. 
Phillips 2017) by outsourcing their riskier production functions to developing countries, often putting 
some of the world’s most vulnerable people in significant danger.  
Marris argues that those who find themselves bearing the uncertainty because of their positions of 
relative weakness have little option but to create a different kind of security for themselves: 
adaptability is sustained through psychological withdrawal and a disinvestment of personal meaning 
(Marris 1996: 103). In my organisation, despite the senior leaders’ reassurances, one could see the 
private speculations of employees about not being told the whole story, or about what the ‘real’ 
motivations behind increased joint working with other organisations might be, as manifestations of 
just such a psychological withdrawal, which is arguably an adaption in response to the experience of 
so many reorganisations over recent years. Each of these has claimed to be solving the problems 
created by the last, so one might well expect employees to be suspicious because their experience 
suggests that this kind of shuffling of deckchairs, which is endemic to organisational life in this part 
of the public sector, rarely achieves the results that are promised.  
While this starts to offer an explanation for why staff may be feeling disengaged, Marris does not say 
much about how these muted realities might be expressed in other ways, e.g. in the photocopier 
conversations or responses to the staff survey. Following Nietzschean and Foucauldian lines of 
thinking, contemporary American political theorist and anthropologist James C. Scott describes a 
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model of public and hidden transcripts in his Domination and the Arts of Resistance (1990), which 
offers a way into exploring these patterns of interaction based on power relating.  
 
Public and hidden transcripts 
Scott considers the ways in which narratives of the dominant and the dominated support the 
perpetuation of power relations: public transcripts are a social group’s officially sanctioned stories, 
which reflect the hegemonic aspirations of the dominant group. They draw attention to the things 
that provide the biased evidence for maintaining their dominance, and away from those that 
threaten it. Political rituals (royal coronations, state openings of parliament, mandatory submissions 
of operating plans and strategies) are among the ways this can be perpetuated (Lukes 1977). Hidden 
transcripts, by contrast, are the narratives of the oppressed that emerge either in non-official 
spaces, or in code, for fear of retaliation by the oppressors against members of the oppressed group. 
They too can serve to maintain the existing power relations: acts of defiance that arise from 
oppressed groups’ feelings of resistance and resentment of their oppressors can be seen as tests of 
whether the system of domination holds up. These tests are acceptable as long as they do not ‘tear 
the fabric of the hegemony’ (ibid: 204), and in those cases the fates of would-be transgressors 
become part of the mythology that serves to strengthen the hidden transcript and maintain the 
existing power relations. Should the challenge succeed, however, the ground is laid for significant 
social reconstruction. 
In my organisation, it would be a conceptual leap to suggest that there is an overt 
oppressor/oppressed dynamic at play between distinct groups of people. However, the absence of 
public dialogue about potential reorganisations and mergers could suggest dissimulation of much of 
what people seem to be anxious about. Based on Scott’s argument, one could see this absence as a 
way of avoiding entering into conversations that might threaten the established social order to the 
extent that we become unable to continue to discharge our organisational functions. This could take 
the form of exodus, or perhaps hopelessness, either of which might even strengthen the case for 
significant reorganisation as senior leaders have to find new ways to deal with their dependence on 
the workforce. Paradoxically, therefore, it may be in everyone’s interests not to push too hard for 
answers about the future (despite a desire for more certainty), as this may ultimately compromise 
our ability to do the work we think is important. As these may be concerns for all employees rather 
than one group or another, importantly, this situates the tension between public and hidden 
transcripts intra-politically (from within) rather than, as Scott suggests, infra-politically (from below); 
in other words, we can at the same time be both oppressors and oppressed.  
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I will come back to this later; but for now, these are important early observations for two reasons. 
First, they help me to consider the ways in which transparency is perhaps being idealised as a 
comforting response to the anxiety that waiting ‘in limbo’ creates. As the other aspect of my job is 
being an internal OD consultant, this is especially pertinent for thinking about the team 
development activities that I facilitate and the sense I make of how people respond to me. Second, 
they are the foundation of how I am now making sense of my experience of undertaking this project. 
In its earlier iterations, I had significant experiences of being stuck: writing about a team away day I 
had run for the Support Directorate in my organisation, I kept feeling that something about it was 
wrong or missing. My exploration suggested that the same things being excluded from the public 
transcript in my organisation might also be unconsciously being excluded in my research. What 
follows, therefore, is an account of the process of becoming unstuck and the role of my research as a 
critical dialogue partner (Alvesson and Kärreman 2011) to my practice.  
 
My relationship with the Support Directorate 
I have been running team away days for the Support Directorate every four to six months for nearly 
two years. This came about because Sandra, the Director of Support, and Jeff, her business manager, 
decided they wanted someone to facilitate their team’s first away day following the last restructure. 
They had heard that this was something I could help with.  
The previous year’s staff survey feedback had indicated morale was low, so all the organisation’s 
executives were putting renewed emphasis on increasing engagement – as a general measure of 
staff satisfaction across a range of measures – in their teams. Most had planned programmes of 
team time outs and away days, and these were just starting to ripple through the organisation. At 
the time, I remember thinking that a rather simple and mechanistic relationship was being assumed 
between bringing people together every few months for some kind of large group activity and 
improvements in morale, almost irrespective of what actually went on in those events. I was 
sceptical about these assumptions, on the one hand, because of how I was coming to think about 
social life in general from my work on the DMan programme (which I was just starting): on what 
basis did we think that better engagement, or happier staff, should lead to more effective work? And 
why should bringing people together have any impact on this?  
On the other hand, and more practically, my colleagues and I talked about how these away days for 
our own directorate seemed to be slightly interesting distractions from our day jobs, and sometimes 
a bit of a waste of time. This was especially the case when the activities undertaken did not appear 
to relate to the work that we were routinely doing together and so, while perhaps enjoyable at the 
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time, were seen by some at least as rather trivial. This no doubt influenced our evolving expectations 
of events like these, which in turn affected how we engaged with future events unless something 
dramatically different were to take place.  
I have found the same mechanistic assumption to be prevalent in many of the organisations I have 
worked in. I wonder if this is because the belief that developing new of ways of thinking or working 
is better done as a group exercise rather than by an individual, reflects the ideologies prevalent in 
those organisations and society more widely. This seems to be especially the case in the public 
sector where organisational purposes tend to address one or another kind of social problem – be it 
the provision of health, education, environment, or prison services, or their development or 
oversight. It has been proposed that the career motivations of those who work in these 
organisations relate to specific social ideals rather than financial rewards (Perry 1996; Feldheim 
2007), and there seems to be an implicit assumption that those ideals can be best realised if people 
work together effectively. 
This isn’t necessarily controversial: when the business of providing care relies on being able to 
cooperate with colleagues to execute what can be very complex activities for the benefit of people 
in various states of vulnerability, coming together physically to work on building relationships or 
managing collective anxieties that might otherwise get in the way (Menzies 1960; Hirschhorn 1988) 
makes sense. And this seems to be a very common thought style in the health and care system, 
where staff morale and engagement are instrumentalised for the idealised purposes of delivering 
better outcomes for patients and service users; for examples, see West et al (2002), or Bodenheimer 
and Sinsky (2014). It is perhaps no wonder then that the belief noted above, about the connection 
between working together and being together, arises. However, a problem with these kinds of 
generalisations is that they do not take into account the particularities of the situations in which 
they are functionalised. I will come back to this later. 
 
Contracting for the first event 
My first contact with the Support Directorate was an email I received from Jeff two weeks before the 
first event was due to take place, asking if I could help. We met briefly, and he explained what he 
and Sandra wanted. I had been excited at the opportunity to work with the team, at the time 
attributing this to the route by which it had come – I had been recommended by another director 
whose team I had worked with to design and run an event using large group facilitation techniques 
that were quite novel, at least for our organisation. I was practising these techniques as part of 
building my own confidence as much as anything, so being recognised in this way was flattering.  
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Jeff showed me the agenda, which was tightly packed with speakers and structured activities that 
seemed to allow little time for any actual conversation, and it quickly became clear that keeping the 
sessions to time was all that Jeff really wanted me to contribute to their day. I felt a little affronted: 
timekeeping seemed to be a poor use of my skills and perhaps even a little demeaning. I asked him if 
there was any flexibility to change the schedule to allow more time for interaction, and Jeff replied 
that the agenda was now set. He seemed to consider his request perfectly reasonable; even when I 
asked him, with a raised eyebrow, ‘So, literally all you want me to do is to make sure things stop and 
start on time?’, he confirmed this with a firm but affable enthusiasm. From his encouraging tone and 
smile, I supposed he thought this was something that took particular skill and for which he was very 
grateful. Perhaps, since he didn’t know me, he was reluctant to deviate much from the original plan; 
and having got to know Jeff better since, I find him to be rather risk-averse, so this approach may 
have been his way of managing his anxiety about the unknown. That said, the power differential was 
not only in Jeff’s favour: given the proximity of the event, I suspected that he was under pressure 
from Sandra to find someone to run the session – so he also needed something from me too: my 
agreement to do it. 
Perhaps because of these competing priorities (though they weren’t obvious to me at the time), the 
experience was uncomfortable. I ascribed some of this unease to the conflict between what I was 
being asked to do and my desire to identify with a community of OD practitioners who share a 
particular thought style. This relates to what constitutes meaningful engagement in organisations; 
Bunker and Alban (2006) provide a helpful overview of the emergence of these large group methods 
over the last three decades. Attributing their inception to a greater appreciation of systems thinking 
in order to increase the speed and scale of change (ibid: 4), these authors suggest these methods 
share four principles: inclusion of stakeholders; engagement of multiple perspectives through 
interactive activities; opportunities to influence; and the search for common ground.  
Emery and Purser (1996) provide a further helpful articulation of the assumptions that underpin 
these principles in relation to the Search Conference technique, but I think generally apply. These 
are: that people are purposeful and have the capacity and desire to select desirable outcomes; that 
people accept responsibility for tasks that are meaningful for them; and that people can function in 
the ideal-seeking mode under appropriate conditions (ibid: 13). Proponents of dialogic OD (Bushe 
and Marshak 2013, 2015) would also situate these within a discursive social constructionist 
epistemology and argue for the importance of an expert practitioner who can add dimensions to 
people’s experience of being together that they cannot elicit themselves.  
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I do not intend to examine these assumptions in any detail, but mention them here to highlight the 
evolution of ways of thinking about development, and to consider why the OD community might 
now be embracing them.  
 
The (re-)birth of tragedy 
In the assumptions above, I see biases towards a formative notion of causality (that people have 
answers or potential enfolded in them that will mechanistically unfold in particular circumstances) 
and a humanistic psychology (emphasising choice and personal freedom). I believe that these biases 
can be thought of as idealising the counterclaims to the perceived wider societal trends of 
individualism, fragmentation of communities, disengagement, and cynicism of the late modern 
period (e.g. Bauman 2015; Knights and Willmott 2002), the prevalence of a pervasive managerialism 
characterised by vacuous rhetoric (e.g. Spicer 2017) and a foremost purpose of self-advancement 
among employees (e.g. Jackall 2009). On that basis, one might characterise the shift in OD practice 
as a new problematisation of lack of intended impact as low employee engagement (as opposed to, 
for example, poor organisational design). This would accord with organisational contexts being 
increasingly described as ‘VUCA’ (volatile, unpredictable, complex, ambiguous).  
It is argued that when the number of participants in any figuration of interdependent people 
increases, the control that any one participant can exert over the process and outcome of the 
interaction decreases (Elias 1978); with the interconnectedness that emerges with global supply 
chains, facilitated by instant telecommunications, the internet and social media, the number of 
players now interacting is vastly greater than it was even just 20 years ago. It is perhaps no wonder, 
then, that organisational leaders and managers feel decreasingly in control of their workforces 
(setting aside the issue of whether they ever really were); based on Marris’s argument that those 
with more control create security for themselves by forcing uncertainty on those with fewer choices, 
one might expect to see new ways of exerting control emerging to maintain existing power relations.  
In The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche described Greek tragedy as arising from a confrontation 
between the ancient, civilised, Apollonian society and the threat of social disruption they saw in the 
Dionysiac cults. The theatrical art form combined the two – a process of assimilation that could be 
seen as the reframing of a threat, enabling the maintenance of status and control. A contemporary 
example of a similar process might be seen in the current debate about ‘real news’ versus ‘fake 
news’: those who are in formal positions of authority are trying to maintain their right to occupy 
those positions, and therefore control, on the basis that they know more than others (Lyotard 1979; 
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Foucault 1980) in the context of the threat posed by a wholesale democratisation of knowledge 
(Davis 2009; Denzin 2014; Lapadat 2017).  
Using the same argument, one could see OD practitioners’ change of emphasis away from the design 
of organisational structures and bureaucratic control and towards more humanistic ideals of 
individual empowerment, freedom, trust, and flourishing (for examples, see Seligman 2002; Laloux 
2014; Kegan and Laskow Lahey 2016) as a form of professional protectionism. Consciously or 
unconsciously, OD practitioners may be responding to threats to their existence as a profession – 
arising from the redundancy of their previous approaches – by assimilating those threats as their key 
concerns. This would be ironic, given the emancipatory nature of the espoused ideals of OD: while 
perhaps based on a different set of assumptions in one sense (we are now trying to engage with 
people as people rather than simply as bureaucratic functionaries, emphasising their freedom), the 
managerialist thought style arguably remains very much intact. This is manifest, for example, in the 
continued reliance on mechanistic assumptions about causality, i.e. that if engagement approaches 
following these principles are used, then benefit for the organisation will follow.  
This is perhaps not wholly unexpected, as it might become very difficult to sell OD work to decision-
makers on the basis that there can be no certainty about outcomes, even if this is tacitly understood. 
And I recognise this in my own experience. For example, in Project 2 I argued for the perspectival 
and temporal instability of meaning based on American pragmatic philosopher and sociologist 
George Herbert Mead’s theory of human interaction (Mead 1934). Mead suggests a very different 
way of thinking about how social organisation comes about based on an inherently unpredictable, 
transformative causality; on this view, any approach to OD that assumes that outcomes can be 
predicted beyond the general expectations we might have based on our previous experiences and 
patterns of behaviour is problematic.  
And yet, while I agree with this critique, I find that I still use the kind of principles described by 
Emery and Purser (1996), and Bushe and Marshak (2013, 2015), to explain to my sponsors how I 
think events should be organised. This is perhaps partly because I assume that sponsors want 
assurance that the time they allocate to team development will yield reliable results, so being able 
to cite evidence and theory adds weight to my suggestions. However, I also find myself 
acknowledging some of my own doubts when I try to manage my sponsors’ expectations by 
emphasising their and their teams’ responsibilities for participating rather than passively receiving 
information during the events I run. Again, this could be sees as a negotiation about who holds what 
aspects of uncertainty, which reveals the politics and power relating that are inherent to these 
interactions. 
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In all of this, the role of facilitator is central, which gives people who are able to facilitate groups a 
special expert status. Part of my discomfort in the conversation with Jeff might therefore be 
explained by a sense that something I consider important was being negated: my desired self-image 
in this context was bound up in being someone who runs particular kinds of events and is 
knowledgeable and up to date with the latest trends in OD. To be asked to do something as 
mundane as keeping time challenged how I want to be seen, both by others and by myself.  
 
The evolution of this project 
While this may be a plausible explanation for some of what I was experiencing, it perhaps doesn’t 
adequately explain how I actually dealt with my feelings of discomfort and the competing priorities I 
have just described – which was largely to ignore them. A simple solution would have been to turn 
down the request; and indeed, in quite similar circumstances I have turned down requests for 
support where I have felt I wouldn’t be able to do things in the way I would prefer. On this occasion, 
however, I did not: responding to Jeff’s enthusiasm, I brightened my own tone and demeanour and 
said ‘Sure – no problem’. We went through the agenda again and I pointed out a few places where I 
thought improvements could be made. I reiterated my concern that it may not provide enough time 
for people to actually interact with each other; but we’d just have to see how it went. 
In the earlier iterations of this project, I paid little attention to the negotiation with Jeff I have just 
described; it was simply part of the scene-setting that contextualised the third away day I ran for the 
Support Directorate. I noted briefly that my motives for accepting the request were about wanting 
to gain more experience and improve my proficiency in working with large groups; I also mentioned 
seeing it as an opportunity to get to know Sandra and her team better, but this was a passing 
thought at best. The proceedings of the third away day became the focus of the project, and I will 
now briefly summarise the analyses that formed the whole of this project in its first few drafts. 
I described how, by running two successful events not of my design, and being able to reasonably 
accurately predict the feedback that they would receive, in Sandra and Jeff’s eyes I had become a 
trusted ‘expert’. This meant that I was able to influence the design and content of the event; and I 
noticed how I brought in ideas from the DMan programme about allowing time for conversations to 
develop, and emphasising reflexivity. This was in the context of discussions about the organisation’s 
new corporate values and trying to improve inter-team working within the directorate.  
I went on to try to describe in some detail what the event was like, what the space was like, who was 
there, the activities I designed, and how they played out. This included a few instances where I 
wondered what we thought we were all doing and made some mildly provocative comments to this 
64 
 
effect. I noticed the paradox of safety and experimentation in OD practice: the role of the facilitator 
(like the coach or therapist) is to create a safe environment for the participants; but to develop 
proficiency, one must also experiment with groups, which might undermine the very safety the 
facilitator attempts to create. Linked to this, I explored the dynamics of the group and the facilitator, 
arguing against the idea that appears in the mainstream OD literature of facilitators as selfless, 
neutral guides working only in the interests of their clients (e.g. Cheung-Judge and Holbeche 2015; 
Marshak et al 2015; Justice and Jamieson 1998; Corrigan 2015). Further, I argued that, despite 
surfacing these competing priorities, the group and facilitator’s mutual collusion in the imagining of 
leader/follower roles was likely to be based largely on norms established by our past experiences of 
this kind of event, rather than the illuminating but perhaps more mystical explanations for crowd 
behaviour described by psychoanalysts in the Freudian tradition (Freud 1921; and e.g. Bion 1961; 
Parkin-Gounelas 2012; Reicher 2012).  
I found these to be interesting observations, and they had some resonance with the colleagues I 
began to discuss them with. In my research and my practice, I found myself emphasising that we 
needed to take more seriously the interests of OD practitioners themselves in their relationships 
with clients, and in particular the roles they might have in reinforcing or changing the existing 
patterns of interaction according to their own biases rather than simply ‘helping’. 
I felt these to be logical and relatively compelling conclusions; however, the feedback I received 
from my DMan learning set as I developed my work, while encouraging and supportive, kept 
returning to a few important problems. First, despite my efforts to describe the Support 
Directorate’s away day, my learning set found it hard to get a sense of how I was interacting with the 
group of ~80 senior managers and what they were all doing as I was facilitating. Second, my account 
lacked the ‘thickness’ (Geertz 1973) that describing context and intention provide for the 
interpretation of events; and, third, I seemed very focussed on my own speculations, anxieties, and 
dilemmas, which undermined the generalisability of my account. Moreover, it wasn’t clear to any of 
us why what I was writing about was anything more than an interesting theoretical foray – my 
arguments may have been sound, but it wasn’t clear why they were of interest to me, if indeed they 
were at all.  
The autoethnographic research method (see e.g. Czarniawska 2004; Rhodes and Brown 2005; Ellis 
2007; Denzin 2014) employed in the DMan programme starts with narratives of experiences of work 
that we feel are somehow significant, and from which generalisable contributions to knowledge and 
practice can be extrapolated (Stacey and Griffin 2005; Mowles 2017a, 2017b). The emerging sense 
that my inquiry was superficial made me doubt that what I had written about had enough of interest 
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in it to warrant the exploration I had conducted, and I was tempted to start again with a different 
narrative. At the same time, I found myself thinking quite separately about the purposes served by 
problematisations of particular topics over others: as Foucault argues, problematisations both draw 
attention to certain things and distract from others (Foucault 1980; Foucault and Pearson 2001). 
Reflecting upon this, in drawing attention to the facilitation aspect of the away day, then, perhaps I 
was also diverting attention from something of significance. At the time, however, I couldn’t easily 
see that possibility, and things only started to become clearer at the most recent residential of the 
DMan programme. 
 
An opportunity to become unstuck 
Attending residential weekends are an integral aspect of undertaking the doctorate and involve 
working in large and small groups to explore how our experiences of being together as a community 
illuminate corresponding aspects of organisational life in relation to our research (Mowles 2017a, 
2017b). The programme uses techniques that resemble aspects of the therapeutic group analytical 
model conceived by S.H. Foulkes (e.g. 1975), and there is an assumption about the value of this kind 
of experience for deepening students’ research inquiries, just as the process of free-floating 
conversation in the Foulkesian therapy group increases patients’ capacity to deal with their 
conditions (Stacey and Griffin 2005; Stacey 2006).  
As I have said, despite the helpful efforts of my learning set, I think we all felt that I was stuck or that 
something significant was missing from my work. Questions would come up that I would try to 
answer hoping for some kind of epiphany, but this optimism would quickly fade with a sense of 
disappointment as I remained feeling stuck. I found myself feeling increasingly despondent about my 
ability to complete the project, and sometimes the doctorate programme altogether. However, 
something changed at the learning set meeting on the penultimate evening of the residential.  
It was dark outside, and we were sitting in a small circle of four. It was my turn to talk about my 
research and, feeling quite resigned about where I found myself with my project, I started by rather 
grumpily expressing my frustration with not being able to ‘fix’ it. I went on to describe my project as 
boring and unimportant, which was a marked change from the more exploratory and optimistic 
attitude I usually try to maintain. Despite being rather uncomfortable, I felt a greater sense of 
coherence, which seemed somehow truer or more honest than before. It is difficult to describe this 
sensation beyond saying it felt like a bodily untightening, perhaps something like the relief 
experienced when breathing out after having held one’s breath for a few seconds too long. This 
shift, finally, was accompanied by a new sense of possibility. Of course, nothing had changed in our 
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small conversational circle beyond my new disclosure, so I am very interested to explore what such 
changes in sensation might mean.  
Traditional Western philosophy tends to characterise truth in terms of some kind of correspondence 
between internal experience and an external reality (e.g. Dreyfus and Taylor 2015), and yet here, my 
sense of something feeling true seemed to be signalled by a change in my body state, rather than 
being purely cognitive – a kind of coherence for which I would struggle to find an external correlate 
or indeed a particularly good description. Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) suggest that these kinds of 
experiences can be better explained by thinking in terms of contact theories, which are ontologically 
based on the assumption that being arises because we are in constant (conceptual and 
preconceptual) contact with the world as engaged agents (ibid; Shotter 2016). Human being, then, 
arises particularly from being aware of our positions as such engaged agents (Brinkmann 2017), 
which is similar to the argument that Mead makes about human consciousness and self-
consciousness in his theory of human interaction (Mead 1934).  
This is in stark contrast with mediational theories, which rely on the matching up of outside referents 
with internal representations, based essentially on some form of Cartesian dualism. Dreyfus and 
Taylor argue that in contact theories, instead, truth is self-authenticating. Giving examples of how 
one can be sure which year it is, or what activity one is currently undertaking (for example, I am 
currently typing at my computer), they argue that when asked to explain why one is sure, little more 
can be said that ‘when you’re there, you know you’re there’: these are firm aspects of the 
background on which other things are examined (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015: 19).  
Importantly, this is an embodied, temporal process rather than an abstract comparison: the 
sensation of truth is inseparable from how it is arrived at. Further, it is a realist position that, in 
contrast to positivist epistemologies, can more easily cope with the plurality of human experience. 
The argument is that nature has its own ontic structure that is radically independent of human 
agents, and to grasp it we are called to continuously revise and adjust our thinking. However, this 
reality can be multiple and incommensurably described, which accounts for the possibility of 
differences in perception and paradox in experience that are another source of challenge to our 
thinking (Carman 2018).  
What I find interesting about this concept of self-authentication is that it seems to be a way of 
describing a bodily experience of coherence that is not purely relativist or constructed socially in 
language, but rather relates to the embodied apprehension of some kind of pre-established 
meaning; while perhaps seeming a little ambiguous, this captures something about my experience 
that I haven’t found another way to describe. If we can judge something as true based on a bodily 
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sensation, then perhaps we can sense honesty – the sense of having revealed to others and to 
oneself all that might pertain to a particular matter – in a similar way. Based on Dreyfus and Taylor’s 
view, however, this is not necessarily a social phenomenon; but I will critique that position later on.  
To explore this fully would probably require an entire project; but for now, these preliminary 
observations are helpful as they lead to a novel way of understanding my dissatisfaction with 
previous iterations of this project. If something had started to happen that felt more honest, what 
might have been untrue about what had gone before? I was as certain as I could be that my 
descriptions of what had happened hadn’t been deliberately misleading; they were the best account 
I could give of my experience. Yet the sense of something missing had been a theme, and so honesty 
seemed to be something to do with completeness; and, in line with the argument above, my inability 
to identify whatever was missing suggested that it was unformulated, unacknowledged, or perhaps 
even concealed from me as well as from others.  
 
A perspective on concealment from psychoanalysis  
One way we might explore how and why we hide things from ourselves is using the psychoanalytical 
concept of repression. In Freudian theory, repression is one of the possible defensive responses of 
the ego to intolerable instinctual tension: through a turning away of the impulse or idea causing the 
tension from the conscious mind, and thus kept at a safe distance (Freud 1915). Something is not 
repressed once and for all, however; rather, it is an ongoing and dynamic process of intrapsychic 
conflict that can result in problematic symptoms or neuroses. Therefore, if something in my 
experience were being repressed, it could manifest in some dysfunctional way, such as in 
expressions of boredom or frustration. Boredom, in particular, has been characterised as a state of 
someone ‘searching for an object [to discharge a drive], not in order to act on it with his drive-
impulses, but rather to be helped by it to find a drive-aim which he is missing’ (Fenichel 1954: 351). 
If, as Fenichel suggests, a sense of boredom can arise from the sense of an absence of meaning or 
purpose, then could my feelings of frustration have arisen from the sense of something being 
missing? 
Another formulation of how we can unconsciously conceal things from ourselves is found in the 
work of twentieth-century British psychoanalyst John Bowlby. In his theory of attachment, Bowlby 
suggests that early life experiences involving deprivation of and reunion with significant security-
providing figures (usually the mother) inform future patterns of relating (e.g. Bowlby 1961, 1979). 
Where children are unexpectedly deprived of this figure, the common reactions of anger and 
yearning – and finally, the construction of the defence of detachment – over time evolve into 
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healthy approaches to dealing with these kinds of events, but fundamentally promote the conscious 
and unconscious pursuit of security over the anxiety that uncertainty provokes (Marris 1996). In this 
theory, exclusion rather than repression enables the maintenance of security; indeed, the exclusion 
of an important aspect of my own experience might be related to the desire not to address certain 
elements of anxiety-provoking threat to my own feelings of security. As noted earlier, this theory 
informs the arguments that Peter Marris makes about the consequences of the pursuit of security in 
society more widely. 
Given that psychoanalytical therapy might be considered successful when those instincts or ideas 
that have been repressed are brought into consciousness so that they can be better managed (Freud 
1915), or when those emotional responses that have been excluded are experienced therapeutically 
(Bowlby 1961), my learning set could be seen as playing the analyst’s role for me by drawing 
attention to the possibility that what was missing might be related to feelings of security.  
There is no doubt that psychoanalysis has a great deal to offer researchers of organisational life (e.g. 
Jaques 1955; Menzies 1960; Marris 1996; Hirschhorn 1988; Gabriel 1999), and a common corollary 
for the study of organisations is to consider how individual processes occur in these kinds of 
groupings through the transfer of mental contents from one person to another. However, the 
explanations it provides can be seen as problematic for a reason arising from the theoretical basis of 
psychoanalysis: it relies on the primacy of the individual mind as an internal world with inborn drives 
or instincts, and assumes a systems-based way of thinking where individuals are closed entities 
interacting with each other. As with all systems-based theories, this position cannot easily cope with 
some of the inevitable outcomes of experience conceived as social, which begins with the proposal 
that individual minds are social through and through (Mead 1934).  
As I have described in Projects 1 and 2, Mead’s analysis of human interaction proposes a continuity 
between society – the conversation of gestures that occurs between the bodies of different 
individuals – and mind – the conversation of gestures that occurs as a kind of private role-play made 
possible by human beings’ ability to respond to the imagined gestures and responses of others. 
These imaginings are informed by our past experiences and idealisations that arise through our 
continual interactions with others, which together constitute the sense of an increasingly complex 
generalised other. This continuity is important because it explains how individuals or groups of 
individuals interacting with each other involve the same social process as does an individual 
interacting with themselves; and, paradoxically, that what is thought of as individual consciousness 
and self-consciousness can only arise socially. On this basis, the notion of innate drives that play out 
interpersonally becomes problematic.  
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Further, from a more practice-based perspective, if psychoanalysis concerns individual minds, then it 
concerns social or group processes (Dalal 1998); and because group processes involve 
interdependence, mutual constraints, and therefore politics and power relating (Elias 1978), the 
concept of an analytical therapeutic process that relies on a notion of internal worlds where politics 
can be ‘kept out of the room’ (Dalal 1998: 113) seems questionable. That these key features of 
psychoanalytical practice are problematic suggests we might usefully look for other explanations.  
 
A perspective on concealment from critical theory 
Staying with the general idea of omission being somehow related to security, one way we might 
proceed in trying to understand honesty is by referring back to Scott’s theory of public and hidden 
transcripts (1990). As I outlined at the start of this project, Scott (1990) suggests that the public and 
hidden transcripts of interdependent groups function to preserve a dominant but fragile social order 
that is at constant risk of transgression by the oppressed. I suggested that some of the hidden 
transcripts in my organisation were about our personal existential concerns relating to the threat of 
restructure, versus the more acceptable public discourses about continuing to be able to do 
meaningful work.  
By analogy, this provides a way into thinking about what might be missing from my inquiry; but for 
this analogy to be valid, I need to demonstrate how – in contrast to the dynamics of the actual 
master/servant relationships that Scott bases his work upon – the sense of competing social 
discourses can be located in the private social processes of individuals. This is possible with 
reference to the continuity of society and mind I outlined above (Mead 1934). On this basis, rather 
than minds being internal worlds interacting with an outside world and therefore requiring fixed 
positions within social hierarchies to provide a basis for power relating, they can be described as 
social processes patterned with a multiplicity of emergent and contextual qualities. In turn, this 
means that the intersection of multiple discourses and their associated power relations can be 
located in an ‘individual’, but only insofar as this is seen as a temporally dynamic process wholly 
embedded in an enabling and constraining network of social interaction. This way of thinking about 
identity formation is captured well by Ybema et al (2009: 301), who characterise it as:  
a complex, multifaceted process which produces a socially negotiated temporary 
outcome of the dynamic interplay between internal strivings and external 
prescriptions, between self-presentation and labeling by others, between achievement 
and ascription and between regulation and resistance. 
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If we consider the public transcript in my case to have been manifest in how I found myself exploring 
and making sense of my experience, then – based on what I have described – we could characterise 
the dominant order being perpetuated as ostensibly involving the rational (Townley 2008) and 
depersonalised (Baumann 1989) ideals traditionally associated with bureaucracy, along with the 
altruistic ideologies of the public sector. I can locate the origination of these norms in at least three 
social discourses in which I have been involved: my university studies, my work, and the public-
sector culture. In Mead’s terms, these inform my sense of the generalised other and so situate my 
habitual tendencies to respond.  
First, as an undergraduate in analytical philosophy I was trained to test the validity of arguments as 
logical problems rather than much to do with the real world – illustrating the kind of rational bias 
which, it has been argued, arises from the predominance of the scientific paradigm and its 
supposition that some kind of objective position is possible (Mead 1923; Elias 1978). So, I might 
describe a predisposition towards this kind of thinking as a long-established patterning of my 
experience, which is probably also evident in the way that I have just tried to provide a ‘proof’ of the 
validity of the analogy.  
Second, impersonal rationalisation is generally expected in my work: the health and care sector is 
dominated by strategic planning and my organisation is, ostensibly at least, very bureaucratic. I 
suggested in Project 2 that, apart from being a way to impose a rational structure on the complexity 
of organisational life so that work can continue, these plans might also serve as instruments of social 
control functionalised for the perpetuation of managerialism, and/or ways we organise ourselves 
unconsciously to manage our anxiety about our work in the context of a system in decline. Having 
worked in these kinds of organisations for over a decade, I am socialised into such ways of thinking 
and no doubt perpetuate these norms, or rules of conduct, because not to do so would be to break 
with the very things that afford me membership of those groups (Elias and Scotson 1965). Following 
Foucauldian lines of thinking (e.g. Foucault 1975), without being articulated, these norms are likely 
to have a disciplining effect that I do not generally notice; this is a different way of thinking about 
how unconscious processes play out.  
Third, I find there is a strong sense in the service-oriented aspects of the public sector of a kind of 
asceticism that denies personal interests (at least formally). For example, those hired into leadership 
roles are usually asked to contractually commit to abiding by the Nolan Principles of Public Life 
(selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership), by which they 
can then be held to account (Committee on Standards in Public Life 1995). It is not surprising, then, 
as Perry (1996) and Feldheim (2007) find in their studies, that public-sector employees tend to cite 
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these kinds of altruistic concepts as their career motivations. However, it is less clear whether these 
truly are personal ideals voluntarily held, or norms into which individuals have been consciously or 
unconsciously socialised as part of working in public service.  
In either case, as social artefacts that moderate behaviour (Foucault 1975), they are considerable 
constraints on human freedom and, ironically, are perhaps rather inhuman: arguably, degrees of 
selfishness, subjectivity, and privacy are part of what make us who we are. Yet acceptance of these 
norms is part of group membership, which is reinforced in ways that are far subtler than the 
performance of signing a contract. For example, at a recent conference, I participated in a small 
discussion group of about 10 people from a variety of healthcare organisations, in which we found 
ourselves talking about workers’ motivations in the context of managing change processes. 
One member of the group – Ian, the head of patient experience for a hospital – seemed to be 
suggesting that we could always rely on the notion of patient care as a way of overcoming resistance 
to change. Aware of being slightly provocative, I suggested that while this might be important, it 
wasn’t the only thing that motivated people: based on my own experiences of trying to manage 
change, mortgages, family life, or other interests often outweighed patient care in the balance of 
deciding whether to support a change – but these other motivators were less easy to talk about. This 
was a reflection of the argument that concepts like patient care are cult values, which are 
generalised ideals that can emerge in groups, imagined as free of the constraints that their 
functionalisation in particular circumstances necessarily involves (Mead 1923, 1934; Griffin 2002; 
Stacey 2012). They can be problematic if they are seen as totalising in a way that ignores the conflict 
that arises between people as they negotiate with each other to functionalise competing ideals in 
their judgements about what to do.  
I thought I was making a reasonable point about the practicalities of our actual experience of trying 
to manage change and the shortcomings of simply relying on abstract ideals, and so I was somewhat 
surprised by Ian’s highly charged emotional reaction: he became quite agitated, perhaps even angry, 
reiterating his point strongly towards me that patient care was always ultimately at the heart of why 
people worked in healthcare. This rather aggressive attempt to silence me could be seen as an effort 
to preserve identity: it is conceivable that for Ian, against the background of what is seen by many to 
be a fundamental principle of this part of the public sector, it might have been disturbing to have a 
core aspect of his role, as well as his way of thinking about how to resolve conflict, called into 
question in public. Ian’s response itself did not deter me – I still wanted to pursue the argument, 
rather than give in to a totalising error that I suspected limited our ability to really make a difference 
to patient care: taking Ian’s line, I felt, ran the risk of covering over important aspects of why we 
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couldn’t be better at it. It was more that when I scanned the faces of other members of the group in 
search of support, everyone avoided eye contact; I guessed that I was at the boundary of what was 
acceptable according to our group norms, so I relented. This is a further example of the ways we 
maintain group membership through self-censorship by avoiding the shame and stigma that 
challenging deeply held beliefs might occasion (Elias and Scotson 1965). It also provides insights into 
how social norms are perpetuated through everyday interactions.  
Acknowledging these socialisations as the basis of ‘my’ public transcript, following the analogy would 
suggest that there may be hidden transcripts that play out in different spaces, for different 
audiences, and can be more emotionally charged. Bringing in the themes of security, uncertainty, 
and power relating, we might also suggest that ‘my’ hidden transcript concerned values or 
behaviours that I might prefer not to engage with. This started to become more apparent as the 
learning set meeting I was describing continued. 
 
The prospect of a grand dénouement 
As my learning set colleagues and I persevered with trying to find a way through my feeling of being 
stuck, my supervisor asked me who else in my organisation might be feeling bored or stuck. This 
question presented me with another new sensation: it was as if a very faint light had become 
suddenly brighter. With some surprise, I noticed a growing sense of enthusiasm (albeit tinged with 
embarrassment that I had not thought of this before) as I started to describe the context of the 
threat of organisational restructure or merger and the conflicting feelings that these created for me, 
none of which had occurred to me to mention before. I went on to describe how, based on the 
photocopier conversations and staff survey results, it was likely that many of my colleagues were 
thinking about their work in the context of potentially not having jobs in the near future.  
Suddenly, new avenues became available for making sense of why I could do little more than 
describe passing details about Sandra’s team at the away day: perhaps in the context of the 
uncertainty about our ongoing employment, the topics of corporate values and inter-team working 
could only ever seem rather trivial. No wonder I was unable to describe the details of my 
interactions with Sandra’s team, and that writing about the away day for this project might also 
seem trivial. Or perhaps I was more actively avoiding engaging with the group, albeit unconsciously, 
to protect myself (and perhaps us all) from the kind of emotionally charged conversations that 
talking about our real preoccupations with future employment might provoke. Further, apart from 
these kinds of conversations being generally out of keeping with the norms of bureaucratic 
organisations (Fineman 2000, 2001), perhaps I thought Sandra and Jeff might find them at odds with 
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the optimistic tone they needed to maintain to keep the team motivated, and so I shied away from 
provoking such discussions so as to maintain my standing with my sponsors.  
What was coming to light in the conversation was a sense that, while I had been talking and writing 
about competing interests and how OD practitioners are perhaps more self-serving than we might 
usually acknowledge in the particular context of running large group meetings, I had been excluding 
the exploration of those same themes in my wider experience. By focussing on the facilitation of the 
away day in isolation from the anxiety-provoking aspects of the organisational context, I was 
avoiding examining how I was going about, through this same event and otherwise, responding to 
the anxiety of organisational uncertainty by attending to my own interests.  
In Scott’s terms, the conversation with my learning set had enabled a transgression of the orderly, 
principled and selfless public transcript of management in the health and care sector with something 
that is usually excluded – both organisationally and personally. This transgression created a sense of 
an opportunity for social transformation; again, I draw attention here to how the dynamic 
relationship between hidden and public transcripts is evoked in the private processes of individuals.  
 
Engaging with the ‘main chance’ of self-advancement 
The moral philosopher G.E. Moore suggested that altruism denotes the theory that ‘we ought always 
to aim at other people’s happiness, on the grounds that this is the best means of securing our own as 
well as theirs’ (Moore 1903: §58, italics added). In other words, selflessness always implies a degree 
of selfishness, however noble or otherwise one’s intentions may be.  
It occurs to me that, for the reasons discussed above relating to the norms by which we ostensibly 
operate in the public sector, a kind of inhuman fairness is implied that denies the possibility of extra-
meritocratic considerations playing into most aspects of work. For example, while we might like to 
believe that our decision-making conforms to calculable rules (Townley 2008), it is argued that most 
of what happens in organisations is actually political, but this is often omitted from official narratives 
(Gunn and Chen 2003; Vigoda 2003). Alternatively, in recruitment and promotion, public-sector 
appointments (at least, those that are not part of national or local political cycles) usually claim to be 
based on fair and transparent recruitment or talent management processes; this is at odds, 
however, with research that clearly describes the role patronage plays in how people actually 
advance in their careers (e.g. Powell et al 2012). 
In the corporate world, these practices and the associated response of employees to focus on the 
‘main chance’ of self-advancement (Jackall 2009) through various forms of impression management 
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(Kowalski and Leary 1990; Drory and Zaidman 2003) are perhaps more expected, if not necessarily 
more acceptable. In the public sector as I have experienced it, these same practices tend to be 
couched in terms, for example, of wanting to make a greater social difference rather than being 
acknowledged as the simultaneously self-serving acts they may be. In the photocopier conversations 
I have had about the impending restructure, and indeed in my own team’s development sessions, 
while we have been thinking about how we collectively position ourselves to maximise our chances 
of survival, we haven’t talked about what we might be doing individually to secure our futures.  
And this is what I now notice I had been doing in the earlier iterations of this project: in my initial 
drafts, my apparent inability or reluctance to engage with the aspects of my experience that concern 
how I am going about trying to secure my own organisational survival could have been a way to 
avoid dealing with the somewhat less noble topics of what we might all be doing to survive, and the 
deep-rooted shame we might experience when these threaten to surface. Further, this is likely to 
involve being in competition with each other; this seems at odds with working for the common good 
and teamwork – which, like patient care, are idealised as cult values.  
Recall the conversation with Jeff: despite feeling undervalued and resistant to the request, I agreed 
to take on the work and explained this to myself in terms of helping Jeff and becoming a better 
practitioner. Given the specific context of uncertainty about the organisation’s future, it is plausible 
that my accepting the request was based to a significant extent on the desire to be recognised by 
Jeff – and by proxy, Sandra – as helpful. And there are good reasons for this: Sandra is an important 
person in my organisation – she has worked in national oversight roles for more than a decade, and 
is well-respected. Her team does the difficult job of supporting some of the sector’s most challenged 
organisations admirably and, further, she is likely to have a significant say in the arrangements 
resulting from a reorganisation or merger. Being recognised as helpful and good at one’s job by 
Sandra is therefore a desirable place to find oneself in terms of future survival and it is perhaps no 
wonder that I agreed to help, despite the challenges this presented to my self-image.  
 
Embodiment, self-authentication, and social reconstruction  
This begins to expose some of what I had been reluctant to engage with until I was led into these 
aspects of my experience by my learning set’s provocations to find alternative explanations for what 
was going on. Despite the noble, selfless ideals into which I have been socialised, there is a hidden 
transcript of less palatable, selfish concerns that I would prefer not to entertain because engaging 
with my response to this existential uncertainty could be distressing.  
Indeed, when my relationship with Sandra came up in the conversation with my learning set, I felt 
flooded with conflicting feelings: from a research perspective, I was excited about starting to grasp 
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something that felt more important than what I had been writing about previously; at the same 
time, from a professional perspective, I felt dismayed as I considered what exposing my own, largely 
unconscious, political manoeuvrings might mean for me in terms of my desired self-image. I also felt 
embarrassed for not having noticed all this in earlier iterations of my project. However, far from 
being debilitating, these messy, conflictual feelings paradoxically created a new sense of coherence 
or honesty; and I was exhilarated by the accompanying sense of optimism that emerged. 
Interestingly, this is in contrast to popular theories from positive psychology and neuroscience 
suggesting that people are at their most creative when they feel comfortable or happy (see, for 
example, Brann 2015). 
As mentioned earlier, Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) suggest that truth can be thought of as a self-
authenticating experience of ‘knowing you’re there’ that is inseparable from the route by which one 
comes to it; I saw my strong and conflictual feelings as a signal that something important might be 
happening. Drawing a connection here back to the description of identity formation provided by 
Ybema et al (2009), in the same way that identities might be described as conflictual, responsive, 
and negotiated in the moment, we could also regard emotions as bodily responses to stimuli – just 
as thoughts and speech acts are responses, based in habit, to the actual or imagined gestures of 
others (e.g. Burkitt 1999, 2014). Therefore, when we notice that our emotions are strong and 
ambivalent, this could indicate that a significant process of reorganisation of our experience or 
identity is underway, which may result in meaningful changes in our patterns of behaviour or 
thought.  
That these emotional experiences suggestive of social reconstruction are almost prohibited by the 
kind of impersonal ideals expressed in the Nolan principles, and maintained by the kind of 
interaction I had with Ian (rejecting my challenges to his apparently deeply held beliefs), perhaps 
offers important insights into why change seems to be so slow and difficult in the public sector. 
What might the world be like if strong reactions were seen as opportunities for change that we 
should rush towards, rather than being suppressed, or intellectualised, or turned into puzzles that 
we can pay consultancies to solve for us? If we could accept that sometimes these uncomfortable 
experiences will be intolerable, could staying with them for even a little longer afford us more hope 
and optimism about doing the meaningful work we claim to want to do?  
It is these kinds of experiences that are leading me towards a sense that what I am now exploring in 
this project is important to me; and this seems bound up in just this question of the extent to which 
my research, and working as an OD practitioner, offers opportunities to think differently about what 
I and others have been doing with more of my experience in view.  
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Social reconstruction and personality reconstruction 
It would be easy to think of the process of social reconstruction (or becoming unstuck or changing 
one’s mind) as an individual process, and, as mentioned earlier, self-authentication – as Dreyfus and 
Taylor describe it – has a similar connotation. However, I argued earlier for the Meadian position of 
individuals being social through and through; and from that basis, these processes can only be 
considered as being social.  
Taking social reconstruction first, Mead is very clear that, most broadly, social reconstruction and 
personality reconstruction are two sides of the same coin:  
Social reconstruction by the individual members of any organised human society entails self or 
personality reconstruction in some degree or other by each of these individuals, and vice 
versa, for, since their selves or personalities are constituted by the organised social relations 
to one another, they cannot reconstruct those selves or personalities without also 
reconstructing, to some extent, the given social order, which is, of course, likewise constituted 
by their organised social relations to one another. (Mead 1934: 309)  
I think what Mead is drawing attention to here is the idea of individual members of societies being 
the intersections of a myriad of continually evolving, population-wide patterns of interaction (Stacey 
2003, 2009, 2012; Stacey and Mowles 2016). Far from being independent, closed entities interacting 
with each other in systems, individuals and society paradoxically form and are formed by each other; 
this is how cultures arise and habitus2 evolves. Therefore, personality reconstruction constitutes 
changes in patterns for social relating, and vice versa: social reconstruction constitutes changes in 
individual identities as social phenomena. 
Arguably, we are having these kinds of experiences all the time as we encounter and overcome tiny 
mismatches between our expectations and our experience; but the kind of experience of social 
reconstruction that is of particular interest to me is that which leads to a bodily sensation of being 
somehow more honest. How might we construe this particular kind of self-authentication as a social 
process?  
 
2 Bourdieu defines habitus as a ‘system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices 
and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious 
aiming at ends or by an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them’ (1990: 53). I 
interpret this as the evolving background social conditionings that unreflectively structure experience, and 
through which identities and social orders are produced and reproduced. 
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Self-authentication and embodiment 
To explore this adequately, we need to grasp a further aspect of Mead’s theoretical programme: in 
addition to mind and society, Mead describes the notion of self (and therefore self-consciousness) as 
the subject taking itself as an object. Mead explains this using the concepts of ‘me’ (self-as-object) 
and ‘I’ (self-as-subject). ‘Me’ signifies particular, temporal and context-specific organisations of the 
generalised other that call out responsive actions. It is a constraining aspect of self, representing the 
rules into which we are socialised. ‘I’, then, signifies that aspect of self which is spontaneously and 
unpredictably responding to ‘me’. It is important to note that for Mead, ‘I’ and ‘me’ are therefore 
functionally discriminable but inseparable phases of self; because they mutually define each other, it 
is important that they are thought of as ongoing dialectical processes, and not reifications as their 
nomenclature might suggest. 
Because ‘me’ is socially formed and therefore must reflect our histories, the constraints of 
interdependence, and the power relations inherent to them, I suggest that the experience of social 
constraint – feeling allowed to do some but not other things – and the occasional lack of it, is one 
way of understanding self-authentication based on Mead’s further description of the potential for 
fusion of ‘I’ and ‘me’: 
It is where the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ can in some sense fuse that there arises the peculiar sense of 
exaltation which belongs to the religious and patriotic attitudes in which the reaction which 
one calls out in others is the response which one is making himself. (Mead 1934: 273) 
Further, 
From the emotional standpoint such situations are peculiarly precious. They involve, of 
course, the successful completion of the social process. (ibid: 275) 
I think Mead is saying here that there are some instances where we temporarily experience a sense 
of harmony with others in our social field that feels somehow free of the constraints of 
interdependence. At its logical extreme, this is the ‘completion of the social process’ because Mead 
regards the aim of society to be the full integration of individuals with their communities (ibid: 
319ff). That Mead’s examples of ‘I’/‘me’ fusion are religious and patriotic moments, or the 
experiences of effective teamwork, perhaps suggests an underlying communitarian ideology; one 
could equally see the ‘I’/‘me’ fusion as a feature of less desirable groups who nevertheless share 
strong beliefs. What is important here is the experience of social harmony and the sense that those 
experiences are especially valued.  
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By the continuity of minds and society, we can argue that this sense of harmony can also be a 
solitary experience (i.e. in private conversations with oneself rather than in conversation with 
others); this may explain the particularly poignant instances of Dreyfus and Taylor’s notion of self-
authentication I am interested in as social processes. Further, because their theory is contact-based 
(or preconceptual) rather than mediational (or cognitive), this is an embodied experience rather 
than an intellectual one. To be clear, however, this is not to say that poignant moments of self-
authentication are always necessarily pleasurable; rather, the contexts in which they occur and the 
nature of what they reveal are likely to determine the valence of the accompanying feelings – we 
can easily imagine, for example, quite depressing moments of realising something displeasing. 
However, in the context under discussion, my own poignant moment of self-authentication arose 
with feeling able to move on with my research, which happened to be pleasing.  
That I characterise this experience as involving honesty perhaps reveals a further aspect of my own 
values – in addition to the set of beliefs I noted at the start of this project, there is something about 
striving for the broadest spectrum of perspectives that seems to be important to me. Reverting to 
the conclusions from Project 2 (P2: 52), this may well be bound up in Mead’s notion of morality and 
leads me to want to investigate the ways in which we find ourselves trying to cope ethically with the 
inevitable uncertainty of social life. 
 
Concluding remarks and areas for further research 
In this project, I have inquired into the ways that avoiding anxiety-provoking aspects of our 
experience can lead to an unsatisfying focus on trivialities, boredom, and frustration. I have 
described how the idea of something being missing led me to look into how – consciously or 
unconsciously – we hide things not just from others, but from ourselves. From a psychoanalytical 
perspective, I found the focus in Bowlby’s attachment theory on pursuing security, and the social 
and political consequences of the associated avoidance of uncertainty that Marris describes, helpful 
in making sense of my experience.  
However, critiquing the theoretical basis of psychoanalysis as insufficiently able to cope with the 
notion of minds as social through and through led me to seek alternative explanations for 
concealment. Considering this from the perspective of critical theory, I proposed that Scott’s 
concept of public and hidden transcripts, construed as a dynamic interplay of social orders that can 
be evoked in the private processes of the individual, offered a compelling alternative way of thinking 
about how and why we might hide things from ourselves. In my case, the relevant competing 
discourses appeared to concern, on the one hand, the self-sacrificing ideals of public-sector work 
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and, on the other, the existential concerns of employees that are negated through shame and guilt 
as they try to live up to their purported ideals and maintain membership of their social groups. 
I found that engaging with aspects of my experience that I had perhaps been socialised to avoid 
meant confronting the steps I was taking to secure my own future in response to the latent threat of 
organisational restructure. I described how the process of becoming unstuck had been facilitated by 
conversations with my learning set, and how the discomfort I felt led to an embodied experience of 
greater honesty, which I saw as bringing the totality of my experience more clearly into view; this 
allowed me to move on in my research, as well as giving me new ways to think about my practice.  
I described this as a process of social reconstruction and that my moments of becoming unstuck 
could be seen as particularly poignant instances of what Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) call self-
authentication in their contact-based epistemological programme. Noting the potentially 
individualistic conception of these terms, I showed how both could be seen in social terms, and 
especially how self-authentication could be reframed as a particular state (the fusion of the ‘I’ and 
the ‘me’) in Mead’s theory of human interaction. Based on my arguments in Project 2, deepening my 
inquiry in this way is a moral process because it increases my capacity to act by offering a richer 
understanding of the complexity of my experience.  
I am now struck by how this project has brought to light a personal preoccupation I had not noticed 
before: seeking the comfort offered by illusions of wholeness. I am becoming aware of this as a 
pattern in my experience – whether making sense of my experience in terms of honesty, or (as in 
previous projects) resorting to metatheory to resolve the conflicts in my immediate experience by 
invoking different kinds of unity. From an attachment theory perspective, one might see this as 
another example of the pursuit of security – if only we could know everything, we could be certain of 
the practical and ethical consequences of our actions. 
I am therefore starting my fourth project intending to explore how idealised totalities – driven by a 
desire for security, and perhaps inevitably accompanied by feelings of hope, doubt, and 
disappointment – play out in organisational life, and how considering alternative ways of dealing 
with uncertainty might increase our capacity to act. 
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PROJECT 4:  
Expertise as a relational practice: exploring the paradox of shame 
and self-respect 
Introduction  
I have been working for my organisation for two and a half years and continue to have a dual role 
developing leadership and governance policy for health and care service providers in the UK, and 
providing OD consultancy support to various internal teams.  
Planning for the organisational restructure that I explored in Project 3 is now very much formally 
underway: the completion of a review of our joint working arrangements with other national bodies 
involved in sector oversight is imminent and the resultant changes are likely to be far-reaching. The 
official intention of the restructure is to create an oversight architecture that resolves some of the 
current problems of fragmentation and duplication across the sector, which gives rise to ambiguity 
and mixed messages from the perspective of the organisations we collectively oversee.  
As the most senior organisational leaders are being more explicit about the kinds of changes that are 
likely to happen, conversations about what people are thinking about the organisation’s future are 
also becoming more open. This is particularly in cases where decisions about key pieces of work or 
recruitment are concerned: people seem keen to wait to see who their new leaders will be before 
making significant commitments. I find it interesting that conversations about where people may 
end up individually in the new structures remain comparatively infrequent, at least in public. Based 
on my explorations in Project 2, this is perhaps a bureaucratic ideology playing out: if people at all 
levels are thought of as interchangeable units of labour, and work is carried out through functional 
division according to calculable rules, then what place do individuals’ histories, interests, or 
intentions have in the discourse of organisational life? Further, what responsibility can senior leaders 
take for their teams when team members, and the leaders themselves, are constantly changing? 
Alternatively, from my explorations in Project 3, we could also interpret the lack of discussion about 
individuals’ futures as an avoidance of the anxiety stirred by engaging with the uncertainty of the 
restructure; it may also be due to the implicit norms of our sector, which eschew public discussion of 
self-interested concerns in favour of declaring more altruistic intentions.  
It may be that all of this matters less to others than it does to me, though I find that somewhat 
difficult to believe: in various ways, we are all likely to be at risk of redeployment or redundancy in 
this process, which is different from the previous restructure. I am aware, however, that one of the 
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reasons the restructure is personally preoccupying – beyond paying attention to these processes in 
my research – is because my dual role means that where I might find myself in the new 
organisational structure is less clear than it might be for others who have more defined remits. 
In this context, I am still working with the Support Directorate, led by Sandra and her business 
manager Jeff, whom I wrote about in Project 3. I have been their OD ‘coach’ for two years now, 
which involves providing input to their OD working group, and helping to design and facilitate their 
whole-directorate development days. As I have been designing and running these kinds of events 
over the last few years, I have been increasingly thinking about how to improve their relevance to 
participants, in the hope that they will no longer see such events as frivolous distractions from the 
actual work they’re employed to do. In Project 3, I found that bringing in aspects of my experience 
that I might unconsciously prefer to leave out could illuminate more of what might be going on as I 
tried to work with others, and evoked a greater sense of honesty.  
I believe this provided new capacities for action, which also points to a wider pattern that is 
emerging in my approach to work and my research: exploring scholarship in the fields of social 
anthropology, critical theory, psychoanalysis, and group analysis has illuminated new aspects of my 
experience, recognition of which gives me a greater sense of choice when I am presented with 
challenging situations. I now find myself considering alternative perspectives on my experience more 
or less as a matter of course, and while one might see this leading towards a kind of nihilistic, radical 
perspectivism, I do not consider myself a relativist; rather, I think it is by considering these 
perspectives that we are better able to take responsibility for what we do end up doing. From the 
Meadian position on morality that I have previously argued for, the process of seeking out the 
widest range of perspectives on the matter at hand, and then making a judgement on the balance of 
interests, including one’s own (Mead 1934), is a way to be ethical when we take seriously the 
inherent fallibility of our sense-making processes.  
As part of this movement of my thought, I now notice myself consciously trying to make sure that 
people are given the opportunity to talk about the things that interest or worry them in the 
development sessions I design, so that they too have the opportunity to discover more options for 
what they do with others. I therefore tend to prefer less structured activities that allow plenty of 
time for interaction and self-organisation, and so find myself quite often suggesting approaches like 
World Café (Brown and Isaacs 2005) and Open Space Technology (OST; Owen 1992), or modified 
versions of these based on similar principles given the particular situational constraints. I realise that 
not everyone may find these activities comfortable or desirable, especially if they break with the 
more established routines associated with these kinds of events; however, I feel it is the right thing 
to do. 
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Recently, I worked with Sandra and Jeff on their fourth away day, my account of which forms the 
start of this project.  
Preparing for the away day 
Over the course of the previous events I had facilitated for them, my ability to influence the 
structure of the Support Directorate’s away days and the kinds of activities we might engage in has 
increased considerably. Compared to the first event, where all I had really been asked to do was 
keep time, I am now able to suggest using techniques like OST and be relatively sure that they will be 
accepted. I have heard Jeff describe such approaches as ‘wacky’, but I take this simply as an 
acknowledgement that they diverge from the usual expectations in our context. This negotiation 
tends to be via the OD working group, whose members are experienced senior managers from 
across the directorate whose day job is to support care providers to improve their performance, but 
who have also expressed an interest in trying to improve ways of working within the directorate. The 
group is chaired by Jeff; he and most of the group’s members – despite the group’s name – have no 
particular OD experience beyond the development activities they have participated in themselves, 
and their own experience of trying to support others.  
In preparing for the fourth away day, I attended the OD working group meeting to agree what we 
would be doing. After a general discussion about the feedback from the previous meeting, imagining 
that lots of people would have the organisational changes on their minds and might find exploring 
that with each other helpful, I suggested that it might be a good idea to give people an opportunity 
to talk about what was worrying them; otherwise, the day might feel a bit trivial given what was 
currently happening in the organisation. Further, as the 80 or so senior managers who would be 
attending the away day had, by now, been getting to know each other for a couple of years, I 
thought that we could give them quite a lot of autonomy in deciding how they wanted to use their 
time together. On this basis, I put forward a simple plan for the day following the rough formula we 
had established over the previous three events: an introduction from Sandra (she likes to do this, 
but then prefers to engage as a participant in subsequent activities); an address from the chief 
executive (in particular about the organisational changes); a World Café-inspired session, to share 
and develop workplans for the year; a ‘self-organising’ session using a modified version of OST to 
give people, in my view, the freedom to talk about what was important to them; and, finally, the 
directorate recognition awards.  
As I suggested this plan to the OD working group, while they seemed comfortable with the overall 
proposal, they asked me so many questions about the proposed modified OST session that I realised 
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it was clearly making some of them nervous. I tried to address this in a number of ways. With an odd 
sense of ‘performing’ (given how many times I have explained this before), first, I explained the 
origins of the technique in Harrison Owen’s idea that much of what people find useful about 
structured events occurs in the coffee breaks. Then I described the process of allowing group 
members to suggest topics ‘in the moment’ in response to an animating framing question, and the 
idea that people could follow their interests and move between groups as the discussions 
progressed. I re-emphasised how this gives responsibility to the participants for how they use their 
time together.  
I have previously critiqued as rather idealistic some of the assumptions made in what are now being 
called dialogic OD interventions (Bushe and Marshak 2013, 2015), of which OST is one: as I will 
explain later, while the idea that skilfully changing conversations in organisations leads to positive 
change may be attractive, we have no guarantees that these interventions will have the kind of 
impact anticipated by those leading change. I still find myself using the techniques, but on a different 
theoretical basis from the way they tend to be traditionally explained. To some extent, this is so that 
I can retain a sense of integrity or honesty about my practice, which seems to be important for me: if 
I do not agree with the theoretical foundations of the interventions I am advocating, why should 
anyone else?  
Taking OST as an example, the principles underpinning this technique are usually explained in terms 
of humanistic psychology and the formative causality associated with systems thinking. The 
assumption is that, given the right conditions, the unrealised potential somehow naturally enfolded 
in people working together will be released to achieve the desired ends (e.g. Emery and Purser 
1996). Instead, based on my DMan research, I prefer to conceptualise it as an activity that takes up 
key ideas involved in understanding human interaction as complex responsive processes (Stacey 
2003, 2009, 2012; Stacey and Mowles 2016). I will explain this briefly.  
 
Open Space Technology from the perspective of human interaction as complex responsive 
processes 
In Harrison Owen’s original formulation of OST (Owen 1992), the event sponsors and facilitator are 
meant to come up with an emotive and engaging framing question, the resolution of which is widely 
recognised as urgent and complex. The question is intended to attract participants who then 
propose topics they would like to discuss in relation to it, using a marketplace/bulletin board. 
Conversations about these topics then occur over a day or more, resulting in documented evidence 
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of the discussions that is given back to the participating community to take forward. Importantly, 
OST aims to flatten hierarchy, encourage a sense of freedom and responsibility, and create a 
temporary feeling of community in which different conversations can occur. From a dialogic OD 
perspective, these changes in conversational patterns also influence the social reality in some 
helpful way that advances the organisation (Bushe and Marshak 2013, 2015).  
In terms of understanding these steps as complex responsive processes, the framing question in OST 
can be seen as a gesture from the sponsors to others to engage with a topic that is important, and to 
which participants are expected to have different and unpredictable responses based on their own 
histories and interpretative tendencies (Mead 1934; Gadamer 1975). As an initial response, they will 
attend or not based on whether the question does indeed resonate; and if they do choose to attend, 
participants can make further gestures in the form of proposed discussion topics. Again, these topics 
may resonate with others, or not; and participants can then choose to attend discussions on the 
basis of their interpretations as further responses. They may find themselves more or less interested 
in the discussion they attend, depending on whether it meets their expectations or needs. OST 
legitimises moving between discussions (the ‘law of two feet’); this offers further opportunities to 
break out of established social orders and their inherent power relations, which might not be 
possible in more traditional meeting settings.  
One could argue, therefore, that OST is an approach to engagement that takes seriously and 
responds to the unpredictability of human interaction in the face of more managerialist ways of 
thinking in organisational life. Where OST is perhaps idealistic, however, is in the suggestion that 
extant social figurations (Elias 1978) can be so disrupted that they do not continue to play out in 
significant ways, regardless of the rhetoric about full participation in these kinds of events (Shaw 
2002). Particularly when they are conducted within more established groups – or, as I ran it in the 
specific session I will shortly describe, at an away day where the directorate members were already 
present – participants’ ability to disrupt established patterns of power relating may be limited, 
because they are surrounded by their colleagues. This may constrain how participants engage with 
the process: the topics they feel able to propose, their choice of which discussions to attend and 
what they feel able to contribute in those discussions, could all be influenced by how they imagine 
others will respond. A sophisticated use of this approach might therefore include considering how 
these kinds of processes playing out – as magnifications of ongoing patterns of relating – are also a 
rich source of data to which OD practitioners might also respond when they try to support the 
development of organisations.  
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However, continuing the argument above, rather than being the neutral, disinterested guides they 
are sometimes held up to be (e.g. Justice and Jamieson 1998), practitioners are also likely to be 
caught up in these figurations and patterns of relating. Our individual social histories are inescapable 
and are brought to bear, consciously or unconsciously, in all of our judgements; so any 
interpretations or responses proposed by practitioners as part of their work must always be 
understood, using the terms from anthropology, as emic (from within the group) rather than etic 
(from outside the group) (Denzin 2014; Denzin and Lincoln 2017).  
Gadamer uses the term prejudice – meaning the pre-judgements that are brought to bear 
consciously and unconsciously in our practical judgements (Gadamer 1975: 283) – to describe this 
necessary historical situatedness. I introduce these ideas here as a reminder that, in a similar vein, 
this project itself is idiographic rather than nomothetic: I cannot escape my own unique history and 
relationship with the Support Directorate, and so my observations about my experience in what 
follows must be understood accordingly.  
 
To share or not to share; is that the question? 
Now, of course I did not explain to the OD working group all of my thinking about OST in terms of 
the complex responsive processes perspective – there was no obvious need to engage in a detailed 
theoretical discussion about the nature of experience; but it was important for me to be able to 
think through this argument, perhaps to reassure myself that my membership of the community of 
OD practitioners who can explain what they are doing, and of the DMan research community, was 
legitimate. This is a way of taking responsibility that I consider important, and I suppose reveals a 
desire to demonstrate (if only to myself) the credentials that I believe afford me membership of 
particular communities, to assuage the anxiety associated with the possibility of exclusion; I will 
come back to this.  
In any case, the group flooded me with questions – perhaps out of curiosity, or scepticism, or a mix. 
How exactly would the session work? What did I think people would want to talk about? Had I run 
these sessions before? What if there were no topics? What if there were too many topics? How 
would people choose which topic they wanted to go to? Would the ‘law of two feet’ apply? I 
ascribed some of the questions to unfamiliarity with the technique, so I was happy to rehearse the 
procedure. I have used and participated in this version of OST many times, and there have always 
been topics, even if they come a little slowly at first; I tried to reassure the group by recounting 
some of these experiences.  
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However, while I was telling them not to worry, privately, I noticed a tension between what I was 
saying and a heightened sense of uncertainty about how things would actually go. In many ways, I 
shared some of the anxiety that was being articulated as questions: every time I use this version of 
OST, when the moment for suggesting topics actually arrives, I have my heart in my mouth, so to 
speak, wondering what will happen. This has been compounded by my research, which emphasises 
the unpredictability of social life: when human experience is understood as complex responsive 
processes of interaction (Stacey 2003, 2009, 2012; Stacey and Mowles 2016), the agents who make 
up organisations need to be understood as having an infinite capacity for unpredictable and 
responsive novelty (Mead 1934). If we also consider the ‘butterfly effect’, whereby small variations 
in the initial starting conditions of non-linear systems can lead to dramatic differences in the impact 
of small perturbations, then perhaps we can never really predict what the effect of an intervention 
will be in an organisation, beyond some general expectations that will eventually be validated or not.  
This profound sense of uncertainty has been increasingly on my mind whenever I use OST, yet each 
time I have always been surprised by the number of topics that are volunteered. Arguably, my 
prejudices in this respect now include a pattern involving doubt and relief, which I take as given.  
Following my explanations, some of the OD group members did seem reassured and even suggested 
topics they might propose on the day. I speculated privately, however, that others were reserving 
judgement or at least not vocalising their concerns; but it is difficult to say why, beyond a general 
sense of lack of resolution. This leads me to think that there was potentially a great deal that was 
being communicated non-verbally, and perhaps unconsciously, to which we were all responding as 
we made sense of the affectual qualities permeating the group. Feeling tentatively reassured, and 
probably compelled by my belief in these kinds of activities as useful, I pushed us towards a decision: 
we agreed to proceed with the proposed approach and agenda.  
Perhaps noticing that the conclusion of this discussion felt more like acquiescence than the 
enthusiastic agreement I might have preferred and have previously experienced, I added that I could 
understand why people might be anxious about this kind of unstructured activity. I stated that based 
on what I have been exploring in my research, not giving people at least some time to talk about 
some of what was worrying them in the context of the organisational changes, though it might be 
unpredictable and perhaps difficult, might at best make an away day at this point in time seem 
rather trivial; at worst, to deny people this opportunity might even be ethically problematic. 
On reflection, I find it interesting to consider that I was reluctant to share more of my own concerns 
about using techniques like OST with the group to whom I was proposing it, when they were 
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expressing their doubts. While I have a clear sense of why these processes are more appealing to me 
than more structured activities, I feel that there is more to explore about why I chose not to vocalise 
more of my thinking with the group. This is particularly striking given that I have argued previously 
for the Meadian notion of morality. In those terms, by not expressing all of my concerns, was I 
negating the moral agency of the group’s members by asserting my own? This revaluation sits 
uncomfortably with me, and I am keen to explore further how this kind of situation comes about. 
 
A need to deal with strangers 
I have found exploring the relationship between trust and expertise in organisations to be a 
productive way of making sense of my experience. One way we might go about this is to consider 
what seems to be a deeply habitual attraction to fantasies of wholeness, apparent in so many 
aspects of the history of Western thought, for example: 
• Philosophy – in Plato’s notion of the form of the good, or Hegel’s notion of the absolute 
spirit, or Mead’s notion of a universal community; 
• Psychoanalysis – in ideas about the desire for security that goes with the certainty of reunion 
in attachment theory, or Freud’s theory of primary narcissism, or the Lacanian idea of a 
yearning for wholeness arising from the lack of enjoyment that comes from being split; 
• Management theory – in its reliance on reified, decontextualised models and techniques 
that distort reality towards particular ends, or the idea of bureaucracy where work and 
labour can be functionally divided to add back up to a whole; or in systems thinking, which 
imagines that some whole beyond the local interaction of human agents can have agency.  
 
We might argue, therefore, that trust in expertise relates to the imagined possibility of omniscience 
as an aspect of the wider pattern of attraction to wholeness in Western thought: if someone knows 
everything and has altruistic motives, then, surely, they are trustworthy because they will be best 
able to take a decision on the balance of relevant goods? We might go on to try to explain the 
attraction to these wholes in terms of, for example, the Lacanian or attachment theory perspectives 
from psychoanalysis mentioned above, as the security and comfort offered by such fantasies.  
This way of thinking seems to appeal to the same assumption that there is an abstract unifying 
explanation to be found; and a problem with this kind of thinking is that any imagined coherent 
totality abstracted from context is likely to ignore important conflicts that arise when it is brought to 
bear in a particular situation because of the constraints of social interdependence (Elias 1978) and 
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the essential paradox of self-consciousness (Mead 1934). From a systems-thinking perspective, the 
only way out of the paradoxes that arise in our experience is through appeal to other levels of 
understanding in which the paradoxes disappear (for example through double-loop learning [Argyris 
and Schön 1974; Bateson 1972; Argyris 1982]), and the central premise of Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem3 (Gödel 1986) is that there are always paradoxes in any logical system. However, the 
temporal and perspectival instability of meaning draws our attention to the way that these 
decontextualised abstract ideas deny the historical situatedness and temporality of our experience.  
If instead we see social change as the evolution of population-wide patterns that emerge in the 
interactive processes of local agents endlessly responding to conscious and unconscious experiences 
of everything that has gone before, then there can be no fixed rules playing out because there is 
nothing more or less to social life than the experiences of those interacting agents. Another way of 
thinking about trust in expertise, then, is to take a Foucauldian approach and see it as the new 
problematisation of some ongoing social phenomenon that serves to maintain a particular kind of 
social order. This is how we might describe the approach that contemporary British sociologist, 
Anthony Giddens, takes in The Consequences of Modernity (1990). There, he argues social relations 
in modern society are dis-embedded, and that this is in contrast to pre-modern societies, in which 
trust tended to be based on intimate knowledge of the members of one’s community, their family 
histories and so on. By this, he means that relations that would have been specifically temporally 
and spatially located in particular communities become abstracted from those contexts, and this 
creates new requirements for relating to allow societies to continue to function.  
Gadamer describes how our prejudices, when brought to bear in a particular situation, prompt 
interpretations based on a fore-conception of completeness – by this he means that our initial 
encounter with a gesture prompts an understanding, or possible understandings, of that gesture as 
part of a coherent idea of the future (Gadamer 1975: 279). For example, reading the first page of a 
novel prompts us to imagine how the whole story might play out. Importantly, these fore-
conceptions are based on the experience or knowledge we already have. In large, fast-changing, 
modern societies, it is impossible to know everyone in the way that one might in a small, stable 
community; yet the complex arrangement of goods and services requires us to have some kind of 
social contract that enables us to interact with people. As individuals have less and less direct access 
 
3 Gödel’s incompleteness theorem states that for a theory, T, that proves only true statements, then the statement, G, of 
T, which says of itself that it is not provable in T, is neither provable nor disprovable in T (because both G and −G are not 
provable in T). Therefore, in every theory T, there is at least one statement that cannot be proved in T and hence the 
consistency of T can only be proved within a larger theory T′, where TT′. 
89 
 
to the society in which they have to operate, they find themselves relying more and more on 
imagined communities (Anderson 1983). Following the twentieth-century sociologist Karl 
Mannheim’s thinking on ideology, which he describes as ‘magical systems of explanation’ 
(Mannheim 1936: 89) that arise unconsciously and function to stabilise society, new ideologies (as a 
particular kind of fore-conception of completeness) are perhaps likely to arise in modern societies in 
a way that may not have been the case in smaller communities.  
Giddens argues that these interactions involve a need to trust strangers. For example, in our most 
general interactions, we cannot know that every person we pass in the street is not trying to harm 
us, but we have to trust that they are not. We may come to see some neighbourhoods as safe if our 
experiences are generally trouble-free. At the other end of the spectrum, in what we might call 
‘specialised’ interactions, while we may not personally know the doctor who is treating us for our 
health condition, we need to trust them enough to follow their advice, as we cannot all be medically 
trained. If we have positive experiences of these interactions over time, our trust, or confidence, in 
the individual with whom we are interacting may increase, though we may know little more personal 
information about our doctor than their name. One might see my role as OD coach for the Support 
Directorate in these terms: although I meet the group members twice a year formally in the away 
days, and every few months in the OD working group meeting, I feel very much an outsider rather 
than a member of the group. However, there is enough consistency in my relationship with Sandra 
and Jeff to provide a sense of accumulated confidence in me, so perhaps this establishes a certain 
level of trust among the group.  
It is important to notice that both of these examples involve interacting with strangers, and 
therefore varying degrees of indeterminacy: as the sociologist and philosopher Zygmunt Bauman 
argues in Modernity and Ambivalence (1991), in the dualism of friends (like me) and enemies (not 
like me), strangers are those not yet known to be friends or enemies; they are therefore potential 
threats who call the friend/enemy duality into question, and, by extension stand for the fallibility of 
social order more generally. The feminist philosopher, literary critic and psychoanalyst, Julia 
Kristeva, defined abjection as the casting away of whatever blurs the boundary of subjectivity and 
objectivity, occasioned by bodily experiences of horror or disgust (Kristeva 1982). For Kristeva, when 
we encounter our own bodily waste, or wounds, or corpses, though we may wish to cast them away, 
we cannot fully ‘other’ them because they are somehow part of our being; instead, we abject them – 
which I interpret as a paradoxical experience of acceptance and rejection. In both perspectives, our 
disturbing encounters with liminality (Horvath et al 2017; Szakolczai 2017) force us to consider the 
contingency of our identities and the social order. Our conscious or unconscious choices can be 
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understood as claims to what kind of people we want to be and in what kinds of societies, and are 
therefore processes of identity formation and the production of social order. 
Therefore, although entering into these temporary trusting relationships is necessitated by the lack 
of alternatives for dealing with our legitimate ignorance of areas of specialist knowledge, this trust is 
often accompanied to varying degrees by scepticism and caution (Giddens 1990: 86–89; Hughes 
1959). Such relationships are therefore characterised by a natural ambivalence. This resonates 
strongly with the experience I have recounted of my interaction with the OD group: on the one 
hand, I felt like a trusted adviser; on the other, I felt that some things were left unsaid and sensed a 
lack of resolution. In a way, my choice of action – a statement invoking my research and experience 
that was intended to reassure, but on reflection was somewhat paternalistic and, as a normative 
moralistic compulsion, perhaps even exhortative (Lifton 1967) – was an attempt to reinforce our 
power figuration.  
This may, then, relate to a further feature of Giddens’s theory: if we accept that the complexity of 
modern societies often precludes many of us from having much more than a passing acquaintance 
with most areas of specialist knowledge, Giddens suggests we are in general asked to place our trust 
in expert systems of ‘technical accomplishment or professional expertise’ (Giddens 1990: 27). This is 
one of the forms of the dis-embedding of social relations; and its ubiquity in our everyday 
experience of being in the world is manifest in our usually unchallenged assumptions that our 
houses will not fall down, or that aeroplanes don’t normally fall out of the sky. Our encounters with 
expert systems tend to be with individuals who act as access points to those bodies of knowledge – 
the doctor to medicine, the judge to law. Arguably, in the case I am describing, I was perhaps just 
such an access point to the body of knowledge about OD as far as this relates to the design and 
execution of development events.  
Traditionally, it has been common to think of expertise as a property of individuals who are seen as 
having acquired more of the complete knowledge lay people might imagine becomes available 
through scholarly or professional activity in one’s field (e.g. Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986; Collins 2016). 
More recent scholarship, however, has begun to explore the ways in which expertise might be seen 
as a relational activity. For example, some scholars advocate a relational turn for expertise. This 
means that, in addition to my own professional knowledge, there are further skills for me to acquire 
regarding how that knowledge is brought to bear with other professionals to work on 
interdisciplinary problems (e.g. Edwards 2010, 2017). Following a similar line, it has also been 
suggested that that expertise is a claim to knowledgeability that experts make to their lay audiences 
(Kuhn and Rennstam 2016; Treem and Leonardi 2016). These views start to acknowledge the 
91 
 
involvement of others in the notion of expertise; however, to my mind, they fall short of taking up 
the sociality of selves, in that they retain a sense of the individual expert as the primary or more 
important agent.  
This is striking because, in my interaction with the OD working group, I experienced what felt to be 
in equal measures a sense of having something that the group needed, but also being completely 
dependent upon the group. A more radical view would therefore be to consider expertise, like 
power, as a property of social relations that are imbalanced (Elias 1978) – in this case, in terms of 
access to specialised knowledge or resources. Building on the position just described, I would like to 
argue that expertise is a co-created relational practice in the sense that it requires performative 
work by all parties involved – the experts, their lay audiences, and society more widely – to conform 
to expected roles and in so doing, perpetuate a social order in which these kinds of interactions can 
take place at all.  
 
Exploring expertise as relational practice 
In many professions, there are reasonably obvious social mechanisms that make it easier for lay 
people to trust experts. Giddens (1990: 86) gives the examples of systems of professional regulation 
(acquiring qualifications, being admitted to recognised professional bodies) and meeting 
expectations of professional demeanour (conforming to the performances commonly associated 
with a particular profession) as the shortcuts that enable lay people to quickly assess the 
competence of the expert with whom they are interacting. This immediately suggests a kind of 
functional collusion (Curtis 2018) involving ongoing work on the part of those representing the 
expert system, those interacting with them, and those who are regarded as able to judge the 
competence of others (Deleon 1998; Mulgan 2000) to achieve common goals; one can imagine they 
are all consciously or unconsciously playing up or down aspects of what they are doing.  
Giddens cites the twentieth-century Canadian sociologist Erving Goffman’s work on frontstage and 
backstage performances (e.g. Goffman 1961) as a way of speaking about aspects of the practices 
through which social order emerges and is reproduced (Giddens 1990: 86). This central tenet of 
Gidden’s structuration theory proposes that social norms and the conditions that allow their 
reproduction (which Charles Taylor [2002, 2003] calls the social imaginary) are perpetuated in the 
mundane, routinised practices of everyday life (Giddens 1984). A similar idea can be found in 
Bourdieu’s practice theory (e.g. Bourdieu 1990) and is inherent to Foucault’s assertions about the 
reproduction of power relations through all actions everywhere due to the ubiquity of non-
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egalitarian and mobile relations (e.g. Foucault 1976). Put another way, the evolving social order, and 
the power relating inherent to it, is forming and at the same time being formed by each instance of 
its particularisation in the social actions or practices of interacting agents.  
Giddens emphasises the recursivity of these processes and relates this to the cybernetic 
maintenance of ontological security (Giddens 1984: 284), a term coined by psychiatrist R.D. Laing to 
describe one’s ‘sense of presence in the world as a real, alive, whole and in a temporal sense, 
continuous person’ (Laing 1969: 40); note that Laing uses ontological here in the simple sense of a 
suitable adverb or adjective derivative of being, rather than its more philosophical uses. The same 
point is made from a psychoanalytical perspective about the need for security giving rise to a 
conservative impulse: maintaining a sense of continuity of the past with the present allows us to 
predict the future, and this enables us to act into the unknown (Marris 1974). Understanding human 
interaction as complex responsive processes draws attention to the dialectical and transformative 
nature of human experience, so we might argue that the tendency towards stability and continuity 
we notice is significantly complemented by unpredictable moments of social change. Following 
Foucault, if there is stability, it is likely to be in the service of something; so revaluation of these 
taken-for-granted phenomena can help to expose such purposes, and this potentially creates new 
possibilities for action. 
In that case, the frontstage performance of experts – what they tend to show their lay audiences – 
might involve demonstrating their knowledge, or conforming to a professional demeanour; this 
enables temporary trusting relationships to form, but also maintains the relevant power figurations 
that cast experts as authority figures based on their knowledge. One could also describe this in 
terms of wider societal trends relating to the Enlightenment’s formal subjugation of authority to 
reason (Gadamer 1975: 290) and the culmination of an assault on irrational subjectivity (Linge 1976), 
which has been increasingly marginalised since the Greeks (Elias 1978). 
By contrast, the backstage performances of experts – what they tend to conceal from their lay 
audiences – might involve dealing with exactly those ambiguities or conflicts that arguably arise from 
being human: disagreements and power dynamics within and between professional groups, or 
overcoming concerns about personal credibility or competence as experts encounter situations that 
fall outside of their experience. This learning–credibility tension is a concept explored in the 
literature, particularly in the field of general management consultancy (e.g. Bourgoin and Harvey 
2018) as a paradigm case: because of their role in trying to work on the kinds of problems those in 
organisations have decided they cannot manage themselves, management consultants continuously 
need to manage their clients’ anxiety as well as their own conflicting feelings of competence and 
93 
 
imposture. One could also see this as a feature of any professional field that has to engage with 
novel situations – or for novice practitioners more generally, as I have been particularly describing in 
my previous projects.  
These are all fairly well-rehearsed arguments that resonate with the internal conversation I have 
described as going on in my interaction with the OD working group. I had a role to play for the 
group, and acted according to the expectations I had of myself and imagined others had of me. Less 
attention is paid in the literature to the other performances that are also required for experts to 
perform their roles. For example, lay audiences – as the OD working group members might be 
considered in relation to me – have considerable work to do. Frontstage performances here might 
involve accepting that the professional credentials are indeed sufficiently reassuring to create 
temporary trusting relationships, and that appropriate displays of deference are expected in most 
interactions with experts. Backstage performances, however, may involve the informal research lay 
audiences may conduct about the experts they are interacting with; or managing the anxiety 
associated with acknowledging that access to the required resources is necessarily mediated 
through fallible individuals; or the self-doubt, and even fear of exclusion, that we might experience 
when we call into question the views of experts who are regarded by others as the leading 
authorities on a particular matter.  
As I have mentioned, one might argue that for experts in professionalised fields, qualifications and 
the membership of particular professional bodies can provide a level of assurance of competence; 
this therefore also creates a demand upon those tasked with admitting others to professional status 
to maintain a reassuring frontstage sense of authoritative continuity while at the same time 
engaging in the backstage work of keeping up with and responding to, for example, social and 
technological innovation. In many ways, this is a key activity for organisations like mine who are 
tasked with oversight and regulation of organisations in the health and care system. 
In the case of the non-professionalised field of OD (and other non-technical consultancy services are 
probably also in this category), there are multiple theoretical paradigms, models, and interventional 
approaches (e.g. Cheung-Judge and Holbeche 2015), each of which may lead practitioners down very 
different paths. There is no standard training route, nor an easily recognisable professional body 
from whom lay people can seek assurance of the competence of proclaimed practitioners, nor a 
particular expected professional demeanour. What is left, then, as a source of legitimacy for ongoing 
working relationships between lay people and experts in OD and similar fields, is the accumulation of 
trust and experience over time.  
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As I described in Project 3, I have a history with the Support Directorate that started with me being 
recommended to Sandra by another director in my organisation. Subsequently, Sandra, Jeff, and the 
wider directorate members’ experiences of engaging with the activities I have suggested and 
facilitated for them have been generally positive (based on feedback from the events). Moreover, I 
have demonstrated an ability to predict what this feedback is likely to be, which I suppose 
encourages confidence in me. The more traditional signifiers of competence remain absent, though, 
so to me this relationship seems somewhat fragile.  
This may help to explain the ambivalence I sensed in the group, including myself. Though we 
reached a tentative agreement to the agenda, my sense of there being much left unsaid leads me to 
consider what the OD group members’ backstage performances might have been. My noticing a lack 
of resolution suggests that these backstage performances can leak (even if only affectually) into 
frontstage. I suppose some of this may involve an awareness of the power relations inherent to our 
social figuration: I work with the group at Sandra and Jeff’s behest, which may lend me some 
perceived vicarious authority; I am a member of my organisation’s central OD team, so I have some 
perceived legitimacy; I am well versed in OD theory and techniques, which other group members 
lack and perhaps suppose they need. Together, these factors might have made it difficult for group 
members to express their dissent or concerns – ironic, given that the topic at hand had been giving 
them and their colleagues an opportunity to discuss their concerns! This demonstrates some of the 
conflicts in our collective experience that may have been in play.  
Going back to the practice theory argument, lay people’s acceptance of the assurances of experts is 
part of the social order that maintains modern society, and indeed is a key feature of how my 
organisation relates to the organisations we oversee. So, seeing negotiations over that social order 
playing out locally in this way should perhaps be expected. In my meeting with the OD group, we 
might therefore interpret the invocation of my credentials and my subtle moral disciplining of the 
group at the end of our conversation as a way of calling attention generally to our respective roles as 
knowledgeable expert and deferent lay audience. They may do something similar in their own 
everyday work of supporting care providers to improve their operations, as another expression of a 
social order in which experts (like me, like them) can exist at all.  
This exploration of trust and expertise as relational practice that reflects wider societal patterns 
helps to explore the question I posed earlier about sharing or not sharing my concerns: it would be 
too easy to think that the moral position I am advocating is answered simply by fully disclosing all of 
one’s inner dialogue so that others may make up their own minds, and that to do otherwise is 
somehow patronising or arrogant. While the latter observation does resonate – and is somewhat 
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disturbing, as this isn’t how I would like to think of myself – arguably, this is just the kind of 
decontextualised, normative ethical thinking that I have critiqued previously as untenable due to the 
temporal and perspectival instability of meaning (Mead 1934), which includes ethical meaning (e.g. 
Griffin 2002). Instead, the discussion above suggests that the contextual features informing what 
happened included competing ideals about OD practice, deference to experts, justifying one’s 
position, the membership of communities, power relating, role-playing, and the maintenance of 
social order. It should suffice to say that none of these were in my immediate consciousness in the 
interaction itself; but, as I will now describe, some of this competition played out on the day itself in 
an unexpected way.  
 
A solid start that met our expectations 
The morning of the away day went largely to plan. We were in the hall of an old hospital building, 
which had been built to resemble the old livery halls found in the City of London. On arrival that 
morning, I had noticed the high ceilings, wood panelling, and austere portraits of people of 
importance. Somehow, despite its grandeur (or perhaps because of it), the atmosphere felt rather 
oppressive and dull. I hoped things would liven up as people arrived, but didn’t feel particularly 
concerned about it; I was feeling unusually relaxed about the whole day, and for some reason lacked 
my usual eagerness. 
Once everyone had arrived, Sandra opened the event, as she usually does, by appreciating her 
team’s most recent achievements and emphasising the importance of making the most of the day. 
She was followed by the chief executive who, as briefed, talked about some of the organisational 
changes that were being scoped. He gave little in the way of detail beyond what had already been 
provided in staff briefings in recent weeks: that there would be some joint functions across the 
organisations involved – some that would be hosted in one organisation on behalf of all, and others 
that would remain separate; it was rumoured that the Support Directorate would be a joint function, 
but this had not been formally confirmed in any way. The chief executive explained that no decisions 
had been made about the restructure, and that high-level proposals would be presented to the 
board in a few weeks’ time. He ended by offering his thanks for everyone’s hard work. The audience 
applauded politely – presumably, a habitual response rather than a real expression of appreciation 
given that what he was saying was probably quite disturbing and offered no reassurance.  
He then took some questions. These struck me as odd, because they didn’t appear to be about what 
he had just talked about. I was surprised that people weren’t being a bit bolder or asking for more 
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details of the organisational changes, given the opportunity to do so. Instead, they were asking some 
quite challenging questions about his views on some very specific issues in relation to some of the 
organisations we oversee, or what he thought of how we work with another national body not 
involved in the restructure. Though I didn’t think about it particularly at the time, one could imagine 
that this avoidance of engagement with what for many was likely to be the source of anxiety (future 
employment) reflects the relational habitus of corporate ascetism that can be seen in the public 
sector more generally. As I explored in Project 3, this is exemplified by the rather coldly impersonal 
Nolan Principles of Public Life (Committee on Standards in Public Life 1995), and maintained 
practically through group processes involving praise and shame (Elias and Scotson 1965). I also 
argued there that more individualistic concerns are still likely to be on our minds, even if only 
unconsciously; in that case, rather than active avoidance of a topic, perhaps the questions that were 
asked were gestures demonstrating good corporate citizenship towards someone imagined to have 
influence over the outcomes of the restructuring process. Alternatively, we might argue that 
repeated exposure to the kind of anxiety involved in restructures (recalling that the last one had only 
been two years ago) has led to a degree of psychological withdrawal as a defence against the anxiety 
occasioned by ongoing uncertainty (Marris 1996).  
These are, of course, retrospective speculations – I didn’t consciously consider them at the time – 
but, given that these are issues I have been thinking and writing about through my research for 
some time, they are likely to have unconsciously informed my responses because they are aspects of 
my prejudices. What seems likely in any case is that if uncertainty about the future already featured 
in the experience of the away day participants, it was heightened by the interaction with the chief 
executive and so had the potential to play out during the rest of the day in some way.  
We proceeded with a short break, after which I explained how the World Café session would work. 
We have done this activity before in away days and on this day, it went completely according to 
plan: group members attended the table discussions that interested them and in the round of 
feedback I conducted at the end of this activity, those who reported back said that they had found it 
helpful to hear about each other’s work and get new ideas. Following this, I introduced the modified 
version of OST that we would be using after lunch, my intention being that this would take the 
pressure off having to come up with topics when asked later in the day. In the same vein, we had 
tried to warm participants up to this session in the pre-event invitation email to the directorate, 
suggesting that they may like to think about topics in advance in relation to the following question:  
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Given recent announcements about organisational changes, what does the Support Directorate need 
to do to adapt to the changing landscape?  
Linking back to the earlier description of OST, we had selected this question because it was broad 
enough to be taken up differently by people according to their interests, but also demanded a 
specific active response to the organisational changes. Though I did not notice it at the time, I 
suppose this reflects a preference for demonstrably dealing with change and the anxiety it may 
create, even if the resultant activities turn out to be the kind of social defences (Menzies 1960; 
Hirschhorn 1988) that help groups avoid engaging with the anxiety that confronting more of their 
experience might occasion. Arguably, this would make sense in the context of a public sector that is 
felt by many to be failing (e.g. Darzi 2017), whose decline national bodies like the one I work for can 
perhaps do little more than slow down. Appearing to be doing something, however little good it 
ends up doing by whatever measure we find ourselves using, is better than appearing to be doing 
nothing – even though doing nothing beyond spending time reflecting upon what is already 
happening is itself doing something that might be useful, albeit out of keeping with the practices of 
the relational habitus. Also noticeable now is just how abstract the question is, and while perhaps 
laudable in its intent to be broad and engaging, it is conceivable that introducing this question may 
have heightened the anxiety that people were already feeling about the restructure, and which had 
been amplified by the chief executive’s session.  
Somewhat aware that the topic generation session coming up next might need a bit of 
encouragement, and perhaps unconsciously out of a desire to reduce my own anxiety about this, 
especially given the strange reaction to the chief executive’s session, I tried to speak with a few 
people over the lunch break. I was listening out for topics that I thought others might find interesting 
in the next session and whenever these came up, I would invite them to host a discussion around it; 
everyone tentatively agreed. By the end of the break, imagining that my efforts would have 
increased people’s confidence to speak up, I was reasonably assured that eight or nine topics would 
be put forward in the next session.  
So, once everyone had settled in their places again, I reiterated the process we would be using and 
asked – with a light-hearted air, and what I hoped was some inspiring buoyancy – if there were any 
topics that people wanted to propose.  
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A crisis in practice? 
My optimism quickly faded as I was greeted with complete silence for what seemed like an age.  
As time seemed to slow down, I could feel my heartbeat quickening; the oppressive atmosphere I 
had noticed that morning seemed to intensify. I tried to catch the eyes of the people I had spoken to 
during the break, but for a while couldn’t find any of them.  
Finally, someone suggested a topic about how a focus on quality could be maintained as we went 
through organisational changes. Another followed quickly, proposing to discuss how the product 
they have been developing could be given more visibility; though this seemed nothing to do with the 
framing question, I felt bound to support it partly because any topic is a good topic according to the 
rules of OST, but also to encourage others to volunteer. Instead, things became quiet again.  
Trying to maintain an encouraging air, I said ‘So, any more topics?’ and ‘I know some of you have 
ideas…’. I picked on a manager I’d had a good conversation with over lunch, to suggest the topic 
they had mentioned – about how to support individuals and groups under pressure; so they came up 
and proposed their topic. Then the room returned to silence once more.  
I started to lose heart. I’ve used this technique numerous times, and my expectation of a 
doubt/relief cycle was being thwarted. Inwardly flustered as I was trying to work out what to do next 
while also trying to maintain my composure outwardly (afterwards, a member of the OD group came 
up to me and complimented me on my ability to keep so calm), I found myself also feeling irritated 
at the lack of any kind of response that might help me to help them. I also felt out of my depth, 
wondering if my habitual self-doubt was actually being justified: here was clear evidence that I didn’t 
really know what I was doing. Surely, a better practitioner would know what to do.  
Looking for an escape route, I earnestly offered: ‘How are we feeling about this? Do you want to do 
something else instead?’. Still, nothing but 80 faces all staring at me, in complete silence. In the blur, 
I thought I saw some of the people I’d expected to suggest topics looking pleadingly at me, and I 
imagined others looking around sceptically; but I couldn’t understand what they wanted me to do or 
how to cope with my ambivalent experience of feeling threatened, irritated, and embarrassed.  
As I described in Project 3, the behaviour of groups has been well explored in psychoanalytical 
literature, and Wilfred Bion’s theory of basic assumption group behaviour (Bion 1961; Hirschhorn 
1988) is a helpful way into trying to make sense of what was happening here. This is the argument 
that when groups come together with a primary task that connects them clearly to some purpose 
beyond their own existence, they have the potential to form a sophisticated work group where 
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members are free to cooperate, associate, join, resign, or whatever is needed to complete the task. 
However, when anxiety levels in the group rise for some reason, the existence of the group itself can 
become a preoccupation that distracts from the primary task and the group behaves more overtly 
according to one or a series of basic assumptions. In Bion’s original formulation, these basic 
assumptions are dependency, pairing, and fight/flight; a further basic assumption of oneness 
(Turquet 1974) or aggregation/massification (Hopper 2009) is sometimes also added.  
Bion, following Freud’s thinking on mass psychology (e.g. Freud 1921), suggested that basic 
assumption behaviour relates to the Oedipus complex (Bion 1961: 161), but one could equally 
characterise this using the Meadian theory of mind that is foundational to the complex responsive 
processes perspective. Here, counter to the assumptions of psychoanalysis that give primacy to 
individual minds and internal worlds (e.g. Frosh 1999), individual minds are regarded as social 
through and through and selfhood is an ongoing social process (Mead 1934; Stacey 2003; Stacey and 
Mowles 2016). In that case, the sophisticated work group bears similarities to Mead’s notion of 
teamwork, which he describes as the situation where ‘all are working toward a common end and 
everyone has a sense of the common end interpenetrating the particular function which he is 
carrying on’ (Mead 1934: 276). Put another way, using Mead’s conceptual programme, there is a 
fusion of ‘I’ and ‘me’ (described in detail in Project 3 [P3: 77] in terms of experiencing freedom from 
social constraint – as also associated with, for example, religious experience), where our personal 
intentions (expressed in the responding phase of self that is denoted ‘I’) align with the intentions of 
the group (expressed in the gesturing phase of self that is denoted ‘me’) towards a particular 
common goal.  
We can therefore reframe basic assumption behaviour as the playing out of conscious or 
unconscious socialisations that arise when a group’s common goal becomes ambiguous for some 
reason. The recognisable patterns of responding in these situations, denoted as the three or four 
basic assumptions, can then be described as deeply entrenched population-wide patterns that have 
emerged over time and which serve to maintain group membership (Stacey 2003: 38). Following 
Giddens (1984, 1990) and Bourdieu (1977, 1990), these responses perpetuate the social order and 
its power figurations; indeed, Bion describes the basic assumptions as being paradigmatically 
represented by the institutions of Western society (the church, the army, and the aristocracy for 
dependency, fight/flight, and pairing, respectively [Bion 1961: 136–137]).  
Thus characterised, basic assumption behaviour may well have been in play in the situation I am 
describing. It is plausible that the chief executive’s reiteration that significant changes were coming, 
but then not providing any further information, had already raised some kind of existential anxiety 
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within the group about its future. Given my history with the group, and my membership of the same 
organisation, I am by no means immune to this anxiety: my own employment is also at risk, as well 
as my ongoing relationship with the directorate. I probably increased anxieties further in breaking 
with typical away-day routine by asking the group to pay attention for a while to their existential 
concerns (which they had just avoided talking about), rather than the external focus that might 
usually and preferentially allow effective team working. By suggesting they engage with parts of 
their experience that the relational habitus tends to exclude, and so perhaps also threatening the 
social defences usually employed to avoid unwanted anxiety, one can imagine a sense of social 
danger emerging in which basic assumption behaviour came to dominate the group, at least for a 
time.  
Pursuing this line, one might then interpret the group’s response to my invitation for topics as 
fight/flight-type behaviour, which tends to be characterised by defensiveness, aggression, or 
hostility. Facilitators, like therapists, are often regarded as experts in creating safe environments for 
development (e.g. Corrigan 2015) and to be skilled in managing tricky situations in large groups (e.g. 
Schuman 2010). In this respect, one can think of many reasons I might have felt threatened: as 
someone working on Sandra’s behalf, or being seen as a representative of the expert system of 
management in general, or the OD community, or of the leadership team who were initiating the 
organisational changes, perhaps I became somewhere for us all to focus our anxiety that did not 
otherwise have an obvious target. I was provoking the group to engage in thinking about parts of 
their experience they might consciously or unconsciously want to avoid – and in doing so, 
challenging the social order and threatening our ability to go on with each other. Perhaps the 
group’s silence was an act of hostility – figuring me as a scapegoat who is attacked to regain a sense 
of social cohesion or order within the rest of the group (Girard 1972, 1986).  
Nevertheless, I was very much part of this emergent phenomenon, not apart from it. Kristeva’s 
notion of abjection (1982) – in particular, its characterisation as a process by which one’s identity is 
defined in the rejection of some problematic aspect of subjectivity – is helpful in making sense of 
how we might figure the group members’ behaviour towards me as a response to conflicts in their 
own experience.  
I have explained previously how Mead’s theory of mind as a social phenomenon allows us to locate 
processes of inclusion and exclusion usually associated with groups (e.g. Elias and Scotson 1965) 
intra-personally rather than inter-personally (P3: 69). This is relevant here, too, because it provides a 
way of thinking about how abjection and similar phenomena, which are typically characterised as 
individual processes, can also be group processes. Following this argument, although group 
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members were not prepared to engage with me about their existential anxiety and take 
responsibility in the way that I had wanted, in another way, perhaps we were all tacitly and 
collectively engaging with and responding to the sense of social danger that had been heightened 
that morning in a way that even an unstructured process – like the modified version of OST we were 
using – could not provide a forum for. In doing so, we were reinforcing the social rules and work 
identities that tend to keep self-interested concerns out of the public realm, and perhaps also 
expressing our personal desire to survive the organisational restructure.  
As I mentioned earlier, these observations and analyses might be fascinating data for OD 
practitioners working with groups – for example, it would be interesting to understand if fight/flight 
behaviour plays out in other aspects of the Support Directorate’s work – but I am struck by how the 
exploration I am undertaking in this project could well have provided different capacities to act had I 
been able to consider them in the moment. This capacity perhaps relies on a degree of detachment 
that might not be possible if one is consumed by involvement in a situation. As recounted by Elias 
(1987), Edgar Allen Poe’s short story A Descent into the Maelström provides a helpful illustration of 
this kind of detached involvement.  
In Poe’s story, three fisherman brothers find their boat caught in a notorious whirlpool that has 
killed many before them. Only one of the brothers survives the whirlpool – and this is because amid 
the terror of being engulfed in the vortex, he finds himself, unlike his brothers, also observing the 
beauty of the whirlpool and patterns in what he sees sinking and floating. Noticing that larger 
objects tend to sink faster and cylindrical objects more slowly, rather than lash himself to the boat as 
his brother does, he ties himself to a water cask and then cuts the cask free of the boat. The cask 
descends more slowly than the boat, and floats to the top once the whirlpool subsides; and so, the 
fisherman survives because his ability to stand apart from the phenomenon in which he is involved 
provided new capacities to act.  
While this kind of detached involvement may offer additional options in moments like the one I am 
describing, the allegory is also instructive for the role of research in the development of practice: the 
exploration in this project provides new encounters with difference, which enrich the field of my 
experience. My prejudices evolve accordingly, which may help me to notice more about what is 
going on and respond differently in the future should I find myself in similar circumstances. Further, 
and as I wrote in Project 2 about reflective practice (P2: 49), this is an ethical practice based on 
Mead’s notion of morality being an inherently fallible process of seeking out the widest available 
range of perspectives and then acting on the rational balance of interests. 
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Ruptures and ripples of resolution 
I am aware that the account I have so far given of the event gives no indication of how things 
actually turned out – and this is very much in keeping with the quality of my experience that I am 
trying to convey: in the silence, as I continued to stand somehow paralysed at the front of the room, 
time seemed to have stopped as I experienced having no idea what I was going to do. Recall 
Gadamer’s notion of the fore-conception of completeness (1975), in which meanings are projected 
for the whole social act based on the prejudicial interpretation of an initial gesture, which then 
evolves as further gestures are made in a continuous dialectical process; taking into account the 
arguments from Giddens (1984, 1990) and Marris (1974, 1996), we could say that this projecting is 
one of the ways we gain the ontological security we seem to need if we are to act at all.  
As discussed in Project 2, in Mead’s terms, this is part of the process of thinking which, in his 
programme, is the ability to imagine possible sequences of responses that may occur through 
private role-play in the form of generalised ideas (Mead 1934: 141; P2: 43). I prefer the Gadamerian 
formulation above, as I think it points to the way in which we deal with partial information by filling 
in the gaps in our understanding with some configuration of the aspects of our past experience, 
current understanding, and intentions, that happen to be called out – consciously and unconsciously 
– by the matter at hand. This creates a kind of continuously evolving sense of coherence into which 
we can act, even if this has multiple options within it and is not fully articulated. 
In the account I have given, my response to the silence could be seen as a failure of this process and 
a breakdown in the coherence that generally allows me to take a next step. Perhaps the situation 
called out too many conflicting responses, or perhaps none at all; either way, a rupture of some kind 
occurred that stopped me in my cognitive tracks. What I actually found myself doing was suggesting 
that the groups have discussions at their tables, to see if they could come up with some more topics. 
Normally, I would have asked them to do this at the start of the topic generation session; but we had 
pre-informed participants of this session extensively and I was confident of having recruited plenty 
of help over lunch, so I had felt it unnecessary. In retrospect, of course, it is easy to see that this 
might have been helpful; but it was not obvious at the time.  
One might argue that there is perhaps an inevitability to this kind of occurrence: given that I have 
described the nature of social life as inherently unpredictable, I might well expect a facilitation 
technique I have used time and time again at some point to not go to plan. As I explored in Project 1, 
Gadamer describes how this kind of experience in which one is ‘pulled up short’ by an encounter 
with difference brings our prejudices into view, which is the start of a process of learning (Gadamer 
1975: 280).  
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As the table discussions started, I sought out Sandra. Saying that the process didn’t seem to be 
working, I asked for her help in deciding what we might do if no more topics were volunteered. To 
my surprise, her first response was to call the whole OST session into question, wondering a little 
sceptically (or so it seemed to me) who had come up with the idea. Expressing my doubts, it seemed, 
had enabled her to express hers. However, when she realised the session had been my initiative, she 
seemed to take back her scepticism, I thought almost apologetically, and suggested we should wait 
and see how things went. I felt this placed the responsibility firmly with me for deciding what to do 
next. I consider this a further example of how expertise can be thought of as a relational practice: 
my asking for Sandra’s help, when our relationship in this context is based our mutual performances 
as OD expert and lay person, respectively, could be interpreted as a challenge to the pattern of 
relating that Sandra and I are accustomed to – through which she maintains her trust in me, and I 
maintain my credibility with her.  
Using Goffman’s frontstage/backstage concepts, when I brought ‘frontstage’ some of the sense-
making and recalculation that usually goes on in my ‘backstage’ private conversation, I was breaking 
out of character in a way that called our habitual way of relating into question. In that case, one 
might well expect a response that reinforced this habit; and, given what had just happened with the 
group’s rejection of my invitation for suggestions, perhaps it is unsurprising that I interpreted this 
gesture as a rejection of my application to Sandra for help in addressing what was happening. A 
different interpretation is that Sandra’s response was consciously or unconsciously intended to 
provide a way to help us both maintain our respective roles so that we could continue to work 
together. A further interpretation, from a structuration or practice theory perspective, is that my 
interaction with Sandra was entirely predictable because these moments are forming and being 
formed by a social order in which expertise is possible at all; this is an order in which I, Sandra, her 
team, and our organisation more generally as an oversight body, are all implicated and on which we 
rely for our continued existence.  
As Sandra and I talked, I noticed with some relief that people were starting to come up to volunteer 
more topics from their table discussions. These weren’t all related to the question that had been 
asked; indeed, one of them was a humorous suggestion about bringing pets to work. At the time, I 
wondered a little if these suggestions might be responses to what had just happened – in Girardian 
terms, had the subtle violence that had just occurred heightened a sense of social cohesion offering 
temporary relief for the feelings of social conflict that are usually present (Girard 1972)? Mostly, 
however, I was just happy that things were moving again. Indeed, the rest of the session returned to 
plan: people chose their topics, had conversations (interestingly, the ‘bringing pets to work’ topic 
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attracted the biggest group and, judging by their convivial laughter, they seemed to have an 
enjoyable conversation – which would fit the Girardian interpretation), and filled out their discussion 
sheets.  
I ended the session by asking people to volunteer their summary conclusions in plenary. With what 
had happened at the start of the session very much on my mind, I was preparing for limited or no 
feedback and mainly wanted the session – and with it, my part in the day – to be over. So, I was 
surprised that almost every group wanted to offer a reflection – and quite enthusiastically, too – 
about ways they could support each other through the coming changes. Wrapping up the feedback 
session, I thanked the group for their cooperation and said that it had been nice to work with them 
again. With ambivalent feelings about what had just happened and the day overall, I watched quietly 
as the directorate awards were presented, and then left as quickly as I could.  
 
Shame and its cognates 
I have been working on this project for a few months now. Though the away day was therefore some 
time ago, I am still left with very mixed feelings about it and my ongoing relationship with the 
Support Directorate in general. Arguably, it was a rather successful event: the feedback (sought 
through an online survey) suggested that almost 90% people who replied had found the day to be 
‘good’ or ‘very good’ (compared to ‘average’ or ‘poor’). One might therefore conclude that the 
experience of what I have called a crisis in this project was only mine, and that my analysis of 
fight/flight basic assumption behaviour, and the collusion between me and Sandra, over-inflates 
what were actually quite insignificant events. Yet there were also indications that my perception of 
the OST session was shared by others. For example, in the survey feedback, someone anonymously 
described the topic generation episode as having been ‘excruciating’, while another described the 
OST session overall as ‘hard work’. 
More immediately after the event, a number of the interactions I had with members of the Support 
Directorate also seemed to suggest that something uncomfortable had happened. For example, at 
the end of the day, Jeff told me that he thought the whole day had been good and seemed to make 
a point of saying that despite some reservations about the OST session, it had gone rather well. 
Another manager approached me as I was packing away my things to say she thought that people 
had been reluctant to speak up in the OST session due to their perceptions of hierarchy, and that I 
was right to leave them with the responsibility even though it may be intimidating to name issues on 
behalf of the group in this kind of setting. Further, the next day, I received an unprompted email 
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from a member of the OD working group saying ‘I think the session worked well in the end, 
appreciate you had to keep the faith!’; another manager came by my desk, apparently with the sole 
purpose of saying that things had probably been a bit bumpy because people were worrying about 
the restructure and that it had turned out OK in the end.  
As these interactions accumulated, I found myself thinking that people were somehow trying to 
make me feel better or make sure I was all right, or somehow apologise for something they had 
done to me. I found this very confusing as, reflecting a habitual pattern in my own sense-making 
process, I had been seeing the breakdown in the process during the OST session as something I 
should have been able to prevent or fix rather than something in the group. It seemed that others 
had different views. My overriding feelings were of gratitude that people had taken the time to 
speak with me, but also confusion about why people would be making these reparative gestures.  
We might interpret these last events, and indeed many of those I have described in this project, 
using the notions of shame and guilt. Much has been written about these, particularly in the 
psychoanalytical literature, and H.B. Lewis (1971) is often cited as providing a primary distinction 
between the two (Dearing and Tangney 2011), with shame focussing on the self and guilt on a 
triggering behaviour. Therefore, while I feel guilty about something I have done, I feel shame about 
who I am, but both involve the idea of inadequacy in relation to some behavioural standard that is 
felt to be morally important.  
Using this distinction, in my account, one might see my own response to the silence as being related 
to shame. I describe feeling irritated, threatened, and embarrassed as I failed to meet my own idea 
about what I should be able to do – which extends to a sense of fraudulence about who I am or want 
to be. It is suggested that anger, contempt, envy, depression, grandiosity, or withdrawal are all 
potential responses to narcissistic injury as we fail to measure up to the idea we have of ourselves 
(Morrison 2011), which might suggest that shame was part of what was going on for me. From the 
perspective of the members of the directorate who contacted me afterwards, one could then see 
their reparative gestures as potentially arising from guilt. In some sense, I was a guest at their away 
day; and one could imagine retrospective perceptions among some members of having treated me 
inhospitably, or perhaps even aggressively, as something that may have triggered remorse. In that 
case, given that we are likely to meet again, making amends was a way to secure our future 
relationship. Another interpretation is that the directorate’s members imagine I have some influence 
over what happens in the reorganisations arising from their own assumptions about my relationship 
with Sandra, Jeff, and the organisation’s senior leaders. In that case, the gestures would not just be 
towards me but also towards what I might represent as an access point to the wider abstract system 
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of management. Conversely, my response to these gestures might have been reflecting my own 
anxiety about the implications for my own future having done ‘a bad job’.  
While these interpretations are plausible and useful for making further sense of my experience, I 
find the distinction being made between shame and guilt unsatisfactory as, to my mind, they are 
based on a rather individualistic conception of human interaction (consistent with much of 
psychoanalysis) and further, they suggest a separation of who we are from what we, in the widest 
sense of the term, do. Where I talk about feeling shame for not being a good enough facilitator, this 
is inseparable from the actions that have stimulated those feelings; when I talk about the directorate 
members potentially feeling guilty for what they had done to me, this is inseparable from what we 
might think of as the kinds of people who act in this way. As I have argued previously, if we think of 
identity as the emergent, dynamic, and multifaceted patterns in the responding phase of self as 
ongoing social process (Ybema et al 2009; Mead 1934), then who we are and what we do are 
mutually constitutive. On that basis, though they may remain somewhat distinguishable in terms of 
their triggers, shame and guilt are conceptually inseparable on the basis Lewis suggests (Lewis 1971); 
further, it has been argued that emotions like embarrassment and humiliation are all part of the 
same phenomenon (Scheff 2000, 2003, 2014).  
This is important because it leads to an exploration of how shame might have been motivating the 
reparative gestures I received and therefore how these responses might have been about group 
members’ sense of self and identity. As suggested earlier, if the Support Directorate’s members did 
indeed see me as a representative of the abstract system of management (of which they are also 
part), or of Sandra or the wider senior leadership team (with whom they also work); or an expert 
(and therefore part of a social order in which they are also implicated, because they are experts in 
their own fields); or indeed as one of their own, given that I have an ongoing relationship with them 
that is likely to continue into the future – then what happened at the away day is probably not just 
something that group members did to me, but also something they did to each other and to 
themselves. Returning to the thrust of Kristeva’s argument, to cast off an aspect of subjectivity is a 
claim to identity and so we come to the idea that shame might also be part of a social process of 
identity formation.  
In that case, the identity of group members implied by scapegoating me, if indeed that was what 
happened, was out of keeping with the expectations we have of ourselves and each other in our 
relational habitus and was therefore likely to be disturbing. This rupture arguably brought into view 
the fragility of the social order and so making amends, as a response that makes a further claim to 
identity, then offered an opportunity for us to find a way to continue working with each other 
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according to the norms we are used to. It may also have mitigated the risk of adverse consequences 
in relation to the influence we imagined we might have over each other’s futures.  
Events like those I am describing here seem fairly prevalent to greater or lesser extents in my 
experience. I therefore propose that, especially for people who are interested in how they affect 
others (as most OD practitioners I have met are), it is important to pay attention to shame in our 
experience of being with others. 
 
The paradox of shame and (self-)respect as moral process  
Though shame is acknowledged as having an important role in the development of self-awareness 
and self-regulation in childhood (e.g. Sedgwick and Frank 1995), it appears to be a common view 
that shame-proneness is unhelpful and undesirable beyond the years during which the ability to 
imagine the attitudes of others is developing. For example, in education, shame arising from 
insecure attachment is seen to stand in the way of learning (Cozolino 2013); in therapy, unconscious 
shame and its manifestations are something to be overcome (Morrison 2011). Popular psychology 
and management literature, where it talks about shame at all, seems to follow a similar line (e.g. 
Brown 2007, 2010). The negative associations of shame go back to the story of Adam and Eve in 
Genesis, and, as Elias argues in The Civilising Process (1939), the evolution of shame and its gradual 
passing into the shadows of discourse can be seen as a key aspect of the move from pre-modern to 
modern Western societies. So, one can well imagine that the undesirability of shame is deeply 
socialised, though not talked about, and therefore why its avoidance or overcoming might seem self-
evident.  
I believe this position becomes very ambiguous, however, if we consider shame as part of the moral 
processes involved in interdependence; and I find the complementary accounts provided by the 
contemporary American philosopher Krista Thomason, and the contemporary Australian gender and 
cultural theorist Elspeth Probyn, particularly helpful in making this case.  
From a philosophical perspective, and to my mind very much in keeping with ideas from 
psychoanalysis about shame being bound up with narcissistic injury, Thomason characterises shame 
as a complex emotion that relates to ‘the experience of tension between one’s identity and one’s 
self-conception’ (Thomason 2018: 18). Drawing on the work of Deonna and Teroni (2012), rather 
than seeing shame as inherently undesirable, Thomason ascribes moral value to it by asserting that a 
liability towards shame demonstrates a willingness to give material weight to the perspectives of 
others: to feel shame is to show that we are open to moral criticism and recognise the standing of 
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others as moral agents. This figures the feeling of shame as a necessary counterpart to having 
respect for others. It is important to note that this does not entail that experiencing shame is a 
pleasurable experience; on the contrary, an important characteristic of shame and its near 
emotional neighbours is that it is morally disturbing.  
Now, if minds are social through and through, then to recognise the moral standing of others is also 
to recognise one’s own; and so, arguably, this further qualification of Thomason’s argument might 
account for the quality in our experience where shame and self-respect seem mutually constitutive. 
For example, in the revaluation of my decision about whether or not to share all of my concerns 
about using OST with the OD working group at the planning meeting, my sense that not sharing – 
and instead, playing to the role of expert by invoking my credentials – was the appropriate thing to 
do is in direct conflict with the sense I have now of potentially having been patronising; this evokes 
feelings of shame for me. Further, in my description of standing in front of a room full of people at 
once believing that, as a reasonably experienced facilitator, what I was doing was right and at the 
same time recognising that it wasn’t working, the sense of unresolvable conflict – which I describe as 
a breakdown in my habitual processes of fore-conceiving completeness – emerged as a sense of 
shame, irritation, and fear.  
We might therefore say that, in Mead’s terms, if ‘me’ and ‘I’ are experientially discriminable phases 
of the ongoing dialectical process of self (as related to experiences of social constraint and of 
creative agency, respectively), then shame relates to ‘me’ and (self-)respect relates to ‘I’. In that 
case, the paradox of ‘I’/‘me’ is closely related to (self-)respect/shame, which we might also then see 
as paradoxical. In that case, particular instances of shame are the opposite of the poignant 
experiences of being in community/freedom from social constraint captured as the fusion of ‘I’/‘me’; 
rather, they are the poignant experience of conflicts of ‘I’/‘me’ in relation to matters of moral 
importance. 
Here, from a different perspective, Probyn’s illumination of shame as an affectual and psychological 
phenomenon that relates to belonging adds a further helpful dimension to my argument. Probyn 
(2005) describes shame as an ambiguous state that arises when a position of interest and its 
concomitant possibility of connection with others who are important to us, is confronted with the 
possibility of humiliation and exclusion. Probyn specifically acknowledges her debt to the twentieth-
century psychologist and pioneer of affect theory, Silvan Tomkins, who characterised shame as 
signalling ‘the incomplete reduction of interest and joy’ (Tomkins in Sedgwick and Frank 1995: 5). 
Tomkins’s formulation emphasises that shame occurs not at the moment of exclusion, but before 
this – when the possibility of connection still exists. The reduction of interest and joy that comes 
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from communion is therefore incomplete, because it may yet increase again. It is therefore a way of 
thinking about shame as particularly relating to threats to the social bond, which is how other 
authors have described it (e.g. Lewis 1971; Scheff 2000, 2003, 2014). 
On this account, shame is a bodily experience of something we personally value greatly – which 
accounts for the different people feeling shame about different things – being somehow put at risk 
(Probyn 2005: x). In my account, my ongoing ability to work with this group, my relationships with 
Sandra and Jeff, and more generally my membership of the OD community are all interests that are 
called into question in small ways during the moment of crisis. Further, from a structuration theory 
perspective, we could say that my experience with the group is forming and being formed by the 
wider social order; this means the rupture brings into view the fragility of the whole ideology of 
support, oversight, expertise, and authority through which my organisation is constituted. Perhaps it 
is no wonder, then, that our collective deviation from expected performances might seem so 
significant in the moment and warrant reparation afterwards. We might also say that our encounters 
with liminality or strangers, or difference in general, is part of the same phenomenon: it draws our 
attention to the possibility of exclusion, and therefore the possibility of shame.  
Taking these perspectives together is powerful: we can now say that the experience of shame is an 
emergent affectual response to conscious or unconscious experiences of tension between how we 
would like to see ourselves and how we might actually be being seen by others (and ourselves), in 
relation to aspects of our conduct that afford us membership of real and ideological communities – 
therefore including institutions, thought collectives (Fleck and Trenn 1992), or others who share our 
values – that are important to us. From Mead, we also have the idea that morality is a process of 
seeking the widest range of perspectives on a matter and then acting in a way that gives weight to 
those perspectives, including one’s own; we might therefore say further that morality as a process 
depends on respect and self-respect, and therefore necessarily involves shame.  
 
Concluding remarks: OD expertise, ruptured practices, and paying attention to shame 
In this project I have proposed four main arguments, which I will now try to bring together. From 
these, a moral philosophy of OD begins to emerge, which I believe naturally extends to any aspect of 
social life where we are interested in our impact on others. 
The first argument is that expertise is a relational practice. By this I mean that, far from being a 
property of individuals, expertise is an ongoing negotiated social process that takes the form of a 
particular set of practices. These practices involve habitus-appropriate performances by those who 
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are seen as experts and their lay audiences, and society more widely, as they are forming and being 
formed by the social order in which those kinds of interactions can occur at all. Examining the 
context in which the experiences of expertise-as-practice I have recounted occur (my conversation 
with the OD working group, and with Sandra in the OST session), I can see the presence of norms 
concerning, for example, the relationship between overseers and the overseen, deference to 
authority, and reverence of those who are seen to have special access to knowledge resources. 
My second argument is that expertise is just one example of the many relational practices that are 
involved in the maintenance of social order, which is essentially fragile. These practices involve 
application to abstract ideals (and therefore the possibility of idealised wholes), the invocations of 
which are invitations to be in community with others. For example, we might imagine that talking 
about expertise, most generally, is an invitation to be in community with others who idealise the 
possibility of omniscience, or at least significantly value specialist knowledge. However, because our 
different prejudices, histories, and intentions are likely to lead us to different interpretations of 
these abstract ideals, these invitations are also the openings of processes of negotiation over 
meaning and the evolution of the very ideals concerned. They therefore involve the possibility of 
exclusion from the real or imagined communities concerned; and I have suggested that experiences 
of shame pervade this tightrope walk between inclusion and exclusion – between our idealised 
selves in conflict-free communion with others like us, and the conflictual selves we encounter in the 
practical failures of our imagined moral universes to deal with our actual experience. And because of 
our deeply socialised aversion to shame, we are drawn towards the avoidance of these experiences 
– perhaps towards the avoidance of conflict in general – and towards inclusion and the ontological 
security that continuity provides.  
This is therefore an argument for conservative or recursive tendencies in our interactions as ways of 
maintaining social order and identity – particularly if we are interested in being able to go on with 
each other, as we need to with our colleagues at work, or in our families or other communities. I 
have described just such recursive tendencies in my project. For example, in my conversation with 
the OD working group, we could see my mildly exhortative statement as a response to the fragility of 
the social order being brought into view: as the contingency of our expert/lay audience roles 
became apparent, I invoked my credentials to reinforce our social figuration and the power 
dynamics inherent to it. Likewise, with Sandra’s response to my call for help; however, there, it was 
Sandra’s gesture that reinforced our figuration. Further, in the OST session, my response to my 
audience’s silence was to find a way to stay on a track that conformed to the relational habitus in 
which these kinds of away days occur. The breakdown arguably brought into view the contingency of 
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our collusive functionalisation of an idealised facilitator–group figuration; while, in the end, order 
was restored (albeit with some significant discomfort), some of the people involved felt compelled 
later to make reparative gestures. 
My third argument is that, while this recursive tendency is clearly a common feature in our 
experience, it is not totalising: there is always the possibility of novelty arising, along with the 
potential for social transformation. Indeed, I am struck in all of the examples I have just mentioned 
by the sense that things could have been otherwise: what would have happened, for example, if I 
had shared my concerns about OST more freely with the OD working group? What would have 
happened if, during the silence in the OST session, I had somehow taken up my sense of feeling 
threatened, embarrassed, and afraid with the group, instead of turning away from these feelings? 
What if I had not acquiesced to Sandra’s handing responsibility for what happened next back to me? 
These ruptures in practice seem to present new opportunities for action; but if we are consciously or 
unconsciously seeking to avoid disturbing but perhaps important aspects of our experience (as the 
examples I give here might illustrate), then perhaps we are missing opportunities for our moral 
development. I am arguing that experiences of shame – in a paradoxical relationship with (self-) 
respect that mirrors Mead’s ‘I’/‘me’ dialectic – are a just such an important aspect of being self-
conscious moral agents. In a way, this project demonstrates how engaging with breakdowns can 
offer opportunities for new ways of sense-making: had I not inquired into these events, I might not 
have come to think about structuration theory, ruptures in practice, or shame as I do now. I believe 
all of these are starting to change my practice as I am better able to explore with others and respond 
with greater choice to disturbing experiences, which might otherwise remain unarticulated.  
My fourth argument is therefore that engaging in our experiences of shame may provide new 
opportunities for action. Following my exploration in this project, it would be tempting to think that I 
have new moral justifications for some of the times I have found myself in conflict with others. For 
example, I recall being irritated by an interaction with an OD expert who seemed uninterested in the 
possibility that there might be other perspectives on the matter of organisational culture than hers; I 
could characterise this as a lack of interest in being part of a community who explore these topics 
together, and therefore a lack of respect, which justifies my irritation as a response to their lack of 
shame. Similarly, I can recall experiences of feeling perplexed by a colleague’s apparent blind 
deference towards an expert; I could characterise this (to my mind) abrogation of responsibility as 
an avoidance of the possibility of shame and a lack of self-respect. However, I am not suggesting a 
self-edifying advocation for calling out these instances, partly because I notice the presence of my 
own values in what I have just written. Previously, I have described attitudinal plurality (belonging to 
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the community of others who are radically open to the idea that they may be wrong); taking 
responsibility (belonging to the community of others who do not delegate their thinking to others); 
and being knowledgeable (belonging to various communities who have particular kinds of specialist 
resources), as all being important to me – so, one could interpret my irritations as simply about 
others not sharing my values.  
In that case, perhaps all I am really arguing for is that inquiring into ruptures in practice as I have 
done – either in the moment, or through research – can bring into view the fragility of the social 
order in which we find ourselves participating. Where these ruptures involve significant experiences 
of shame, it may be that the aspects of the social order at stake concern things that matter to us; 
therefore, through further inquiry, we may find out more about what the things that matter to us 
are. Sometimes, these inquiries will present intolerable threats to ontological security and identity 
more generally, so we might expect them to be disturbing. This disturbance may well cause 
significant anxiety as we encounter our taken-for-granted selves and others as strangers; our 
abjective responses are likely to be further claims to identity. At times, pursuing such explorations 
might be harmful to those concerned; at other times, these explorations may be hugely generative – 
much of the work in OD practice involves disrupting unhelpful patterns of interactions, to allow new 
possibilities to emerge. The same could probably be said of any therapeutic or transformative 
process of personality and social reconstruction. 
However, despite the unpredictability of social life, we are nevertheless performing with others all 
the time, in and out of keeping with collective expectations. And for as long as we are interested in 
the impact we have on others (as OD practitioners working to facilitate organisational change, but 
also more generally as social agents interdependent with other social agents), at the heart of these 
considerations is the question of how to be ethical. Another way of describing the Meadian 
perspective on morality is to say that we need to respect the perspectives of others as we take 
responsibility (with self-respect) for how we step into the unknown. We are probably better able to 
do that if our prejudices are, as far as possible, in plain sight; and I have argued that paying attention 
to disturbing aspects of our experiences that we might prefer to avoid – of which shame is one – is a 
way to find out more about ourselves. This is therefore an important aspect of how we take 
responsibility for ourselves and our moral development. 
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3. Synopsis of my research 
In this section, I reflect on my research projects, first summarising each of them and then analysing 
them thematically – citing new literature in some places – to draw out what I see as having been the 
key movements in my thought. This includes setting out a summary of the theoretical foundation for 
my research. Deliberately adopting a more detached attitude than when writing Projects 1–4, I then 
articulate my argument as a series of five claims and associated implications for OD practice. In the 
case of the last argument, I also note some implications for research as a practice. Finally, I critically 
engage with the contemporary literature on expertise, providing a new conceptualisation of it as a 
social object. 
This review is therefore a further iteration of the research cycle: if Project 1 explored the evolution 
of my interpretive tendencies, and each of Projects 2–4 were exercises in breakdown-oriented 
research (Alvesson and Kärreman 2011; Brinkmann 2012; see Chapter 4), then this summary too is a 
further opportunity for critical and reflexive analysis, through which I may understand more about 
identity and the social order in which I am involved. 
Project summaries 
Project 1: Engaging and distancing as processes of managing my sense of self 
In my first project, I tried to describe the evolution of some of the thought styles (Fleck and Trenn 
1992) that now inform my approach to work. I traced a personal history that started with an early 
enthusiasm for learning in childhood, combined with a sense of not quite fitting in. This was 
followed by significant movements in my thought during my undergraduate and graduate studies, 
and through my experiences of work as a healthcare manager in the public sector and as a 
consultant to healthcare organisations.  
From an epistemological perspective, I described an evolution from a clearly positivist perspective 
(i.e., that through scientific inquiry we can discover the true nature of the world ‘out there’, as 
reliably documented in school textbooks) to a more relativist social-constructionist perspective, 
which came about largely through my undergraduate encounters with Nietzsche’s writings. I then 
described a move to a more pragmatic perspectivism that focussed on the value of theory as a 
means to social action, which I associated with my graduate studies in critical theory. Though I 
stepped away from academia at that point, these ideals followed through as a tendency towards 
doing socially motivated work and a belief in the importance of intellectual honesty and rigour. 
In describing these movements in my thought, I drew attention to how I have appeared to try to 
manage my emotional states – which I would now describe in terms of anxiety – through repeating 
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patterns of engaging in and distancing from my work. I noticed how this seem to be particularly 
related to my ability or willingness to tolerate the emotional volatility that accompanied my more 
challenging experiences of being with others. I also noticed how these kinds of experiences became 
more prominent as I took on more senior roles: while committed to doing socially motivated work, 
when I was unwilling to play into particular kinds of politics or power relating that I found difficult, or 
when they led me to unhappiness or distress, I sought to distance myself from them, and this often 
involved ‘escaping’ to academia. These were helpful observations about my history that I had not 
previously considered, which enriched the field of my attention and immediately started to offer 
new ways of dealing with events at work to which I had strong reactions.  
As I was writing Project 1, I also noticed that the process of its development itself offered useful 
insights into how I think, beyond the content of what I was writing about. In that phenomenological 
move (from the object of inquiry to the process of inquiring [Brinkmann 2012]), I noticed that I was 
getting very stuck when contemplating the vast extent of literature waiting to be explored and the 
ideas I might encounter: there was so much that I could have read and written about, and each new 
idea I encountered seemed to profoundly change my understanding of the experiences I was 
reflecting upon. What had seemed important initially suddenly felt trivial; what had seemed 
unpredictable at the time became easily explained through some new critical or psychoanalytical 
perspective. This open-endedness was both paralysing and exhilarating: I couldn’t see how I would 
complete my project because I didn’t know what I might come across next, yet I sensed that new 
possibilities might be becoming available to me, although I couldn’t articulate these at the time. 
Further, I felt that to be a good researcher, I should know more – which perhaps draws attention to a 
more general sense in which knowledge and certainty have been idealised in Western society since 
the Enlightenment (Gadamer 1975; Elias 1978; P2: 42; P4: 87).  
What I found most helpful in dealing with this conflict between a cognitive appreciation of not being 
able to know everything, and a much more pre-cognitive, bodily, attraction to wanting to know 
more, was to try to reframe the problem of being stuck by exploring the process of interpretation. I 
took up Gadamer’s theory of hermeneutics (Gadamer 1975) and within it his ideas of insight (P1: 8) 
and experience (P1: 27). Together, these led me to revise my project to concentrate on writing about 
the events that had been particularly anxiety provoking (as these offered the greatest opportunities 
for learning) and to reassess my desire for completeness and certainty. This revealed a disconnect 
between my espoused pragmatic perspectivism and my actual interpretive tendencies, which 
seemed much more positivist than I would have cared to admit. This was a profound moment for me 
and catalysed a new sense of (at least cognitive) ease with a lack of certainty about the future and a 
greater appreciation of my interdependence with others. I ended my project intending to inquire 
more deeply into politics, ethics, and emotions. 
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Project 2: Reflective practice and the ethics of uncertainty 
In my second project, I wrote about how I went about initiating a culture and leadership project in 
my organisation. The work had been requested by the director of OD, and, as a part-time member of 
their team, I was directed to use a particular set of diagnostic tools. As this work progressed in 
tandem with my research, I found myself becoming increasingly sceptical about the approach I was 
using. This was especially because revaluating what I had been doing brought about ethical 
concerns: I felt regret and embarrassment about how I was coming to reinterpret my previous 
actions.  
I started by considering what sense I could make of the increasing focus on culture using diagnostic 
and strategic planning tools, identifying these as some of the traditional techniques of scientific 
managerialism based upon the principles of strategic choice theory (Child 1972). Using ideas from 
anthropology on rituals (Lukes 1977), I argued that one of the reasons that these simplifying tools 
might be taken up in bureaucratic organisations (in preference to engaging in the complexity of our 
experience) was to preserve managerialism, its associated patterns of power relating, and the status 
of people (like me) who are kept in work by the managerialist paradigm. I argued that we could see a 
wider conflict in these approaches between bureaucratic ideals – viz. the discharge of business 
according to calculable rules through the functional division of labour (Weber et al 1958; Townley 
2008) – and the interests of individuals, which can be seen as tending to be negated in these kinds of 
organisations (Bauman 1989). 
I critiqued the either/or assumption implied by separating bureaucratic ideals from the interests of 
individuals as an oversimplification of a more complex set of competing and irreconcilable ideals (du 
Gay 2000). Consequently, I suggested that it was worth exploring other explanations for my 
experience and took up ideas from psychoanalysis on rituals as a way to think about what happens 
in organisations (e.g. Jaques 1955; Hirschhorn 1988; Gabriel 2013). Specifically, I considered how the 
kinds of planning activities I was examining might be seen as social defences against anxiety 
(Menzies 1960; Armstrong and Rustin 2015). This is the idea that groups can be unconsciously 
motivated to collude in creating ritualised social processes that help group members to avoid 
dealing with the disturbing reality of their fuller experience. I suggested that it was at least plausible 
that the work on culture I was leading could be thought of as a social defence against the anxiety 
provoked by the actual experience of trying to lead teams in the challenging environment we find 
ourselves in. Extrapolating from this, I concluded that strategic planning activities in general could be 
seen as important but temporary ways of making sense and managing anxiety, rather than as the 
prophetic forecasts we might sometimes imagine them to be.  
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I suggested that accepting this proposition might imply a very different way of dealing with, for 
example, the non-delivery of plans than current ways of holding individuals to account sometimes 
involve. As a result, I found myself being more explicit with my colleagues about what I thought 
project management tools were for, which seemed to resonate with them and provided us flexibility 
and space to negotiate agreements that might otherwise have been seen as unamendable. I also 
found myself talking about taking responsibility for what we were doing in different ways, 
emphasising the need to engage with people as people rather than spaces on organisation charts. 
However, noticing that both the anthropological and psychoanalytical perspectives on rituals had 
offered insights that felt significant to me, I wondered how many other perspectives might do the 
same. As I had done in Project 1, I noticed a sense of paralysis emerging from the observation that I 
had no idea what else I might find if I read more. Relatedly, in light of the new interpretations I was 
making, I noticed how I myself might inadvertently have been negating the interests of my 
colleagues, which led to further ethical discomfort. I therefore became curious about how OD 
practitioners could ever work out what the right thing to do was in light of this kind of uncertainty 
about the future and about the past.  
I went on to suggest that my paralysis might reflect a deeply held preference to look for the fixed 
and stable in our experience (Elias 1978) being called into question – in other words, a defence 
against anxiety. I explored a more processual alternative position in the argument from pragmatic 
philosophy that meaning emerges in interaction (Mead 1934), concluding that the assertion that we 
can predict the impact of our actions with much confidence beyond some general expectations was 
unwarranted; and for the same reasons, argued that the search for a definitive explanation of what I 
was doing at work was probably futile. I notice now how this could be seen as a further example of a 
habitual tendency to dichotomise as I pitched certainty against uncertainty, at this point privileging 
the latter. I now also wonder if my turn away from exploring further interpretations may have been 
a form of intellectualising defence against anxiety, manifest as a reluctance to admit how socialised I 
was into the bureaucratic ideology I was criticising, and the prospect of finding further disturbing 
explanations for what I had been doing.  
The movement in my interpretive tendencies that seemed to being brought about by my research, 
and particularly the ethical concerns that were arising as a result alongside new capacities to act, 
were becoming increasingly prominent in my thinking. This led me to write about how reflective 
practice could be seen as an ethical process of engaging with uncertainty. I argued against more 
traditional systems thinking–based conceptions of how we learn (e.g. Bateson 1972; Argyris and 
Schön 1974; Argyris 1982) on the basis that single- and double-loop learning implied a repeatability 
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of social experience and an ability to step outside our experience, both of which I suggested were 
problematic in the absence of an Archimedean ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel 1986). Instead, I set out 
how reflective practice could be regarded as an intentional social process of enriching the field of 
our attention based on the Meadian theory of human interaction (Mead 1934). Further, on Mead’s 
view, that morality could helpfully be thought of as a necessarily fallible process of seeking the 
widest possible range perspectives and acting on the balance of competing goods. This suggested a 
way that OD practitioners could engage differently with uncertainty, by thinking differently about 
what it is possible to take responsibility for.  
By the end of Project 2, I felt much more comfortable relying on my instincts rather than trying to 
predict what would happen as a result of my interventions, as I would have done before. I would 
now characterise this as a state of awareness that was more sensitive to signals that things were not 
going to plan. In practice, I’m not sure if it is possible to say what I did or did not notice as a result, 
but I mention this to draw attention to the way that a new way of thinking was also feeling or bodily 
state. I also now see my project as an initial exploration of the practice of researching the surprising 
quality that inquiring into my experience seemed to occasion. I ended my project intending to 
inquire into what we are actually doing when we find ourselves knowing or not knowing what to do.  
 
Project 3: Exploring being stuck as a negotiation of social orders: preliminary thoughts on honesty as 
a way of coping with uncertainty 
In my third project, I continued to inquire into my experience of working on employee engagement 
and culture in my organisation, this time starting with an account of a team away day I facilitated for 
a large directorate within my organisation. I explored the power dynamics of the facilitator–group 
relationship and while I came to some interesting conclusions about the paradox of safety and 
experimentation, and about the how current trends in OD practice (e.g. towards dialogic OD) could 
be seen as forms of professional protectionism in the OD community, none of this seemed to be 
particularly satisfying for me.  
As I worked at trying to make my inquiry more compelling, no matter what I tried, I seemed unable 
to create the thick description (Geertz 1973) that enabled others to empathise with my narrative 
and subsequent analyses; and this was leading to me feeling stuck, bored and frustrated. This 
triggered an interest in the embodiment of social processes, which I took up by engaging with 
literature about boredom (Toohey 2012; Fenichel 1954); this largely suggested that there was 
something important missing from my work. 
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Noticing that the process of becoming unstuck had been facilitated by conversations with my 
learning set, which had led to a greater sense of honesty, I became curious about what might not 
have been honest about what I had been doing until I became unstuck. This led me to consider 
psychoanalytical perspectives on concealment – repression (Freud 1915) or exclusion (Bowlby 1979) 
– and how these might relate to the pursuit of ontological security (Laing 1969; Marris 1996). While I 
critiqued the basis of psychoanalysis as insufficiently explanatory of the social nature of mind and its 
development (Mead 1934) if human interactions are understood as complex responsive processes, I 
found the theme of the pursuit of security through concealment compelling. So, I turned instead to 
James C. Scott’s theory of public and hidden transcripts (Scott 1990) as an alternative way of 
exploring ideas about concealment as social processes. I argued that from this perspective, feeling 
stuck could be seen as the embodiment of conflicting social orders: in my specific case, this related 
to the competition between, on the one hand, the self-sacrificing and arguably rather impersonal 
ideals that seem implicit to the discourse of public-sector work; and, on the other, the existential 
concerns of employees and their accompanying anxieties – manifest perhaps as boredom, envy, 
anger, or other emotions that are formally excluded from this discourse, but still very much present 
in other ways. I suggested that these patterns were maintained through group processes involving 
shame and guilt (Elias and Scotson 1965).  
I went on to consider how the threat of reorganisation likely heightened anxieties, which are 
arguably most likely to be borne by the weakest members of the social figuration (Marris 1996); 
though in organisations, the ‘weakest’ also place constraints on what leaders can achieve. I argued 
that while this may lead to workplace disengagement or preoccupations with trivialities (and I 
noticed this happening in my work and in what I found myself able to write about in the earlier 
stages of the project’s development), I was nevertheless consciously or unconsciously taking steps to 
secure my own future; when I became able to engage with this, I found that new capacities to act 
became available.  
I used the notion of self-authentication from Dreyfus and Taylor’s contact-based epistemological 
programme (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015) to explore the experience of feelings of coherence or honesty 
that accompanied becoming unstuck, and figured this further as a process of social reconstruction. 
Using Mead’s arguments that individuals are social through and through, I showed that far from 
being processes that occur ‘in individuals’, both could be seen as social processes. In particular, I 
argued that moments of felt coherence were instances of what Mead terms the fusion of ‘I’ and 
‘me’, representing a temporary sense of freedom from social constraint, and that social 
reconstruction and personality reconstruction were mutually constitutive (Mead 1934).  
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On that basis, I suggested that OD practitioners and leaders in general might well consider what 
could be enabled by bringing into view anxieties arising from uncertainty. Though I appreciated that 
seeing this as an alternative totalising ideology of transparency was also likely to be problematic, I 
nevertheless leant towards the idea that anxiety should be explored wherever possible because 
having more choice was somehow necessarily better. I noticed that this might speak to an 
idealisation of the possibility of omniscience, which could also be seen as being shared (at least 
implicitly) by organisational researchers who are currently inquiring into practice (e.g. Greig et al 
2012; Hibbert et al 2017). I ended my project intending to explore how else we might deal with the 
conflict between the uncertainty that seems inevitable in organisational life and a pursuit of 
certainty (Bowlby 1979), which I saw as driving our apparent attraction towards idealised totalities 
(e.g. aiming for familiarity with ‘all’ of the organisational literature, or to know ‘everything’ about 
oneself). 
 
Project 4: Expertise as a relational practice: exploring the paradox of shame and self-respect 
In my final project, I was determined to stay focussed on my experience of work and resist the 
temptation to idealise or resort to metatheory that I had demonstrated in my previous projects. I 
started with the description of a further experience of planning for and facilitating a development 
event for a directorate in my organisation. This event occurred just as an organisational restructure 
was getting underway.  
Whereas I had been drawn to describing quite stark or dramatic events in Projects 1–3 (the 
moments of being significantly ‘pulled up short’, as I had resolved to pay attention to in my first 
project), I was now much more interested in the more mundane ways I was going about my work, 
keeping in mind the learning from my research so far. In particular, I noticed how I was paying much 
more attention to competing social orders and community memberships, and this showed up in my 
research as writing about why, for example, I was choosing facilitation techniques based on the 
extent to which I could describe them using the theoretical perspectives I was using in my research: 
being able to describe Open Space Technology (Owen 1992) from the perspective of human 
interaction understood as complex responsive processes felt important because it justified my 
membership of, for example, the DMan community of researchers, or of the community of OD 
practitioners who can explain the theoretical basis of their practice.  
As I inquired into experiences in which I responded to some sense of my credentials as an OD 
practitioner being called into question, I increasingly started to notice the performative quality of 
what was involved for different parties participating in expert–lay audience relationships, and in 
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particular the backstage and frontstage aspects of those performances (Bourdieu 1977, 1990; 
Giddens 1984, 1990; Goffman 1951, 1959, 1967). I also noticed how the ideology of the regime of 
overseers and the overseen seemed to play out in the moments of rupture I was describing, and I 
found practice theory (and particular Giddens’s duality of structure and agency [1984]) to provide a 
compelling account of the production and reproduction of social orders, the power relations 
inherent to them, and the conditions that enable their reproduction.  
What I find missing from practice theories is an adequate description of how practices produce and 
reproduce ideologies, but I think this is where the complex responsive processes perspective can 
help. Firstly, from the complexity sciences, complex adaptive systems involving heterogenous agents 
suggest by analogy how population-wide patterns can emerge and evolve paradoxically in local 
interaction; secondly, from pragmatic philosophy, Mead’s conception of self-consciousness as a 
paradoxical experience of self as simultaneously both subject and object also provides a way of 
reconciling Giddens’s duality of structure and agency (Stacey 2012; Stacey and Mowles 2016; 
Mowles 2015; Simpson 2009). 
Alerted by my conclusions in Project 3, I also noticed how experiencing the fragility of the social 
order being brought into view was accompanied by bodily discomfort. I suggested the aspects of the 
social order involved included: the role of experts in modern societies as access points to specialist 
knowledge resources (Giddens 1990); the particular role my organisation occupies in the oversight 
regime for health and care services; and the role I play in relation to the directorate I am supporting. 
These observations emerged from critically analysing my account of a meeting with the directorate’s 
small OD group in which we were planning the upcoming team development day, and a second 
narrative recounting an episode at the development day when the process I had planned for the 
eighty or so delegates seem to dramatically fail.  
The experiences themselves were disturbing at the time, and so was their revaluation as I inquired 
into them. I took these disturbing moments, as in Project 3, as indicating that processes of 
personality and social reconstruction were going on. Relating this to practice theory, I described 
them as embodied ruptures in our socially constructed, habitual processes of fore-conceiving 
completeness (Gadamer 1975) that produce and reproduce patterns of interaction. These can be 
thought of as moments when the contingency of our assumptions is brought into view, which 
provides openings in which patterns may transform unexpectedly (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011). 
Importantly, responses to these ruptures can also be recursive, and indeed may often be so. Where I 
had previously been rather drawn to the idea of transforming stuck patterns towards some greater 
purpose – as is, to some extent, the job of OD practitioners as they try to improve organisational 
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performance (e.g. Bushe 2017) – I noticed the contingency of even that ideological position. In 
Project 3, I had already rejected the idea of OD practitioners as the ‘neutral guides’ they are often 
supposed to be (see e.g. Cheung-Judge and Holbeche 2015; Marshak et al 2015; Justice and 
Jamieson 1998; Corrigan 2015) because of the essential interdependence of being a social actor 
(Elias 1978). And in that case, given that my motivations may not always be the same as other 
people’s motivations, how could I go about deciding whose moral agency was more important?  
I was surprised that my inquiry led to an exploration of shame (though I now notice that I described 
feeling embarrassed and regretful in previous projects, too), which seemed to offer an explanation 
not only for some of my own feelings about my experiences, but also for the actions of others. 
Exploring philosophical and psychological perspectives on shame (Probyn 2005; Sedgwick and Frank 
1995; Scheff 2000, 2003, 2014; Thomason 2018), I concluded that experiences of shame could be 
thought of as affectual responses to the possibility of exclusion from real or imagined communities 
that were important to us, and that this sense of vulnerability demonstrated an openness to being 
morally criticised by others. I argued that these experiences were likely to arise when some kind of 
social norm was transgressed; and since abjective responses arise in relation to the desire to cast 
away some disturbing aspect of ourselves (Kristeva 1982), experiences of shame could be considered 
as abjective affirmations of identity – and simultaneously (because selves are social) of the social 
order. I argued that shame was therefore an important aspect of moral development.  
I concluded my project with four arguments:  
• Expertise can be thought of as one of the routinised relational practices – here involving the 
backstage and frontstage performances of experts, authorising bodies and their lay 
audiences – through which the social order of large, complex modern societies is produced 
and reproduced. 
• Routinised relational practices in general are the means by which social figurations and the 
power relations inherent to them (Elias 1978; Foucault 1976), and the conditions that enable 
their reproduction, are produced, reproduced, evolve and transform (Bourdieu 1977; 
Giddens 1984). In particular, our aversion to shame and other anxiety-associated responses 
that are called out during ruptures in practice account for a recursive tendency, often 
because we fear exclusion (Probyn 2005; Sedgwick and Frank 1995; Lewis 1971; Scheff 2000, 
2003, 2014; Stacey 2003) or are seeking to reduce the anxiety that uncertainty creates 
(Marris 1996). I think this tendency is privileged in systems thinking and cybernetics.  
• Alongside this recursive tendency, there is also a tendency towards significant social change, 
but it is difficult to predict how these competing tendencies will play out in particular 
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instances due to the perspectival and temporal instability of meaning (Mead 1934) and the 
analogy of the butterfly effect. 
• Staying with and inquiring into the felt disturbance that goes along with breakdowns in 
practice – including those involving shame, experienced alone and with others – may 
provide new capacities to act. The extent to which this is possible, of course, will depend on 
the context; and making judgements about what is appropriate – at particular times, in 
particular places – is what taking responsibility might mean. Importantly, this tries to resist 
the tendency to preferentially elevate one side of dichotomised propositions (such as 
certainty/uncertainty or thinking/feeling) that I noticed in my practice in previous projects: 
in some cases, not challenging the status quo might be, on balance, judged the ‘right’ thing 
to do.  
 
Looking back over the four projects summarised in this way, I notice how the themes that emerged 
in Project 1 about politics, ethics and emotions, and in Projects 2 and 3 about uncertainty and 
security as intended areas for exploration, did indeed turn out to be the foci of my research. I did not 
anticipate that expertise and shame would arise as topics for exploration, or that practice theory and 
morality would become so dominant in my thinking, in the way that they did in Project 4. I think this 
demonstrates something about the way the DMan enables researchers to follow what puzzles them 
rather than trying to anticipate this in advance. I will come back to this in Chapter 4. 
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Thematic analysis of my projects 
A further review of the project synopses I have just provided begins to illuminate some of the key 
movements in my thought over the course of the DMan programme. I will now summarise those 
that I see as being most material to the arguments I want to make, and try where possible to 
account for the societal conditions that may explain why I am drawn to them.  
Uncertainty and the pursuit of wholeness 
How we respond to the prospect of experience being endlessly revisable has been a consistent 
theme in all of my projects. It emerged in Project 1 as reflections about how – despite my leanings 
towards perspectivism that arose in my undergraduate studies – I felt both exhilarated and 
paralysed by encountering academic literature that kept prompting reconstructions of my previous 
experience. I found some sort of resolution in Gadamer’s notion of the hermeneutic circle (Gadamer 
1975) as a metatheoretical way of explaining why enquiries into practice were necessarily open-
ended. Later, I would find this echoed in the work of contemporary social constructionists (e.g. 
Gergen and Gergen 1991) and qualitative researchers using narrative inquiry (e.g. Andrews et al 
2008). 
In Project 2, I explored in detail how meaning arises in interaction in Mead’s pragmatist philosophy, 
and therefore needs to be seen as time- and context-dependent (Mead 1934). I also noticed a 
tendency to look for the static and stable through what Elias (1978) calls ‘process reduction’, and 
found this a helpful way to draw attention to the processual nature of social life that tends to be 
underplayed in managerialist thinking.  
In Project 3, despite my coming around to the idea that we can never really know how our gestures 
will be taken up by others and ourselves, I noticed a strong attraction towards idealised ‘wholes’: in 
Projects 1 and 2, I had looked to metatheory to resolve conflicts in my experience, and in Project 3, I 
found knowing more about myself to be somehow comforting. In Project 4, I located this tendency 
to idealise imagined wholes as a feature of Western thought that found its greatest expression in the 
Enlightenment (Elias 1978; Gadamer 1975; Linge 1976).  
Summary: I would now characterise this movement as a growing acceptance of human finitude and 
the inherent unpredictability of social life, which renders all action probabilistic. I have moved from 
sensing an unarticulated tension between a cognitive understanding of the limitations of inquiry and 
a kind of pre-cognitive, bodily attraction to some ideal of omniscience, to being able to explain this 
tension more succinctly as an embodied competition of the ways of thinking in which I have been 
socialised.  
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Rituals and anxiety management 
My interest in rituals or routinised interactions emerged most clearly in Project 2, where I explored 
perspectives from both social anthropology, which connects rituals to the perpetuation of power 
relations, and psychoanalysis, which connects rituals – as social defences – to group processes of 
managing anxiety. For clarity, by anxiety, here, I mean any disturbing response to unarticulated or 
underarticulated factors, either in the environment or in the self; anxiety in this way of thinking is an 
aspect of the absorbed coping of everyday life (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015), which may be captured 
socio-linguistically as this or that particular emotion (e.g. Burkitt 1999, 2014). From both of these 
perspectives, I noticed the way that we can habitually conform with ritualistic activity, without 
considering how those activities might be part of the very patterns of interaction that we, as OD 
practitioners, and particularly as internal consultants, may be trying to change.  
In Project 3, while not considering rituals specifically, I explored arguments from attachment theory 
that the pursuit of security is linked to managing existential anxiety (Marris 1974; Bowlby 1979), and 
in particular Marris’s arguments about the distribution of uncertainty being inherently political 
(Marris 1996). This connected the distribution of anxiety in social figurations to power relating, 
which was emphasised further in my exploration of Scott’s ‘public and hidden transcripts’ (Scott 
1990). As the narratives of the dominators and the dominated, respectively, these patterns of 
interacting could be seen as routinised relational activities – or practices – that provide some kind of 
certainty to those involved (even if the consequences of that certainty are undesirable to some), 
versus the social chaos that may arise from transgressions of social orders.  
I explored the idea of routinised practices most fully in Project 4, where I used Giddens’s 
structuration theory (Giddens 1984), with the addition of key arguments from the perspective of 
human interaction understood as complex responsive processes (Stacey 2003, 2009, 2012; Stacey 
and Mowles 2016), to make sense of how patterns of interaction are produced, reproduced, evolve 
and transform in local interactions. I argued that the recursive tendency we notice in group 
processes may arise from a collective avoidance of the anxiety associated with the uncertainty that 
would arise from challenging established ways of working and social ordering. This may be especially 
noticeable in modern societies due to the extent to which their size and complexity preclude really 
getting to know more than a tiny fraction of the people we might encounter in everyday life. In line 
with Marris (1996), I would see the uneven distribution of uncertainty – and therefore anxiety – as a 
political process that serves to perpetuate power relations. 
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Summary: I would therefore characterise my thinking here as a movement from noticing the rituals 
in some aspects of organisational life, to seeing routinised interaction as constituting identities and 
social order in ways that are bound up with power relating and the management of anxiety.  
Embodiment of social processes, including breakdowns 
My interest in how heightened bodily states can indicate that important reconstructive processes 
are going on has also been an ongoing theme in my projects. In particular, I have found myself 
interested in how experience is affectual rather than simply cognitive; and by affect, I mean any of 
the ways we find ourselves affecting or being affected by the world around us, including other 
people, objects, ideas, language and ourselves (Gherardi 2017, 2018; Carlile et al 2013). Anxiety, as I 
have expressed it above, is therefore an affectual response in these terms, which may be captured 
socio-linguistically in different ways, depending on the quality of the experience and its social 
context (Gherardi 2017). 
This theme appeared in Project 1 in a number of ways: for example, I describe how each new 
perspective I encountered seemed to change my sense of my history and my identity in disturbing 
ways; further, I took up Gadamer’s notion of insight, which emphasises that our most important 
learning experiences involve suffering (Gadamer 1975: 365); further still, the reason I turned to 
Gadamer was because of the paralysis I felt when confronted by the sheer scale of the available 
literature.  
In Project 2, I was disturbed by ethical concerns associated with realizing that my habitual ways of 
working may have perpetuated some of the very patterns of interaction that I was criticising. This 
disturbance manifested as feelings of regret and embarrassment about who I was finding myself to 
have been, and it was these feelings that led me to inquire into reflective practice more generally as 
a way of minimising the chances of this kind of problematic revaluation (and the discomfort that 
went with it) in the future.  
In some ways, Project 3 largely focussed on the embodied experience of unacknowledged conflicts 
of the group processes of social ordering in which I am involved, with identity being a way of 
speaking about the location of competing concerns in individuals (Ybema et al 2009). Importantly, I 
started to become more attentive to the pre-reflective, pre-linguistic or affectual quality of 
interaction (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015; Gherardi 2018; Shotter 2016). In inquiring into my experiences 
of feeling stuck, and becoming unstuck, I started to explain how ‘individual’ psychodynamic 
processes, involving concealment and pragmatic resolution, could be seen as embodied group 
processes. In particular, I found Mead’s notion of personality reconstruction and social 
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reconstruction being mutually constitutive (Mead 1934: 309) to be helpful in articulating this as a 
paradoxical relationship. 
In Project 4, I paid attention more formally to ruptures in practices, where the contingency of the 
social order comes into view, manifest as bodily experiences. I proposed that a rising sense of 
anxiety correlates with increases in uncertainty about our ability to stay in relation with each other –
logically, then, a rising sense of anxiety might lead us to question what about the social order or our 
identities is at stake.  
Summary: I would chart this movement in my thought as a growing dissatisfaction with the 
Cartesian mind/body dualism that has dominated Western thought since the Enlightenment. 
Arguably, this historical separation of rational objectivity from irrational subjectivity, and the 
elevation of the former over the latter (Linge 1976), negates much of what makes us human. If we 
are interested in social life and all of the ways that we affectively interact with each other, and 
accept Mead’s position that human experience consists of bodies interacting with other bodies and 
themselves, then there is clearly more to attend to than just the cognitive and linguistic aspects of 
experience we tend to privilege.  
 
Shame and self-respect  
In Project 4, I engaged with the notion of shame, its emotional neighbours and their associated 
manifestations. I characterised these as arising with the threat of exclusion from real or imagined 
communities that are important to us, as a recognition of the moral agency of others (Lewis 1971; 
Sedgwick and Frank 1995; Probyn 1996, 2005; Scheff 2000; 2003, 2014; Stacey 2003; Thomason 
2018).  
Further, using Kristeva’s notion of abjection (Kristeva 1982) – figured as a group process that can 
occur privately, using Mead’s notion of minds being continuous with society (Mead 1934; P3: 69) – I 
explored how our visceral awareness of these threats of exclusion and the responses that follow 
could be seen as affirmations of both identity and the social order. Put another way, what we do 
when we feel shame may say a lot about what or who is important to us among competing identity 
or membership claims. I saw this as closely related to Mead’s dialectic of ‘I’ and ‘me’, and came to 
see self-respect and shame as similarly dialectically related in the process of self-consciousness. Far 
from being something to be avoided, shame therefore becomes a fundamental aspect of what it is 
to be human.  
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Looking back over my projects, I can now see constant examples of this interplay of shame (where 
memberships were at risk) and self-respect (where what was important to me was expressed). Table 
1 illustrates this with just two cases (there were many more) from each project as examples. In each, 
I describe the incident in which I experienced shame to some extent; I suggest which real and 
imagined communities may have been at stake; and I suggest what aspect of my identity or the 
social order my response affirmed. The range of experiences in the table indicates the diversity of 
stimuli that called out a shame-like response, and the conscious and unconscious identity 
affirmations that were involved. The patterns observable in the final column, I would argue, 
demonstrate how identity can be thought of as an ongoing negotiated process (Ybema et al 2009) 
that is always forming and being formed by the social order. 
 
Table 1: Experiences where memberships are at stake 
Experience Page 
ref. 
Memberships at risk  
(evoking shame) 
Response and interpretation  
(involving self-respect) 
Project 1 
During my Master’s studies 
at UCL, being told off for 
taking risks by writing 
polemically rather than 
conforming to norms of 
academic writing.  
15 Real: Academic community at 
UCL; Master’s graduates 
Imagined: Continental 
philosophers who write 
polemically, prompting social 
action; people who are 
subversive  
Largely submitted to academic norms but 
tried to maintain my focus on polemic. 
• Found a way to reconcile conflicting 
memberships to get my degree but not 
compromise on my ideals; 
• perpetuated a social order in which 
deviation from norms was allowed, but 
only to an extent. 
In my commissioning role, 
depression as I found 
myself not fitting in.  
24 Real: My own team; the 
organisation more widely 
Imagined: People who are 
intellectually rigorous; healthcare 
managers who are good at their 
jobs; credible interlocuters with 
leadership teams  
Submitted to team play but tried to find 
ways to do the work I thought was 
important.  
• Found a way to reconcile conflicting 
memberships, but played down my own 
concerns;  
• submitted to organisational patterns of 
power relating, arguably reinforcing the 
social order. 
Project 2 
With Jerome, ethical 
discomfort when 
considering whether or not 
to take on the culture work 
because I disagreed with its 
positivist basis.  
31 Real: Jerome’s team; in the 
future, the OD community  
Imagined: People who are 
intellectually rigorous; my 
research community  
Agreed to do the work on the basis that I 
would do it the way I felt made sense. 
• Expressed the importance of my own 
priorities over others; 
• challenged the status quo, enabling the 
possibility of transformation of patterns 
of relating. 
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Experience Page 
ref. 
Memberships at risk  
(evoking shame) 
Response and interpretation  
(involving self-respect) 
Regret when revaluating 
how I had been going about 
the Culture work as 
perpetuating the habitual 
patterns of relating I was 
criticising. 
39, 41 Imagined: People who promote 
the agency of their colleagues; 
people who are self-aware; 
people who take responsibility 
for their actions; people who are 
intellectually rigorous 
Changed my approach to be more 
consistent with my values, and tried to 
influence wider OD activities.  
• Set myself in opposition to my habitual 
tendencies/organisational norms, 
affirming my preference for the 
imagined communities listed;  
• primarily an evolution of identity. 
Project 3 
Alone and with my learning 
set, feeling stuck because I 
wasn’t able to progress my 
project – boredom, 
frustration, resignation. 
65 Real: My research community; 
DMan graduates 
Imagined: People able to work 
through difficulties; people who 
are academically able 
Stayed with feelings, even though unsure 
about outcome.  
• Expressed desire to stay in research 
community and prove myself;  
• perpetuated social norms of the DMan 
being personally as well as academically 
challenging. 
With the group at the 
healthcare conference, 
ambivalent feelings when 
wanting to pursue the 
argument about cult values 
when others didn’t.  
71 Real: The particular group of 10 
people and others at the 
conference 
Imagined: Healthcare managers; 
my research community; people 
who are intellectually rigorous 
and willing to consider 
alternative or critical 
perspectives 
Submitted to group norms rather than 
argue with Ian. 
• Group membership seemed more 
important, and I contributed to 
perpetuating the social order in which 
‘patient care’ trumps other concerns; 
• that I’ve written about it suggests that 
the research community is more 
enduringly important to me. 
Project 4 
Ethical discomfort when 
revaluating not having 
shared more of my thinking 
with the OD working group. 
86 Imagined: People who respect 
the moral agency of others 
Considered explicitly the situatedness of 
the decision, which will likely change my 
approach in future. 
• Affirming my commitment to attitudinal 
plurality and acknowledging fallibility;  
• primarily an evolution of identity. 
Embarrassment, irritation 
and fear when the OST 
process didn’t go to plan. 
98 Real: The Support Directorate’s 
members; the central OD team; 
the organisation more widely 
Imagined: OD community;  
good facilitators; people who can 
handle tricky situations with large 
groups; people who care for 
others 
Asked the group members to have table 
discussions, rather than following my 
original plan. 
• Expressed deference to group norms by 
‘giving in’ to what I thought they 
wanted, i.e. escape from discomfort;  
• perpetuated a social order in which it is 
difficult to talk about some topics in 
public. 
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Summary: I see the movement in my thought here as an increasing appreciation of the importance 
of shame in group processes of inclusion and exclusion, and in particular moving from being 
uncomfortable about feeling embarrassed or ashamed, to seeing these experiences as opportunities 
to inquire into what is at stake for me or for others. I also see a move from privileging the moral 
agency of others over my own, to a greater appreciation of the situatedness of ethical judgements 
and the responsibility involved in acting (self-)respectfully. Paying attention to these experiences in 
my research has led to significant revaluations of my experience and more choice in subsequent 
encounters with unexpected difference: now, when I notice heightened emotional states in myself 
and others, they tend to trigger conscious reflexive processes in the moment rather than 
unreflective action. 
Morality and freedom 
A preoccupation with the relationship between morality and uncertainty has been present 
throughout my projects. In Project 1, I posed the question of how we could ever work out what we 
should do when faced with the open-ended and revisable nature of meaning that I was starting to 
notice. In Project 2, I focussed specifically on my dissatisfaction with normative perspectives on 
morality in the Kantian tradition (e.g. Kant and Paton 1948), and how the Meadian pragmatist 
perspective on morality – as seeking the widest range of perspectives, then acting on the rational 
balance of ‘goods’ (Mead 1934) – seemed better able to deal with the actuality of negotiating with 
others (Griffin 2002). This led to my characterising reflective practice as an ethical process because it 
was a deliberate way of enriching our fields of attention, allowing more perspectives to be taken 
into account, and therefore expanding our capacities to act. On reflection, if choice relates to 
freedom, then this is an argument for maximising human freedom. 
In Project 3, morality was less of an overt theme, but was nevertheless present in my considerations 
about bringing into view aspects of our experience that we might prefer to avoid through 
psychodynamic, but still social, processes of repression (Freud 1915) or exclusion (Bowlby 1979). 
Implicit in this was the tendency to dichotomise certainty and uncertainty, privileging engaging with 
uncertainty as a way of increasing choice. This again emphasises a bias towards human freedom, 
even if these processes were disturbing.  
In Project 4, I re-engaged with the theme of morality more explicitly in my exploration of the ethical 
implications of staying with ruptures in practice as opposed to acting unreflectively to try to escape 
them. This was particularly in my considerations of shame, as recognising the moral agency of others 
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and demonstrating an openness to moral criticism; and self-respect, as asserting one’s own moral 
agency in the balancing of ‘goods’ proposed by Mead’s moral philosophy.  
Summary: I now characterise the movement in my thinking about morality as an increasing 
appreciation of how rejecting normative perspectives on morality in favour of pragmatic ones 
creates new responsibilities for those who are making judgements about what to do. In the course 
of my research, I moved from not really understanding what I thought about morality, to then 
idealising uncertainty and exploration of the anxiety associated with it as a means to greater 
freedom, which I seemed to feel everyone should pursue. I have now come to a more explicitly 
egalitarian notion of human freedom and a more nuanced view of morality whereby each 
judgement has to be uniquely assessed for the potential benefits and harm it may cause to others, 
and ourselves, at the same time as seeing whatever we do as ongoing processes of identity 
formation and the evolution of social order more widely.  
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Theoretical grounding: pragmatism, performed. 
The core theories involved in the complex responsive processes perspective come from the 
complexity sciences, pragmatist philosophy, process sociology and group analysis (Mowles 2017a, 
2017b). The emergent approach prescribed by the DMan research method (see Chapter 4) inevitably 
means that researchers are exposed to a variety of theoretical paradigms that cannot be predicted 
in advance. Further, as the research method aims to deepen an inquiry that arises in each 
researcher’s own work, these inquiries can focus on very different aspects of the core theories 
according to researchers’ interests, learning set patterns, and what they find most useful based on 
their own histories and contexts. 
Reviewing my projects now, I notice that the ideas that I found most useful are quite diverse, which 
is perhaps a further expression of my stated commitment to attitudinal plurality and a growing 
appreciation of the value of a radical openness to the perspectives of others. I also notice, however, 
that the key ideas I took up can be seen to reflect the tenets of classical pragmatism, and I will set 
out below my understanding of that position and describe how ideas from non-pragmatist 
disciplines can be reconciled with pragmatism to provide a coherent theoretical grounding for my 
research.  
Defining pragmatism 
It has been argued that pragmatism does not have a single definition, but, rather, is a family of 
approaches taken by different scholars who seem to share a set of principles that can broadly traced 
back to the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey (Bernstein 1991, 2010; 
Talisse and Aiken 2008; Simpson 2018). This lack of a clearly delineated theory of pragmatism 
arguably reflects one of its central principles: that the theories that prove useful for living and 
working together will be responsive to and evolve with the situations in which they are called into 
use. Importantly, these theories are endlessly open to critique, which makes any kind of epistemic 
foundationalism problematic; indeed, it has been suggested that this kind of non-foundationalism is 
core to critical philosophy in general (Bernstein 1991), and so to be completely consistent, the 
principles of pragmatism themselves must be open to radical critique.  
One logical conclusion of this way of thinking is an ‘anything goes’ epistemic relativism – which, as 
noted in Project 1, was largely the position I took during my undergraduate studies. The assumptions 
involved in that line of thinking perhaps reflect what the contemporary American philosopher 
Richard Bernstein describes as the ‘grand Either/Or’ that started with Descartes and animated the 
Enlightenment: either there is a secure foundation for our knowledge that can ground our existence 
and moral choices, or we are cast into a radical relativism and intellectual and moral chaos 
(Bernstein 2010).  
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Bernstein suggests that pragmatists reject this dualism by recourse to the notion of pluralism. Unlike 
relativism, pluralism makes no claims about our ability to know the world ‘as it really is’ because the 
distinction between epistemology and ontology is largely irrelevant to the questions that actually 
arise when we engage with our experience of trying to go on with each other; this includes the 
experience of yearning for unifying explanations that seem ultimately unavailable, which was a 
theme that arose throughout my projects. Bernstein’s critique here can be seen as an example of 
rejecting epistemic dualisms, which is suggested to be a further defining characteristic of pragmatist 
thought (Simpson 2018). Reviewing my projects, this was very much was the direction my research 
took as, for example, I started to consider affect (as defined on p.125) as an alternative account of 
experience that did away with the need to separate thinking and feeling; or in my use of the notion 
of routinised relational activities as embodied processes of managing anxiety as a way of bringing 
together the often separately treated issues of identity formation and social ordering. 
A pluralist approach, instead, asks us to consider what kinds of unity feature in our experience, and 
what practical differences they make (Bernstein 2010: 59). For the purposes of academic research, 
this perhaps permits a more exploratory way of engaging with research paradigms compared to 
more positivist approaches that seek to resolve ambiguities and contradictions that arise in 
experience teleologically through, for example, metatheoretical resolution (see, for example, P2: 
48); instead, those issues become opportunities for further inquiries that create new more helpful 
working theories. This does not, however, negate the need for critical rigour in research – indeed, it 
perhaps increases the need to demonstrate that alternative perspectives are being taken seriously 
so that our critiques, and the affirmations immanent to them, are robust enough to stand up to 
scrutiny in our communities of inquiry. 
‘Classical’ pragmatism in my research 
As the preceding subsections of this thematic analysis section indicate, my projects can be read as a 
deepening exploration of pragmatism, which emerged as I came increasingly to see my experience 
of being in the world as engaged, plural and fallible, rather than the detached, teleologically rational 
and ostensibly impartial attitude that many of my colleagues over the years have seemed to idealise. 
It is important to note that the emergence of this perspective was in no way inevitable – it would 
have been equally possible for another paradigm to have emerged as dominant had certain ‘starting 
conditions’ been subtly different (e.g., when I started my research, which learning set I was in, what 
was going on at work at the points when I started each project).  
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Particularly from Project 2 onwards, I found key ideas from George Herbert Mead compelling, and I 
drew heavily on his collection of noted lectures, Mind, Self and Society (1934), throughout my 
projects. In particular, the following elements emerged as enduringly important in my research: 
• Human selves as social through and through in terms of: bodies interacting with themselves 
as they interact with other bodies giving rise to selves and self-consciousness; challenging 
the Cartesian mind/body split, which provoked me to consider affect rather than focussing 
on cognition or intelligibility; and the ways in which identities and social orders can be 
conceptualised as forming and being formed by each other.  
• Meaning emerging unpredictably in those interactions and the possibility of novelty and 
creativity being ever-present as we find ways to live and work together; this is a provocative 
counterpoint to theoretical perspectives that focus largely on the conservatism or recursivity 
in our experience, and to the idea that communication is the cybernetic transfer of mental 
contents from one person to another.  
• The evolution of the sense of the generalised other, which I understand to be a temporally 
dynamic range of sensitivities that arise over time from being able to take an increasingly 
sophisticated set of attitudes of others into account; these are differentially and 
intentionally functionalised according to the particular circumstances in which they are 
called out.  
• Morality as a fallible process of judgement having taken into account as many as possible of 
the possible perspectives on the matter at hand. Pragmatist ethics is a way of thinking about 
how moral problems can be addressed, rather than the moral imperatives found in 
normative ethics. I find that, for Mead, this is situated within a wider ideology of democracy 
and the pursuit of a universal community.  
I also draw slightly on the work of Mead’s contemporary and fellow pragmatist philosopher, John 
Dewey. This is particularly when I write about reflective practice as a formulation of Dewey’s notion 
of engaging with perplexity in the process of inquiry, however, in Project 2, I link this back to the 
Meadian conception of the evolution of the sense of the generalised other.  
Using ideas from non-pragmatist disciplines 
Bernstein describes how pragmatist principles can also be found in the work of many of the 
twentieth century’s most prominent philosophers, even though they come from very different 
historical and theoretical roots to classical pragmatism. For example, in The New Constellation 
(1991), he critically examines how Heidegger, Gadamer, Foucault and Derrida (among others) all 
speak to concepts that the American pragmatists had raised, but fell out of fashion in the middle of 
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the twentieth century. The contemporary Canadian philosopher, Cheryl Misak, makes a similar point 
in her New Pragmatism (2007), where she suggests that key themes from the work of Peirce, James 
and Dewey have emerged in the work of other philosophers who may not normally be considered – 
or even consider themselves – part of the pragmatist tradition.  
As I noted above, the main theories I take up in addition to Mead’s are those that I found useful in 
making sense of experience leading to new, more helpful ways of working; following Bernstein and 
Misak’s lines, I think the elements of those theories I have taken up are those that sit quite 
comfortably with classical pragmatism. In many cases, within my projects I have critically explored 
how theories that do not seem to fit with the pragmatist paradigm could be reformulated so that 
they are theoretically consistent. Some examples are outlined below.  
Psychodynamic theory 
I found exploring the ideas of individual and group psychodynamic defensive processes to be helpful 
for making more sense of how my colleagues and I seemed to respond to the situations we were 
engaged in. This was particularly in relation to my experiences of managing felt experiences of 
unease, or anxiety (as defined on p.124). However, while psychodynamic theories are themselves 
diverse – with classical Freudian schools tending to posit innate drives, the conflicts of which give 
rise to psychodynamic tension and unconscious motivations; and other formulations, such as object 
relations theory, focussing more on the imprinting of early relationships as templates for future 
interactions – they are all largely based upon individualistic, psychologically deterministic and 
broadly Cartesian assumptions (Frosh 1999; Stacey 2003).  
I was drawn to the more relational theories because of the importance they give to social 
conditioning, but noted the same reliance on internal worlds – which is incompatible with the 
pragmatist perspective of social selves. Further, classical psychoanalysis tends to treat groups as 
somehow regressive (e.g. Freud 1921) and from which individuals need to be liberated in order to 
flourish; yet again, this is inconsistent with the notion of individuals being social through and 
through. In response, I suggested how even these notions could be considered to align with Mead’s 
theories of development and interaction. An evolving sense of the generalised other will inevitably 
involve patterns of power relating, or habitual responses to anxiety, that over time come to pattern 
our sensitivities and responsive tendencies in particular ways that resemble what is described as 
psychodynamic repression (e.g. Freud 1915) or exclusion (e.g. Bowlby 1979).  
In this way, I attempted to analyse, from what I would now describe as a pragmatist position, 
aspects of my experience that seemed amenable to psychodynamic interpretation. Indeed, my 
inclination to consider shame as the anticipation of exclusion (from both real and imagined 
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communities) could be seen as arising primarily from this attention to sociality, which also takes 
seriously human fallibility and an apparent need to belong; this therefore also locates identity 
formation – as processes of shifting identifications – securely within a pragmatist perspective.  
Hermeneutical phenomenology 
I found the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, especially his Truth and Method (1975), helpful in 
developing my understanding of the interplay of the past, present and future. In his formulation of 
prejudice (ibid: 283) as a set of responsive tendencies established in history that inform our 
interpretations of the present, and in particular in his notion of a fore-conception of completeness 
(ibid: 205), I found a way to articulate some of the tensions I was experiencing in my practice that 
my reading of Mead did not call out in the same way. Insofar as the fore-conception of completeness 
is a way of articulating the abductive logical steps we take – extrapolating immediate experience 
based on our histories to working hypotheses about the world – as we act into the future 
(Brinkmann 2012; Martela 2015; P4: 88), this can be readily associated with the responding phase of 
the self in Mead’s theory of interaction (Simpson 2018), and therefore emergence and the possibility 
of novelty in experience in general (Garud et al 2015). So, despite hermeneutical phenomenology 
having a very different lineage from classical pragmatism,4 on reflection, the ideas I have used are 
those that sit comfortably with the pragmatist perspective.  
Practice theory 
Particularly in Project 4, I drew on Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory, which I encountered when 
I was exploring his work on experts as access points to specialist knowledge resources in complex 
societies. To my mind, this work spoke generally to the bringing together of the individual and the 
social, and specifically to Mead’s notion of global patterns forming and being formed by local 
interaction (including identity as a patterning of interaction with the self). Giddens’ formulation 
helped me specifically to understand how one might take up these ideas in relation to the 
organisation of complex modern societies (Giddens 1990). A key critique of Giddens’ work is that it 
over-emphasises recursivity; and this is arguably also seen in Bourdieu’s practice theory (Nicolini 
2012), upon which I also draw. I highlight this tendency towards conservatism in Project 4, where I 
connect it to affectual engagement and the management of anxiety, contrasting it with the sense of 
unpredictable novelty that I also recounted in my projects – in the complex responsive processes 
 
4 Hermeneutical phenomenology originated in the methodologically oriented theological hermeneutics of 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, which Wilhelm Dilthey – with whom Mead studied (Joas 1997) – revived, focusing on 
trying to understand human lives. Martin Heidegger’s phenomenological project began with, but then 
critiqued, Dilthey’s work – as did Gadamer, who studied with Heidegger (Brinkmann 2012). 
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perspective (reflecting the pragmatist philosophy that informs it), both recursivity and novelty are 
core and inseparable features of experience. 
Further, the concepts of structuration (Giddens) and habitus (Bourdieu) have both been critiqued for 
insufficiently engaging with the embodied social actors who provide the vehicle for practices 
(Simpson 2009), and the possibility of novelty in experience associated with those social actors. In 
my research, I addressed this performatively by starting with my own experiences as an social actor, 
embodying competing social orders through the routinised relational activities I came to see as 
forming and being formed in local interaction; reflectively, I noticed the opportunities for making 
different choices, and how reflexive inquiry seemed to accentuate this sense of contingency. I think 
my analyses are therefore consistent with pragmatism, as long as practice is construed as the 
routinisation of relational activities that patterns interaction rather than, for example, in opposition 
to theory. Indeed, this conception of practice has much in common with Mead’s notion of the social 
object (Mead 1925) – or the generalised tendency to act shared by groups of people. I will explain 
this in more detail in my further examination of expertise as a social object at the end of this chapter 
(p.150). 
Power, inclusion and exclusion 
The only perspectives I have used that are not quite so easy to reconcile with my understanding of 
pragmatism are those concerning power, inclusion and exclusion. While it has been suggested that 
notions of dominance and subordination are largely absent from Mead’s work (e.g. Athens 2002), 
Mead and his pragmatist contemporaries were clearly concerned with politics, given their interests 
in democracy and ethics. Indeed, in the third section of Mind, Self and Society, Mead does explore 
cooperative and antagonistic socio-psychological impulses as aspects of social interdependence that 
give rise to conflict or integration (1934: 303–304). He also discusses the changing relative values or 
importance of ‘I’ and ‘me’ in interactions (ibid: 199), which I interpret as a way of talking about the 
differential prominence of the experiences of social constraint and freedom as we act into the 
unknown. Both of these might be seen as ways of talking about power relating, but I did not find 
these expositions particularly helpful for deepening my research inquiry.  
The authors I did take up in relation to power and politics seemed to address more directly the 
issues that were coming up in my practice. These were the German process sociologist, Norbert 
Elias, and the French post-structuralist philosopher, Michel Foucault – both key authors in the 
complex responsive processes literature. They both suggest that power is not something that 
individuals can possess; rather, power should be regarded as a property of non-egalitarian and 
mobile relations, immanent to ever-changing social figurations in which social actors simultaneously 
enable and constrain each other. I also draw particularly on Elias’s focus on inclusion and exclusion, 
and on Foucault’s genealogical approach to understanding social phenomena that perpetuate 
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hegemonic biases. Interestingly, where, for example, Dewey does write about power – such as when 
he suggests that maintaining an epistemic dualism of habit and thought enables ‘those who wish a 
monopoly of social power … to do the thinking and planning while others remain docile … 
instruments of execution’ (Dewey 1922: 72) – it is similar to the way that Foucault would later write 
about discourse. This again shows that, despite arising from very different traditions, many of the 
ideas I take up are consistent with a more formal pragmatist perspective.  
If we assume that Elias and Foucault’s observations are relevant to understanding patterns of social 
relating (and the themes of inclusion and exclusion, and the perpetuation of dominant ways of 
thinking, did seem to feature in my projects in important ways), then it is reasonable to suggest that 
in the terms of Mead’s theory of social selves, they inform the development of the sense of the 
generalised other and therefore the evolution of identities and society. A further addition from 
pragmatism is that these patterns are not somehow fixed, but open to radical transformation as we 
transact with each other (and self-consciously with ourselves) in the world. 
 
Summary: while my research did not adhere to a particular theoretical paradigm in terms of the 
ideas I used to deepen my inquiry, I see it as engaging with the same themes that concerned the 
pragmatists. As I have tried to set out, the key non-pragmatist paradigms I engaged with, and use 
within subsequent sections of this thesis, can all be related to the pragmatist principles that have 
emerged as underpinning my research. I see this approach as very much in keeping with the 
evolution of the complex responsive processes perspective itself over the years since its inception in 
the 1990s. The diverse perspectives that the DMan research community has engaged with have 
been reframed and combined over time to provide a multidisciplinary theoretical position 
highlighting a range of features of experience that seem relevant to the study of organisational life 
(Mowles 2017a, 2017b; Stacey and Mowles 2016).  
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Synthesis of my key arguments  
In Project 1, I investigated the following dilemma: If our ability to act is based on the sense we make 
of our experience in the context of the histories we construct for ourselves, but this is constantly 
changing with each interaction, how can we decide what we should do with any certainty about 
what the result will be? 
I think the thematic analysis above shows how this question has echoed throughout my research 
projects, which I now articulate as the central research question I posed at the start of this thesis:  
In the context of an essential uncertainty about social life, how might researching disturbing 
breakdowns in everyday practice be a process of moral development? 
In this section, I will try to concisely articulate the five key arguments, and some implications for OD 
practice, that together start to answer this question. With my fifth argument, I also suggest some 
implications for the practice of research. 
Limitations and aspirations 
I am keen to emphasise that my arguments are responses that have emerged for me based on my 
history, my interactions with my learning set, the wider DMan community and the people outside of 
my research community with whom I have discussed my work. In keeping with the argument I have 
been making for the time- and context-dependence of meaning, this is clearly not the only set of 
conclusions that could arise from my project work; rather, it reflects my history, a growing curiosity 
about group processes, and also the interests of my learning set colleagues and supervisors.  
It also reflects the values I hold about the importance of intellectual rigour, attitudinal plurality, and 
trying to do right by others in an uncertain world. Of course, these values are themselves contingent 
and I can chart their origins in my own personal history; but throughout my reflexive inquiry, they 
have remained the points of stability to which I found myself anchored. I realise that these are 
choices, and fully expect encounters with new perspectives to change what I think about my 
arguments in the future; for now, however, they are good enough and give me new ways of going 
about my work. My hope is that they may also provoke new thinking for others, providing them with 
new ways of going about their work too. 
Further, it should be clear that my research has concerned my experience of doing research about 
my work. This is unavoidable: as part of meeting the obligations of research ethics, I have let my 
organisation’s ‘gatekeepers’ (its most senior leaders) and people I am working with regularly know 
how my research is conducted. This knowledge must change our interactions in conscious and 
unconscious ways. Further, my attitude to my work is as a researcher as well as a practitioner: that I 
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am trying to pay attention to my experience in a different way, and that others know I am doing so, 
has consequences that I cannot predict or account for. On that basis, I see my research as 
concerning my work as a practitioner-researcher (rather than just a practitioner), and it is in that 
context that my arguments are intended to be read.  
 
i. The inherently uncertain nature of social life renders OD interventions probabilistic. 
I have come to understand meaning as a way of describing all the various ways we can understand 
each other and ourselves, arising in interaction (Mead 1934; P2: 43) based on our socialisations 
(Gadamer 1975). Our interpretations are therefore contingent, time- and context-dependent, and 
endlessly revisable (Gergen and Gergen 1991). This accords with the Gadamerian description of the 
hermeneutic process as an iterative (rather than purely self-referential) circle in which a constant 
turning of parts and whole continually reconstructs the past in the present based on expectations of 
the future (Gadamer 1975). 
Therefore, while we may have ideas about the responses (as bodily states, understandings, or 
reflective or unreflective actions) our gestures will call out – which we can imagine and anticipate 
with increasing degrees of sophistication as we develop (Mead 1934) – we cannot know for certain 
how we will find ourselves acting in the moment, or how those actions will be understood. This is 
because experience is unrepeatable (and therefore unpredictable) insofar as every situation involves 
a unique configuration of individuals, objects, histories and intentions. Applying the analogies of 
non-linearity and the butterfly effect from the complexity sciences, appreciating that there are 
innumerable and often imperceptible differences in ‘starting conditions’ helps to explain how 
gestures may be interpreted and amplified in quite unexpected ways. Further analogies from the 
complexity sciences using the ideas of self-organisation and fractal symmetry suggest how 
population-wide patterns can emerge from local interaction (e.g. Gleick 1997; Stacey and Mowles 
2016).  
The important contribution from Mead’s theory of selves (1934) is that that humans are social 
through and through. This is in three senses. First, human development can be seen as the evolution 
of our sense of the generalised other, which expresses the way in which our interpretive and 
responsive tendencies arise through interaction and are constantly evolving (P2: 48). This intensifies 
the argument that every interaction is unique. More importantly, Mead explains how the dialectical 
conversation of affectual gestures between different bodies in which meaning arises (society) is the 
same process as bodies interacting with themselves in private conversation (mind). Minds therefore 
have the same quality of being dynamic temporal processes in which meaning can arise with 
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unpredictable consequences (P2: 69). Finally, because we can ‘hear’ and understand ourselves, we 
can take ourselves as objects to ourselves, which adds a further transformative potential. Mead 
expresses this self-consciousness as the dialectical, mutually constitutive experiences of subjectivity 
and self-objectivity, which he terms ‘I’ and ‘me’ (P3: 77). This puts paradox at the heart of human 
experience.  
Together, these modify the theory of complex adaptive systems as it is understood in the complexity 
sciences by emphasising that human interaction is predictably unpredictable: humans can be 
regarded as dynamic processes responding to each other and themselves, with paradox as an 
essential feature of experience. 
Implications for OD practice: 
Starting from this point gives us a very different way of thinking about how OD practitioners might 
go about understanding what they are doing when they are intervening in organisations. I have 
found mechanical assumptions about how change happens through strategic plans and calculative 
implementation according to strategic choice theory (Child 1972) to be very prevalent in the 
ostensibly rational bureaucracies (Weber et al 1958; Townley 2008; Bauman 1989) in which I have 
worked. Indeed, I would argue from a practice-theory perspective that it is through these very 
activities that bureaucracy is produced and reproduced.  
However, taking the uncertainty of social life seriously means that actions can have unexpected 
results, and perhaps should be expected to go other than to plan at least some of the time. In that 
case, perhaps a more tentative way of acting is called for, that expects and looks for the unexpected 
and accepts that conflicting rational explanations can exist at the same time. This is not to say that 
such ways of acting cannot be purposeful, but more that the certainty with which the outcomes of 
OD interventions are sometimes positioned may reasonably be treated with some scepticism.  
 
ii. Seeing everyday practices as involving social processes of managing anxiety introduces new 
ethical dimensions to OD practitioners’ judgements about what to do.  
Despite the unpredictability I have just described, there are many aspects of our experience that do 
seem to be relatively stable. Bourdieu describes social actors as virtuosos to convey the way in 
which, in general, we forget the way that the many instances of responding to similar situations in 
our past, over time, become our conscious and unconscious patterns of predicting the responses our 
gestures will invite (Bourdieu 1977: 78–79). This implies at least some consistency to experience.  
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A key theme in my research has been the different ways that we are socialised to manage anxiety in 
everyday life, both privately and with others (Elias 1978; Bowlby 1979; Stern 1985; Mead 1934). As a 
pre-reflective state, this absorbed coping (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015; Gherardi 2017; Shotter 2016) 
can involve individual processes of repression (Freud 1915) or exclusion (Bowlby 1979), which I see 
as embodied conflicts of social relations (P3: 76); or social defences (Menzies 1960; Hirschhorn 1988; 
Armstrong and Rustin 2015), seen as group processes of avoiding anxiety. 
Taking group processes first, practices – defined as routinised relational activities – can be regarded 
as the sites of the production, reproduction, evolution and transformation of patterns of relating, 
and the conditions that enable their perpetuation (Giddens 1984; Bourdieu 1990; Foucault 1976; 
Nicolini 2012). As I illustrated with the example of expertise as a co-created relational practice (P4: 
91ff) – and which I examine more fully at the end of this chapter – I would like to argue that in 
organisations, everything from the way we greet our colleagues each morning, or what people 
usually talk about in public and in private, to the way meetings are usually organised or where they 
take place, or how pieces of work are planned, all constitute the practices of everyday life. This is 
because I think they share a basic property of being processes through which anxiety associated with 
uncertainty (Marris 1974, 1996) is maintained at a tolerable level through joint performances that 
conform to expectations within the relational habitus. Put simply, if routines create certainty, and 
certainty reduces anxiety, then practices reduce anxiety.  
Further, continuing the argument that individuals are social through and through, we can make a 
similar argument about individual identity. As described above, Mead accounts for the uniqueness of 
human experience by arguing that humans are not just conscious, but also self-conscious because 
we can hear and respond to ourselves in the same way that we can hear and respond to others. This 
leads to a paradoxical experience of selfhood involving both social constraint and agential freedom 
at the same time as an ongoing dialectical process. I argue that identity amounts to the patterning of 
this dialectical process as interpretive and responsive tendencies that maintain ontological security 
(Laing 1969), or a sense of continuity about who we are (Marris 1974, 1996).  
The distinction between individual defences and social defences is therefore that the former 
involves the interaction of bodies with themselves, and the latter involves the interaction of bodies 
with other bodies. In that sense, identity formation can be thought of as an ongoing, social practice 
of the body interacting with itself to manage anxiety, just as social ordering is an ongoing, social 
practice of bodies interacting with each other to manage anxiety. 
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Implications for OD practice 
Regarding relational practices and identity as both the sites of reproduction of social order and 
processes of managing anxiety in organisations complexifies the judgements of OD practitioners: 
disrupting any routine can no longer be simply a matter of improving performance, but also of 
potentially creating additional anxiety for those the changes involve. It is already argued that 
inquiring into organisations as collections of practices may offer new insights into how ideologies are 
perpetuated through everyday activities, and therefore what might be done to destabilise the logics 
of those practices (Nicolini 2012; Gherardi 2012; Gorli et al 2015). Seeing those practices as the ways 
that people are maintaining tolerable levels of anxiety, however, adds an ethical dimension to 
considerations of what might be the right thing to do in a particular situation at a particular time.  
This may lead to the consideration of questions such as: How able are people to tolerate anxiety in 
the interests of improving performance, and how might those anxieties be engaged with? How 
might anxiety be unevenly distributed, and in particular, are the weakest members of social 
figurations being obliged to bear more anxiety by those who have more autonomy? And how do the 
answers to these questions change if the organisation’s continued existence is at risk?  
Answers to any of these questions are necessarily judgements, which I think place different kinds of 
responsibilities on those initiating and facilitating change processes. I will say more about what this 
means in Argument (v). 
 
iii. Breakdowns in practice bring the fragility of the social order into view; engaging with them to 
develop better organisations is an ideological choice.  
Moments where we experience mismatches between what we expect to happen and what actually 
happens can bring the contingency of our habitual ways of thinking and relating starkly into view. 
These breakdowns have long been discussed in philosophy: to give just a few examples from 
different traditions, Dewey – from the perspective of pragmatic philosophy – describes how 
encountering difficulties in our experiences can lead to processes of updating systems of warranted 
assertions to better cope with the world (Dewey 1933, 1938; Martela 2015). Heidegger, from a 
hermeneutic and phenomenologist perspective, has a similar concept in his oft-quoted analogy of 
the hammer: it is only when a hammer breaks that it comes into view as an object in its own right – 
or present-at-hand, to use his terminology – rather than simply being an aspect of the carpenter’s 
work that isn’t reflected upon (Heidegger 1962). Following Heidegger, Gadamer (1975) describes this 
experience in relation to reading texts as being ‘pulled up short’ (280), and more generally 
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emphasises how these moments are affirmations of human finitude and one’s own historicity (365–
356). Foucault, from a poststructuralist perspective, describes these moments as eventalisations, 
where the self-evidence of our habitual ways of thinking is called into question and we wonder how 
else things could be (Foucault 2000: 226). 
In all of these, breakdowns can be thought of as potentially reflexive moments, by which I mean that 
they destabilise taken-for-granted assumptions in relation to social conditions in general, or more 
existentially to the researcher’s own social history (Cunliffe and Jun 2005). Contemporary 
organisational researchers of practice and reflexivity, who are largely working in the Heideggerian 
tradition, have taken up the idea of breakdowns as the foregrounding of the ‘background’ logic of 
practice (Greig et al 2012) through critical and self-reflexivity (Cunliffe and Jun 2005). Where these 
lead to arresting moments (Cunliffe 2003; Greig et al 2012), new ways of relating may arise 
(Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011; Gorli et al 2015; Hibbert et al 2017). Engaging with these experiences 
may therefore increase our options for going on with each other, but to do so is acknowledged as 
being difficult (Greig et al 2012); breakdowns inevitably increase uncertainty and therefore anxiety 
(Marris 1996), so engagement with them might be consciously or unconsciously avoided. Moreover, 
if one begins engaging seriously with breakdowns through reflexive inquiry or deliberate attempts to 
remain detached and involved at the same time (Elias 1987; P4: 101), breakdowns may well become 
scarcer – or at least, the events that occasion breakdowns will be very different from those that 
might have done so before, as our relational habitus evolves in unexpected ways.  
While noting that change may or may not come about from exploring breakdowns (Gorli et al 2015; 
Hibbert et al 2017), implicit in these analyses seems to be an idea that bringing about opportunities 
for change is likely to be a good thing. This fits with the humanistic assumptions of OD practice, the 
purpose of which is sometimes described as supporting the creation of better organisations, evoking 
a therapeutic metaphor whereby organisations become more able to help themselves by bringing 
ostensibly unhelpful stuck patterns of relating into view on an ongoing basis (e.g. Bushe 2017). In 
that case, one might naturally think that encouraging people to engage reflexively with breakdowns 
is a helpful thing for OD practitioners to do, as a means of identifying opportunities where changes 
in patterns may become possible (Hibbert et al 2017).  
While I might agree with this position in principle, it is important to recognize it as an ideological 
stance that is likely informed by wider sociological trends: there is nothing in the notion that 
understanding more – and therefore having more choice about what we might do – is of itself 
morally better; rather, this kind of thinking perhaps reflects Platonic or Enlightenment ideals about 
perfect knowledge, an egalitarian notion of human freedom, and belief in external moral standards.  
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Implications for OD practice 
Seeing reflexive inquiries into destabilising moments, in which the taken-for-granted assumptions 
involved in organisational life become apparent, as a means to creating better organisations is an 
ideological position. While it may be attractive to think that engaging with breakdowns is generally 
productive, understanding ourselves as forming and being formed by ideology more widely brings 
the contingency of that ideology into view too: engaging with breakdowns that bring patterns of 
relating into view may well increase uncertainty, and therefore anxiety, for people (including OD 
practitioners); further, by my argument that social life is essentially uncertain, any such intervention 
may make things better or may make things worse for those involved.  
In that case, if considerations about harming and not harming others are moral questions, then 
deciding to deliberately challenge individual and social defences by disrupting the logics of practice is 
an ethical judgement. Such judgements place further responsibilities on those initiating and 
facilitating change processes, which, again, I will come back to in Argument (v). 
 
iv. Shame helps us understand what is at stake for us and for others, which may provide OD 
practitioners with new capacities to act.  
Many of the scholars currently writing about breakdowns from a practice perspective point to the 
way that they involve heightened emotional states which may signal ‘pivot points of change’ 
(Hibbert et al 2017: 3). Some of them also point to the way that feelings such as shame, guilt and 
embarrassment can be involved in these moments (Hibbert et al 2010; Greig et al 2012); however, 
these researchers do not seem to explicitly explore the qualities of those experiences, either for 
practitioners or for the people with whom they are working, beyond noting that such feelings are 
strong. These ideas are, however, taken up in other fields of research – especially in philosophy, 
psychology and psychoanalysis – and I have found bringing together ideas from practice theory and 
the psychodynamics of group processes to be both fruitful and underexplored. 
I have already argued that practices can be thought of as group processes of managing the anxiety 
associated with uncertainty in organisations, which can manifest as individual and social defences 
that perpetuate ontological security or social order, respectively. These normative patterns of 
relating emerge as social figurations (Elias 1978), and compliance with social norms is therefore part 
of group membership. Further, it is argued that one of the ways community cohesion is maintained 
is through group processes that symbolically (Lukes 1977; Scott 1990) and psychologically (Elias and 
Scotson 1965; Girard 1972, 1986; Stacey 2003) reinforce those norms. 
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In that case, for the member of a community to challenge its norms through creating or exploring 
breakdowns is to put themselves at risk of exclusion; as the psychologist Silvan Tomkins suggests, 
this ‘incomplete reduction of interest and joy’ where someone finds themselves about to be 
humiliated or cast out from a community that is important to them, is experienced as shame 
(Sedgwick and Frank 1995; Probyn 1996, 2005; P4: 108). Indeed, shame has been more generally 
related to issues of group membership and the judgements of each other such memberships involve 
(Elias and Scotson 1965; Stacey 2003; Lewis 1971; Scheff 2000, 2003, 2014).  
I agree with this position, and notice particularly the way in which both the avoidance of shame is 
deeply socialised (Elias 1939) and communion with others seems to be rather precious. I explored 
the latter in Project 3 as Mead’s notion of the fusion of ‘I’ and ‘me’ (Mead 1934; P3: 77) in which the 
temporary alignment of the goals of a group’s members is experienced poignantly as a sense of 
belonging, or freedom from social constraint. I noted there that the preciousness of these moments 
– such as one can imagine occurring in, for example, religious or patriotic moments – related less to 
the nature of group members’ goals (which may be benign or malign) but rather to the sense of 
them being shared. Together, I think these provide a compelling explanation for why processes of 
inclusion and exclusion seem to so easily trump rational arguments in change initiatives.  
I suggest further that if everyday practices are the means by which identity and social order are 
perpetuated, then shame may arise in every interaction in some degree, as tiny breakdowns happen 
all the time. For example, at its simplest, any gesture that tries to communicate an idea can be 
thought of as an invitation to others to be in a community who understand that idea in a particular 
way. However, if meaning arises in interaction, then this is also an invitation to negotiate the 
meaning of that idea. If the importance of being understood in a particular situation is low – in 
casual encounters, or about a trifling topic – this negotiation and its lack of resolution may be largely 
inconsequential; where the importance of being understood is higher – in political statements, or in 
our expert performances at work, or when accounting to our loved ones, or even in one’s doctoral 
viva – this negotiation may concern the things that are most important to us, both individually and 
as groups. As such, they may have significant consequences at the time, or later, that are impossible 
to predict. Arguably, the extent to which the membership of real communities (expressed in the 
social norms of our organisations, teams, friendships or families) or imagined communities 
(expressed in our values) matter to us, will inform the intensity of the experience of shame (e.g. Kelly 
1955; McCoy 1977).  
On that basis, I would like to argue that noticing experiences of shame in breakdowns, when we 
poignantly feel at risk of exclusion, can help us to become more aware of which communities are 
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important to us. From an individual perspective, these breakdowns might be experienced as a sense 
of rising anxiety or emotion, or feelings of ambivalence, or something being unsaid or 
misunderstood, which may or may not be articulable. Similarly, from a group perspective, 
heightened tensions, spoken or unspoken disagreements, passivity, despondence or outbursts of 
laughter, perhaps as forms of basic assumption behaviour (Bion 1961), may suggest that something 
existential for the group is at stake. Reflecting upon these experiences can help us to explore which 
aspects of the social order might be being negotiated and therefore what is important to us.  
As suggested by contemporary organisational consulting literature in the psychodynamic tradition 
(e.g. Obholzer and Roberts 2019), this could be seen as taking seriously our experiences of 
countertransference – the state of mind in which the consultant (or therapist) identifies with the 
unconscious projections of their clients (or patients) according to their own responsive tendencies. 
This literature suggests that consultants’ awareness and interpretation of experiences of 
countertransference can be very helpful in understanding what might be going on for their clients 
that they find difficult to articulate consciously or may be defending against. I think this position, 
while compelling and helpful, perhaps underplays the role of consultants as moral agents in their 
own right rather than agenda-less helpers.  
Implications for OD practice 
Based on the argument above, if the business of OD is indeed trying to create ‘better’ organisations 
through changing ways of working, then OD perhaps necessarily involves experiences of shame. This 
happens in two ways. Firstly, initiating and facilitating change will inevitably involve challenging 
existing patterns of interacting. If those patterns are the means by which social order and individual 
identities are sustained as processes of maintaining anxiety at tolerable levels, then OD 
interventions, and in particular those that focus on reflexivity, have to be seen as threats to social 
stability and therefore as potentially increasing anxiety. OD practitioners are therefore perhaps 
always putting themselves at risk of being excluded, and therefore of experiencing shame; and this 
could be especially the case for internal consultants who, due to their shared histories and 
involvement in patterns of power relating with the other people in their organisations, may be 
consciously and unconsciously involved in the production and reproduction of the very problematic 
patterns of relating that they are trying to influence.  
Secondly, if social life is essentially uncertain in the ways that I have already described, then 
interventions will inevitably not ‘go to plan’ from time to time. Not living up to one’s self-image, or 
reputation, or what we imagine others expect of us as – all as ways of speaking about the 
communities we imagine we belong to – may also therefore be a source of shame. 
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However, I contend that if OD practitioners are willing to accept an ideological position that 
advocates an egalitarian notion of human freedom, and have in their minds some ideal about 
promoting social goods, then paying attention to breakdowns involving shame is a way to find out 
more about what is important to them and to others. As this has the potential to bring more of our 
experience into view, it may provide more options for how we might proceed together. Appreciating 
that these experiences may be disturbing, practitioners also have responsibility for making 
judgements about the foreseeable impacts of what they do, understanding that those judgements 
will inevitably privilege some groups over others.  
 
v. Resolving breakdowns involving shame and self-respect can be thought of as a process of 
moral development.  
Morality in general relates to questions of right and wrong, or good and bad. Normative moral 
perspectives, for example in the tradition of Kant’s categorical imperative, suggest that possible 
actions can be judged against some external moral standard, which should then inform what we do 
(P3: 39). However, if meaning is unstable (Mead 1934), then ethical judgements (like all judgements) 
rely on interpretations of social life that are time- and context-dependent (Griffin 2002). Further, in 
the absence of an external moral adjudicator (e.g. Nietzsche and Kauffman 1883), any moral 
standard we may wish to measure an action against is itself an imaginary construct whose meaning 
is evolving over time in the instances in which it is brought to bear in particular situations.  
Mead provides a very different way of thinking about morality, which accounts for the problem of 
historical situatedness I have just described. For him, moral processes involve impartially taking 
account of as many of the interests involved in a particular problem as possible, including our own, 
and then making a plan of action that deals with them all on the balance of ‘goods’ (Mead 1934; P2: 
50). Importantly, competing goods here are assessed not by reference to any external moral 
standard, but instead by reference to the adjudicator’s own standards – which we might call their 
values. Reflexivity (as defined on p. 143) can draw attention to how those values are socialisations 
that evolve over time, and so are not innate or pre-given; if this brings into view the contingency of 
what we stand for, then all that is really left is our in-the-moment judgements – in Mead’s terms, the 
spontaneous responding phase of self (or ‘I’). Then, like ‘I’ and ‘me’ (Mead 1934; P3: 77), these 
judgements are mutually and paradoxically constitutive of our values, our identities and social order.  
Ethical judgements on this basis are therefore always acts involving self-respect insofar as we are 
prepared to take our own moral agency seriously, and stand up for what we believe in, including 
when this goes against what others might prefer. To be clear, this is not to advocate an ‘anything 
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goes’ moral relativism or nihilism; rather, I am arguing for a moral philosophy where through 
ongoing reflexivity, we come to understand more of our taken-for-granted assumptions, which 
increases the sophistication of our moral reasoning in Meadian terms. This is an ideological position 
that speaks to my own values about maximising inclusion towards a universal community, which is 
likely (in this case, paradoxically) to exclude those who do not share this value. Then, if we are also 
interested in an egalitarian notion of moral freedom, which is a further ideological position and 
speaks to another of my values about attitudinal plurality which also may not be shared by others, 
these judgements will also involve shame as we demonstrate our respect for the moral agency of 
others by welcoming criticism from others as part of our own moral development (Thomason 2018). 
Further still, as a process that can occur privately as a conversation with oneself, self-respect and 
shame can be regarded as paradoxically related in the same way that Mead’s ‘I’ and ‘me’ are 
paradoxically related (P4: 108).  
Adding to this the argument that shame is about the risk of exclusion from real or imagined 
communities that are important to us, then ethical judgement – in Mead’s terms – can be seen as a 
process of balancing the relative importance of the competing memberships of those different 
communities. The choices we make in response to breakdowns involving shame – seen as moments 
of personality and social reconstruction that are felt in the body as increases or reductions in anxiety 
(P3: 77) – say something about who we think we are or want to be (Kristeva 1982). As an ongoing 
dialectical process, these self-respecting responses transform our future experiences of shame, just 
as our responses to ourselves and others transform our future expectations of responding to 
ourselves and others in the ‘I’/‘me’ dialectic.  
Implications for OD practice 
Thinking about morality in this way starts to explain what I have so far described as the ‘further 
responsibilities’ that are placed on those initiating and facilitating change processes. If OD 
practitioners are interested in an egalitarian concept of human freedom, and accept that what they 
are working with – social life – is inherently uncertain, then decisions about what to do to facilitate 
change in organisations can perhaps only be made tentatively, paying close attention to the 
responses that those actions call out. Ongoing judgements need to keep considering whether the 
anxiety or harm to others (and indeed to the practitioner themselves) that may be caused by actions 
taken is warranted, based on the practitioner’s own values and the ongoing demands of 
organisational survival. 
Reflexively inquiring into breakdowns involving practitioner shame can help us to understand more 
about what is valued in organisations (as evidence of our respect for the moral agency of others) and 
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about what we value (as evidence of our respect for ourselves), providing more perspectives on 
what might be going on when practitioners are trying to facilitate change. Keeping these 
perspectives in view, and being open to criticism, may provide new capacities to act. From a 
Meadian perspective, as a skill in organisational life, this is one way that we can strive to do right by 
others in the context of an essential uncertainty about social experience.  
Implications for researching practice 
This is therefore also an argument for seeing organisational research as a moral process. Researching 
practice can be seen as a systematisation of finding out more about what we are saying and doing in 
organisations in a way that gives us more options for how we go on with each other. It is therefore 
also a way of enriching the field of our attention, increasing the range of perspectives we can bring 
to bear in particular situations as we balance competing goods.  
However, in the same way that I have suggested OD practitioners’ ongoing judgements need to 
account for the potential for benefit and harm, I believe so too must social inquiry. It is perhaps too 
easy to think of organisational research as occurring in some rarefied arena, where all observations 
are permitted as long as appropriate ethics approvals have been secured, because it will be up to 
others to take them up. To me, this suggests the same kind of thinking that Bauman criticises in his 
analysis of bureaucracy: if we decouple the process of doing research from its outcomes, then we 
are perhaps not taking sufficient responsibility for the impact we may have on others. I suggest, 
then, that if we are interested in the impact we have on others as researchers, then we too must be 
tentative – directing our ongoing attention to how our work is taken up, so that we can respond 
(self-)respectfully to whatever happens. 
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Expertise as social object: a key conclusion 
While the arguments I have presented so far are perhaps necessarily broad, and relate primarily to 
practice, my research also offers a novel way of conceptualising expertise. In Project 4, I wrote about 
expertise as a co-created relational practice, drawing attention to the joint performances involving 
experts (those with access to specialised knowledge resources), legitimising authorities (e.g. 
regulatory bodies such as the one in which I work), and lay people (those who need those resources 
but cannot access them directly). Earlier in this chapter, I also suggested that expertise could be 
considered as a routinised relational activity among many others that mutually constitute identities 
and the social ordering of complex modern societies.  
This section more fully explains my contribution to theory by critically engaging with contemporary 
scholarship on expertise, and challenging what seems to be a commonly accepted epistemic dualism 
between experts and lay people.  I see this dualism as unduly limiting the scope of inquiry into 
contemporary debates about expertise and, instead, propose what I think is a more fruitful, anti-
dualistic, pragmatist conceptualisation. As I will explain, this new approach constructs expertise as 
temporally dynamic and takes seriously the multiplicity of roles involved in the perpetuation and 
evolution of societies where access to specialist knowledge resources is mediated.  
Contemporary perspectives on expertise 
In many ways, the question of expertise is highly pertinent to contemporary public discourse, where 
anyone with a view on the matter at hand who is able to gather sufficient support, appears to be 
able influence broad opinion without recourse to traditional sources of legitimacy. According to 
popular commentators, we are living in the era of ‘fake news’, ‘alternative facts’ and ‘post-truth 
politics’, where the ways in which the representatives of specialist fields of knowledge are 
legitimised – be they journalists, economists, historians or academics – seem to be becoming 
increasingly democratised. Arguably, this is a crisis of trust that arises not from a lack of information, 
for there is perhaps now more information available about world affairs than there has ever been 
before. Rather, the issue seems to concern the ways in which traditional safeguards against 
deception by commentators or politicians have been weakened (O’Neill 2002), and the apparently 
simultaneous decrease in interest in assessing the quality of that information, or the ability to do so 
(Davis 2009).  
Determining the nature of expertise is by no means a new problem, however; take, for example, the 
classical Greek reflection (attributed to Socrates):  
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Now I observe that when we are met together in the Assembly, and the matter in hand relates 
to building, the builders are summoned as advisers; when the question is one of shipbuilding, 
then the shipwrights; and the like of other arts which they think capable of being taught and 
learned. And if some person offers to give them advice who is not supposed by them to be an 
expert craftsman, even though he be good-looking and rich and noble, they will not listen to 
him, but laugh and hoot at him until either he is clamoured down and retires of himself, or, if 
he persists, he is dragged away or put out by the constables at the command of the prytanes. 
(From the dialogue in Plato’s Protagoras, 391c) 
This is cited by Ericsson et al (2018) as the starting-point for their attempt to summarise the ways in 
which expertise has been construed through history. Tracing a line that starts with a special status 
given to people with certain skill sets by the ancients (illustrating this with the quotation above), 
they recount the emergence of guilds in the Middle Ages as mechanisms for protecting against 
competition, much as one might view the Scholasticism of the same period. Then, they recount the 
creation of the first encyclopaedia as articulating the spirit of the Enlightenment, where reason was 
elevated over authority and people were invited to inform themselves rather than relying on dogma. 
Finally, they give an overview of the main contemporary conceptualisations of expertise, covering 
themes including hereditary or innate prowess, skills acquisition models, the content and 
organisation of knowledge, elite achievement, and reliably superior performance. 
What is striking about this account is the way it presents a gradual narrowing of the field of inquiry: 
from broadly commercial issues about the perpetuation of communities with access to specialist 
technical and knowledge resources, to a highly cognitivist focus abstracted from social relations that 
casts expertise as the defining characteristic of experts, ignoring the others who are involved in 
interactions concerning specialist knowledge resources (which I will call expertise-interactions). This 
trend seems to be echoed in other recent studies that try to summarise the history of expertise: for 
example, the contemporary cognitive learning scientist, Chi (2011), accounts for 30 years of 
literature on expertise largely by describing individualistic models concerning both what knowledge 
is involved, and how the structure of that knowledge changes for solving problems as one moves 
from novice to expert. She ends with suggestions for how to accelerate the acquisition of expertise. 
In another recent example, Cherrstrom and Bixby (2018) review expertise in 12 years of human 
resources development literature assuming throughout that it is something that HR professionals 
have, can develop or use.  
Naturally, there are variants within these conceptions; ‘fluency’ theories that describe the 
decreasing reliance of individuals on deliberation in the execution of their skills (Winch 2010) – such 
152 
 
as Dreyfus’s novice-to-expert stage model (2004), or Schön’s notion that proficiency is about the 
ability to reflect in action and reflect on action (Schön 1983) – do seem to broaden the notion of 
expertise beyond considering specific mental contents and innate capabilities, towards a conception 
that emphasises that expertise is something that develops over time. However, they retain the 
notion of a set of skills or competencies with which individuals can become fluent; and this can also 
be seen in approaches that try to broaden the conceptualisation of expertise further by trying to 
emphasise relationality. For example, Edwards (2010, 2017) introduces the concept of relational 
agency to describe the way in which bringing one’s experience to bear with others in relation to the 
resolution of particular problems is itself a skill that can be developed.  
This is what contemporary practice theorists Nicolini et al (2018), who also try to summarise the 
history of expertise, describe as a ‘turn’ in its contemporary history: from conceiving of expertise as 
something that experts have to something that experts do – often with others, and sometimes in 
particular environments with specialist types of equipment. They go on to suggest that further 
‘turns’ involve considering how any notion of expertise also seems to need to take into account the 
ways in which professional communities, loaded with economic, commercial and intellectual 
interests, legitimise and negotiate with each other what counts as expertise, as an ongoing process. 
Expertise is therefore less an attribute than an attribution made and enabled by relevant others 
within a social milieu, which therefore problematises the notion of fluency because expertise is 
decentred from individual experts. Taking these personal, social, relational and material concerns 
into consideration, Nicolini et al (2018) suggest that ‘experts are not so much owners of expertise 
but rather the carriers or conduits of broader circuits of knowledge’ (ibid: 318); on this basis, they go 
on to suggest radically that expertise ‘is an effect produced by and emerging from the entire … 
rhizomatic heterogeneous entity composed by practitioners, sites and their connections’ (ibid: 319).  
In keeping with the critique that practice theory can lose sight of the embodied social actor (Simpson 
2009), the perspective just described does seem to underplay the agential, creative and responsive 
nature of selves (so central to a pragmatist perspective) that must surely feature in a 
conceptualisation of expertise that describes our experience of living and working together.  
Moreover, what remains absent from these accounts, is a sense of the additional others – beyond 
professional communities and those who are economically or intellectually invested in them – who 
are involved in expertise-interactions; specifically, I am referring to ‘lay people’ or those who need, 
but do not have, direct access to specialist knowledge resources. However, this seems to be less a 
case of these others not featuring in researchers’ experience, than it not having been a focus of their 
studies. This may well be due to the locus of the data collection that forms the basis of analyses 
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concerning expertise: arguably, if studies are designed to look at organisational practices, it is 
unsurprising that those formally outside of the professional sphere are left aside.  
However, we should not overlook the importance of audiences prepared to accept that experts are 
indeed credible in respect of the tasks for which they have been summoned (as noted in texts as 
ancient as Plato’s Protagoras) and the group processes of shaming that may serve to perpetuate the 
social order (Elias and Scotson 1964). Yet, Ericsson et al (2018) pay little attention to this aspect of 
the quotation from Protagoras in their summary of the history of expertise. Similarly, Nicolini et al’s 
(2018) account makes almost no mention of the lay people involved. This is despite their study using 
the example of a medical procedure (trans-aortic valve insertion) where the roles of everyone 
involved in the procedure – surgeons, nurses, equipment suppliers – are brought to bear in the 
analysis they provide. Everyone, that is, except the patient undergoing the surgery – who is 
presented as part of the material environment that the procedure relies upon, rather than a social 
actor who presumably has a history that is also relevant to the situation. 
Returning to my own examples from Project 4, the experiences I recounted clearly demonstrate the 
importance of lay people in expertise-interactions. Any sense in which I considered myself as having 
access to resources that others did not was bound up entirely in the sense of having to maintain 
credibility with my sponsor, the OD working group and the groups with whom I was working. This 
was in addition to my familiarity with some of the theory of OD (e.g. the use of Open Space 
Technology), the situatedness of that knowledge in particular times and places (in the large group 
meeting I described), and a sense of the professional communities in which I was implicated 
(contributing to my experiences of shame), 
Now, of course, it could be argued that my own history and circumstances for some reason led me 
to a preoccupation with lay people that others find less relevant. However, from a pragmatist 
perspective, taking the Meadian notion of sociality seriously means understanding that there is no 
experiential boundary to our engagement with the attitudes of others in respect of this or that 
specific group; rather the whole of society insofar as it is relevant to the problem at hand is present 
in individual conduct as a sense of the generalised other that develops through encounters with 
others (Mead 1934). Therefore, if the notion of expertise is to deal more fully with the kinds of 
interactions I have recounted – with the OD working group, with the Support Directorate’s 
members, and with Sandra – its conception should go far beyond notions of local and trans-local 
professional communities and the materiality immanent to those communities that have been so far 
discussed as the constituting the mainstream perspective on expertise.  
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What about lay people? 
The minority of scholars who do acknowledge the roles of lay people in conceptualising expertise 
tend to maintain an epistemic dualism that limits the scope of inquiry. For example, the 
contemporary British management theorist, James Fleck (1998), suggests a tripartite formulation of 
expertise, comprising knowledge – involving individual ability to produce particular outputs; power – 
involving who legitimises those outputs; and tradability – involving the demand for those outputs by 
the relevant markets. Tradability must surely include lay people, but this is not really explored. More 
recently, contemporary sociologists Collins and Evans (2007) suggest a ‘periodic table of expertises’ 
that includes: 
• Ubiquitous expertises – those that all members of particular communities possess 
• Dispositions – personal qualities that make us better or worse at certain activities 
• Specialist expertises – concerning the acquisition of specialist tacit knowledge or fluency 
• Meta-expertises – concerning how expertise is judged by other experts. 
They add that there are also meta-criteria by which expertise can be measured by what the authors 
call ‘outsiders’. These include the assessment of experts’ credentials, track record and experience 
and recalls Giddens’ (1990) perspective on trust as the basis of expertise-interactions, which I write 
about in Project 4 (p.89). 
The contemporary organisational and communications theorists, Treem and Leonardi (2016: 2), go 
further, noting that ‘to be recognised as an expert, an audience needs to see signs of that person’s 
expertise’, and proposing that this involves two key assumptions: that an observer can know what 
expertise looks like (echoing the perspective on outsiders from Collins and Evans [2007]), which they 
find problematic because of the fluidity of that assessment; and that there are communicable cues 
experts can use to indicate different levels of skill, which is the authors’ focus of their 
communication theory-centred argument.  The latter point is the basis for the description of 
expertise provided by Kuhn and Rennstam (2016) as a claim to knowledgeability, which does 
presuppose others to whom experts make their claims and recognises that such claims have validity 
only in relation to the contexts in which they are made.  
These further perspectives acknowledge the role of lay people, yet retain the dualistic notion of 
experts as the locus of expertise, which is assessed, legitimised and traded, versus lay people who 
require access to those resources. A very different way of approaching the problem would be 
through an anti-dualistic, pragmatist critique (Bernstein 2010; Simpson 2018) that construes 
expertise as being bound up in the interactions of people taking up expert and lay roles in different 
ways at different times in relation to society more generally, as an ongoing temporal process. Based 
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on my own experience of the shared taking up of norm-based roles, I would like to argue that a 
more radical position – one that collapses this primary expert/lay people dualism and re-situates 
expertise in dynamic social relations – provides a more helpful understanding of how we live and 
work together. 
Conceptualising expertise as a social object 
My argument is that experts do not ‘have’ expertise, but rather that (so to speak) expertise ‘has’ 
experts, lay people, authorising bodies, and ultimately the whole of society, insofar as these roles 
are involved to varying degrees at different times in the evolution of identities and social orders in 
communities where access to specialist knowledge resources is mediated. This relies primarily on 
what I have been calling routinised relational activities as processes of managing anxiety; from a 
more formal pragmatist perspective, this is equally captured in Mead’s notion of the social object.  
Mead defines a social object as the object of a social act ‘that answers to all parts of the complex act, 
though these parts are found in the conduct of different individuals’ (Mead 1925: 264). I understand 
this to mean that a social object can be thought of as a common expectation among at least two 
social actors as to the completion of a social act, so that the expected differential conduct of each 
actor is contained within the conduct of the other actors at the same time. Over time, these social 
objects can be become common expectations for large numbers of people, and are, in a sense, 
institutionalised – which is a way of saying that a common set of responses to particular stimuli 
become habitual for community members, and that such responses are related to recognisable 
complex social acts (Mead 1934: 261). In that sense, social objects are generalised tendencies to act 
found in the conduct of social actors within communities; and importantly, like all generalisations 
from a pragmatist perspective, they are in a constant state of forming and being formed in their 
particular moments of being functionalised – sometimes conservatively, and sometimes giving rise 
to novelty.  
If we then examine expertise as a social object, then we are immediately presented with the 
multiplicity of roles noted above that are all likely to feature in the conduct of social actors involved 
in interactions about accessing specialist knowledge resources. On that basis, expertise becomes a 
set of shared expectations that shapes identities at the same time as producing and reproducing the 
social order in each of those interactions. Further, if those interactions are necessarily about 
accessing knowledge resources that are unequally distributed, they are also about power; however, 
as I describe in my projects, these power relations are plural rather than simply balanced in favour of 
those taking up the role of expert.   
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To illustrate this, I try to describe the roles that emerged in my projects as relevant to expertise-
interactions in the table below, and identify the competing identifications that may co-exist in the 
experience of individuals, at least in the kinds of organisations I have worked in. I suspect that this 
analysis extends naturally to similar organisations in Western capitalist societies, although more 
research would be required to confirm this.  
Table 2: Roles and relations concerning expertise-interactions 
Role Performative demands of social actors Power relating 
Experts, educators and 
professional communities:  
those with direct access to 
specialist knowledge 
resources 
Demonstrate skills to maintain standing, 
and satisfy and give confidence to those 
who are accessing those resources, at 
the same time as managing concerns 
they may have about what they either do 
not know or consider unknowable 
Notionally have ability to withhold 
resources, but are constituted 
through demand for resources 
 
Lay people: Those who need 
access to specialist 
knowledge resources but 
cannot gain them directly 
Appear deferential or compliant to get 
what they need, at the same time as 
managing doubts and concerns about the 
particular individuals involved (e.g., 
through research or seeking opinions) 
Notionally have to seek access to 
resources, but without this demand 
those resources may have no value 
Legitimising authorities: 
Where relevant, those tasked 
with setting the standards by 
which facility with specialist 
knowledge resources is 
notionally judged, accepting 
that this is problematic 
Maintain regulatory authority with 
professionals and the public, at the same 
time as assimilating innovation and 
dealing with the failure of the 
professionals they have authorised 
Notionally have ability to define who 
can give access to resources, but are 
constituted both through regulatory 
mandates and through the 
confidence of professional 
communities and the public 
 
Surely, it is only through considering the expectations of all these aspects of conduct that we can 
achieve a notion of expertise that reflects the breadth of issues involved in what individuals are 
doing when taking up roles in relation to expertise-interactions. Moreover, thinking about expertise 
in this way highlights how the notion of expertise necessarily evolves over time with changing 
patterns of social relations. For example, it makes sense that the guild-based professional 
protectionism of the Middle Ages might resemble the Scholasticism of the same period, concerned 
as they arguably both were with the exclusion of lay people to maintain standing and authority. 
Similarly, it makes sense that the legacy of the Enlightenment’s focus on individuality and rationality 
may lead to constructions of expertise as the property of individuals, perhaps with omniscience as 
an ideal animating the emergence of professional communities.  
Further, it also makes sense that, in the United Kingdom today, we are struggling with the concept of 
expertise because of what I have been calling the democratisation of traditional sources of 
legitimacy – a process perhaps accelerated by social media, which offers a platform for self-
appointed ‘experts’. If we take current debates about the reasons for and against the UK leaving the 
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European Union as an example, analyses conducted by traditionally legitimate experts – such as the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, the Bank of England, or indeed HM Treasury – are all being largely 
ignored by pro-Leave campaigners. A more traditional approach to conceptualising expertise may 
lead one to suggest that experts and professional communities are being marginalised in favour of a 
pernicious popularism; indeed, it is suggested that democracy cannot dominate every realm because 
this would destroy the value of expertise (Collins and Evans 2007: 8). What this analysis misses, and I 
think treating expertise as a social object offers, is that no realm of human conduct is free from 
democracy in these terms: pragmatism gives us the notion that all meaning is negotiated in 
interaction, so to suggest otherwise is to abstract this or that concept from its constitutive social 
relations. In turn, this may prevent us from noticing aspects of experience that may be pertinent or 
even crucial to living and working together.  
Conclusion 
I am proposing a novel conception of expertise that builds on but also departs from existing scholarship:   
Expertise, as a social object, can be thought of as the continually evolving, population-wide 
expectations of the differential conduct of social actors in relation to accessing specialist knowledge 
resources in communities where this access is mediated – shared expectations that are present in the 
conduct of all social actors involved in such interactions.  
In this sense, as stressed earlier, experts therefore cannot ‘have’ expertise; rather, expertise ‘has’ 
experts and all others who are involved in expertise-interactions. 
The movement of expertise with broader social trends arises responsively in the construction and 
reconstruction of identities, as the members of communities are brought into different relations to 
each other. Only at some times will these relations involve the kind of cooperation that privileges 
those taking up expert roles, which draws attention to the contingency associated with the taking up 
of those roles, the ever-present possibility of new patterns of relating emerging. It also highlights the 
ways in which the emphasis placed on particular knowledge resources is a matter for societies at 
particular times in relation to particular problems.  
My analysis here arises from the experiences I recount of being, or being asked to be, an expert in 
OD within the wider patterns of relating in the health and care sector where, rather traditionally, 
power relations tend to be balanced in favour of those who have access to specialist knowledge 
resources. It would be interesting to explore the experiences of those involved in some of the more 
contentious expertise-interactions – such as those providing evidence and analysis regarding Brexit – 
to understand what is involved in attempting, and increasingly failing, to bring people into more 
traditional relations concerning expertise. These are areas for further research. 
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4. The DMan method 
I have found it helpful to see the DMan research method as a form of what Alvesson and Kärreman 
(2011) introduce as the investigation of breakdowns in everyday practice, where our expectations of 
what will happen in a given situation fail to match what actually happens in some surprising way 
(Brinkmann 2012). As I will explain in this chapter, I see this method as consistent with some of the 
key principles involved in understanding human interaction as complex responsive processes, which 
is the theoretical position on social experience taken up by the DMan research community.  
Note: I have already made arguments in Chapter 3 that are relevant to justifying the use of this 
research method for researching organisations, and I will indicate where I am drawing on those 
arguments rather than repeating them.  
 
Contributing to theory and practice through qualitative case-based research 
As an approach to social research, organisational ethnography and narrative inquiry are becoming 
increasingly widespread (Czarniawska 2004; Rhodes and Brown 2005; Andrews et al 2008; Denzin 
and Lincoln 2017). Indeed, some even say it has become fashionable (Gherardi 2018). In these 
necessarily case-based – or idiographic – approaches, generalisability has to mean something quite 
different from the kinds of predictive rule-generating – or nomothetic – conclusions that tend to be 
the goal of the natural sciences. The same could be said about, for example, action research, which 
arguably shares similar positivist assumptions insofar as it recommends actions to improve practice, 
implying some degree of repeatability of experience in which those actions would have lasting 
validity (Stacey and Griffin 2005).  
I see the key consideration as being that, if social life is seen as essentially uncertain (Argument (i) in 
Chapter 3), then conclusions from social research cannot be predictive beyond some general 
probabilistic expectations based on hitherto repeating population-wide behavioural patterns. For 
example, the very statement of a conclusion that purports to predict some aspect of experience 
changes the reality it is describing in unpredictable ways: who says it, when, and with what histories 
and intentions, and who responds to it, when, and with what histories and intentions are all aspects 
of unique social acts taking place in particular places at particular times. I refer back to the analogies 
from the complexity sciences I described earlier, and particularly the way in which imaginary 
constructs – such as ideology, social norms, or organisational culture – are paradoxically forming and 
being formed in the practices of everyday life. I think this leads to a natural attention to both local 
interactions and the social objects that emerge in them as legitimate foci of organisational research. 
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Adding to this further perspectives from pragmatic philosophy, process sociology and group analysis 
– the notion of individuals being social through and through (Mead 1934; Foulkes 1975), and that 
interdependence and therefore power relating are unavoidable aspects of conscious and 
unconscious human experience (Elias 1978) – I think leads to a further focus on group processes. As I 
describe in Project 3 (P3: 65), the DMan research method is strongly influenced by the Foulkesian 
group analytical model in how it conceptualises these processes (Mowles 2017a, 2017b), which is 
perhaps not least because its earliest incarnation was as a joint programme with the Institute of 
Group Analysis. Exploring what may be going on consciously and unconsciously in local interactions 
is also therefore very much part of what researchers on the DMan do in their project work. 
Taken together, these propositions constitute what I understand as the core principles of the 
perspective of human interaction understood as complex responsive processes. It should be clear 
that this perspective is based on radically different assumptions about the nature of human 
experience compared with the more mechanistic theories of scientific management, and this 
perhaps naturally informs a way of undertaking research that is very different from practices in 
social sciences that might try to emulate natural scientific research. This includes a different way of 
thinking about the notion of how contributions to theory and practice are identified.  
The contemporary Danish professor of psychology and qualitative research, Svend Brinkmann, 
provides a helpful way to approach this. He suggests criteria by which conclusions from qualitative 
research can be judged for contributions to theory and practice (Brinkmann 2012). These are truth, 
beauty and goodness, all of which are addressed through the DMan method. Truth is assessed in 
terms of plausibility: Do the proposed contributions from our research make sense, are they 
compelling, and do they emerge coherently from our analyses and what we come to know of each 
other in our learning sets? Further, as researchers progress through the programme, is their self-
awareness, or reflexivity, increasing the plausibility of their analyses and therefore the conclusions 
they draw as they inquire more deeply into their practice? Beauty is assessed through the extent to 
which contributions resonate with others – again, as above: Are they recognisable in the experiences 
of others, and, if so, are they of interest to widening communities of inquiry: our colleagues, other 
researchers who take the perspectives we do, and some who perhaps do not? Finally, goodness is 
assessed by considering how useful contributions are found to be – in line with pragmatist 
philosophy, which sees ideas as the tools that people use to cope with the world (Brinkmann 2012). 
The correlate for research is that new social theories can be thought of as tools that lead people to 
articulate their experiences differently, which transforms their reality; a key test in the DMan is 
whether others find our conclusions helpful for making new sense of their own practice, which may 
increase their capacity to act. 
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In this way, conclusions from social research can be seen as provocations or gestures that others 
may find helpful in their own practice in different ways. Though perhaps humbler than the 
nomothetic aspirations of some social scientists, I think this approach is more aligned to our actual 
experience of taking up other people’s ideas. For example, experiences in everyday life where I find 
myself taking up a new idea about management or leadership occur less when I am asked to simply 
accept a theoretical hypothesis, however well-reasoned, and much more when ideas are presented 
in a way that makes sense to me because I can relate them to my own experience and sense that 
they might be worth a try.  
In summary, then, contra the necessary conclusions sought by research assuming a positivist 
epistemology, no absolutes are sought through the research method used in the DMan. The goal 
instead is to make interpretations that are epistemically, aesthetically and morally sufficient to the 
researcher, taking the attitudes of wider research and professional communities increasingly into 
account. This undertaking is successful if contributions provide others with new responsive 
capacities, just as the research process has done for the researcher. Initially this can be tested with 
members of the DMan research community, but researchers are encouraged to increasingly test 
their ideas with members of their professional communities or other academics.  
 
Programme components 
As outlined in the Introduction to this thesis, the main part of the DMan programme involves 
undertaking four projects and participating in the DMan research community.  
Project work 
Each student’s first project is an intellectual autobiography that seeks to bring to light some of their 
assumptions and how these have come about. As well as identifying the themes that seem to be 
animating the researcher’s experiences of work, it is a first exercise in reflexivity and helps to 
establish the plausibility of the accounts that form the bases of subsequent research projects. As 
noted in Argument (iii) in Chapter 3, reflexivity can be thought of as bringing into view the 
contingency of the assumptions that inform why some things are taken up over others (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2000), and some authors differentiate reflexivity further as concerning either general 
social conditions or one’s own social history (Cunliffe and Jun 2005). However, if individuals are seen 
as social through and through (Mead 1934), then these are arguably aspects of the same 
phenomenon, and, in addition, are particularly hard to differentiate when using autobiographical 
accounts. For simplicity, I will describe the exploration of the historical situatedness of 
161 
 
interpretations of social phenomena in general as critical analysis, and accounting for the 
researcher’s interpretive tendencies as reflexive analysis. 
Projects 2–4 are all inquiries into autobiographical narratives of the researcher’s more specific 
experiences of their working lives. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000: 255) provide a framework for 
undertaking reflexive analysis through the construction of data, interpretation, critical interpretation 
and self-critical reflection; as I will explain, I think this framework is broadly followed in each project. 
As these projects are developed iteratively, over time they serve to deepen the researcher’s inquiry 
and further increase the plausibility of the eventual contributions to theory and practice. Taken 
together, these four projects form the main ‘data’ and analytical content of the thesis.  
Engaging with the DMan research community 
Alongside this, researchers are obliged to participate in the DMan research community. This involves 
attending four residential weekends per academic year, working as part of a learning set of up to 
four students and a supervisor, and participating in the DMan research community more generally. 
Learning set members read and comment upon iterations of each other’s written work, which are 
then discussed in learning set meetings at each residential, and four more times during the year. 
These activities help to accelerate each researcher’s work, as well as evaluating the novelty, 
plausibility, resonance and usefulness of emerging conclusions. Further, learning sets are also small 
group processes, the exploration of which can help to illuminate aspects of what happens in 
organisations relating to researchers’ inquiries, and can also support the researcher’s ongoing 
reflexive analyses. For example, the patterns of relating in different learning sets varies greatly and 
there can sometimes be competition between learning sets, the exploration of which can help 
researchers to think about how teams may compete with each other in the workplace. Alternatively, 
in Project 3, it was my experience of a learning set meeting that illuminated some of the group 
processes playing out in my organisation, which were being also expressed in my research project.  
Residential weekends also involve three ‘community meetings’ where the whole research group (of 
up to 20 students and five faculty) meets for 90 minutes, using the model of the Institute of Group 
Analysis’s large experiential group. The group sits together in a large circle with no agenda, exploring 
whatever comes up. Similar to the learning set, what happens in the community meeting can help to 
illuminate aspects of what happens in organisations, or help researchers understand more about 
their interpretive tendencies or make new connections to other students’ project work. This 
therefore provides another forum in which research ideas can be tested or developed; and over a 
weekend, themes can sometimes be taken up in quite unexpected ways. For example, examining my 
own experiences of responding to the participation of a visiting researcher in community meetings 
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during one residential helped me to explore how others might perceive me when I ‘dropped in’ to 
groups as a facilitator in Project 4.  
These aspects of the programme that focus on exploring group processes can be seen as drawing 
attention to aspects of experience that may lead to new capacities to respond, just as the process of 
free-floating conversation in the Foulkesian therapy group increases patients’ capacity to 
understand and alter their everyday behaviour (Foulkes 1975; Stacey 2003). Through writing their 
projects and participating in the ways described, researchers demonstrate a deepening 
understanding of the theoretical perspective taken up in the research community and, by Project 4, 
an ability to work at doctoral level.  
 
Data collection: using autobiographical narratives 
The first step in Projects 2–4 is to gather the ‘empirical data’ relating to the breakdown to be 
explored. I have already argued for the utility of breakdowns (Argument (iii) in Chapter 3) as a way 
into reflexively exploring both the social order in which we work, and our social histories as 
researchers. A further feature of the DMan method to explain is the use of autobiographical 
accounts of these experiences, which form the start of each project. There are three main reasons 
for this choice of method, and some important limitations to note that the programme design 
mitigates, at least in part. 
Why use cases? 
The first reason for using autobiographical narratives concerns the use of cases. Perhaps reflecting 
biases towards rationality and stability that I have already explored (P2: 42, P4: 87), case-based 
research is sometimes seen as inferior to methods that aim to formulate general theories (Flyvbjerg 
2011). However, those general theories are necessarily abstracted from time, and largely do not 
account for the way in which, as above, their very articulation changes important aspects of the 
social reality they are trying to describe. As Bourdieu puts it: 
The detemporalizing effect (visible in the synoptic apprehension that diagrams make possible) 
that science produces when it forgets the transformation it imposes on practices inscribed in 
the current of time […] is never more pernicious than when exerted on practices defined by 
the fact that their temporal structure, direction, and rhythm are constitutive of their meaning. 
(Bourdieu 1977: 9, italics in original) 
As a response to this, it is suggested that dealing with cases is more appropriate for conveying the 
‘data’ of social inquiries because this acknowledges that the world of human affairs is particular, 
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concrete and processual, rather than general, theoretical and static (Flyvbjerg 2011). As described 
above, any attempt to determine how things ‘really are’ abstracted from particular contexts could 
be seen to ignore the way in which temporal and contextual interpretation and reinterpretation, 
along with ‘practical necessities, uncertainties and urgencies’ (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011: 342), are 
an unavoidable part of social life.  
Why narratives? 
The second reason concerns the use of narratives. Narratives can be criticised from a positivist 
perspective for being unreliable or unverifiable data because they are subjective. A first general 
response to this claim is to argue that all inquiries (even those in natural sciences that claim to be 
objective) are subjective in important but underacknowledged ways, because there can be ‘no view 
from nowhere’ (Nagel 1986; Mead 1923). As Denzin and Lincoln (2017: 17) note, in light of the 
postmodernist and poststructuralist turns, it is generally accepted that:  
Any gaze is always filtered through the lenses of language, gender, social class, race and 
ethnicity. There are no objective observations, only observations situated in the worlds of – 
and between – the observer and the observed. 
A second general response is that if individuals are socially formed in Meadian terms, and 
interdependent in Elias’s terms, then all subjective accounts represent a range of conscious and 
unconscious socialising processes and so necessarily involve others. This means that my accounts are 
never just mine, but rather reflect collective experience from my perspective, aspects of which 
others are likely to share but may interpret differently (Gadamer 1975). 
More positively, we can also argue that narratives are able to convey more about the experiences 
being examined than can (ostensibly) objective descriptions of events, because narrativisation is 
itself a defining feature of human experience (e.g. Jameson 1981; Bruner 1986; Ricœur 1991; Niles 
1999). In writing down an account that connects events and attributes meaning in a particular way, 
informants or researchers are not simply documenting events; they are also taking abductive logical 
steps to come up with explanations that sufficiently deal with the breakdowns they have 
experienced (Brinkmann 2012). These are creative moments (ibid) and inevitably reflect the 
accounting party’s prejudices (Gadamer 1975). 
It is important to note that I am therefore not arguing for a pure relativist position, as I am not 
denying the existence of a reality that is being experienced. Rather, I am arguing that assumptions, 
intentions and interpretations are as much the stuff of human experience as the ontic reality that is 
being multiply interpreted. In that case, as narrative inquiry embraces the subjectivity of accounts as 
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a defining feature of experience, it offers organisational researchers a different way of accessing 
important aspects of our working lives from which knowledge can be generated (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2000; Flyvbjerg 2011; Denzin and Lincoln 2017).  
Why autobiographical accounts? 
The third reason concerns the use of autobiographical accounts in preference to the reported or 
observed experiences of others. There is a long history in social anthropology of theorising based on 
observing and analysing the interactions of others, and there is clearly much to learn from 
embedded research. However, there are two important limitations of, for example, interviewing or 
observing others, which are at least partially addressed by the use of autobiographical accounts.  
The first is that if human experience is primarily affectual (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015; Shotter 2016; 
Gherardi 2017), then the use of reported accounts is necessarily partial; analyses are restricted to 
what is reported, which may not adequately or reliably reflect the informant’s experience, 
particularly if aspects are misremembered or, for example, consciously or unconsciously repressed 
(Freud 1915) or excluded (Bowlby 1979) as a way of managing anxiety. Further, the reports that 
informants provide may be influenced by their own intentions, how they understand the object of 
the inquiry, or what they imagine the researcher’s prejudices may be. Observation can help to enrich 
and triangulate accounts; but observing the affectual responses of others, or imagining what people 
might be thinking or feeling, as above, will always involve the observer’s own interpretive tendencies 
and fields of attention. A further constraint relates to the time that is actually spent with those who 
are being observed: in researching organisations, experiences that occur deliberately or accidentally 
out of sight, or by text message in the evening, or by phone because the matter is too sensitive to be 
recorded, will all fall outside of what is available for analysis. These factors may limit the plausibility 
of analyses produced; however, statements of researcher bias, longer periods of observation and 
diverse research teams may help to mitigate these risks.  
Inquiring into autobiographical accounts responds to some of these risks, but is not without its own. 
The affectual experiences, assumptions, intentions, and interpretations to which researchers have 
the fullest access are arguably their own: researchers are ‘with themselves’, so to speak, all the time, 
so DMan researchers are able to explore experience in ways that other methods cannot. An 
important consideration in this approach, however, is that because the researcher provides accounts 
of their own work, for those not involved in the researcher’s organisation, accounts are not 
objectively verifiable as having taken place. Another is that researchers exploring their own 
experience may also exclude aspects of their experience as a defence against anxiety (which I write 
about in Project 3), or edit their experiences due to their own concerns about what they can write 
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about because, for example, the work will eventually be published under their own name (Lapadat 
2017). 
The DMan programme design helps to mitigates against these risks in a number of ways, and this is 
primarily through the obligation to participate in the DMan research community while undertaking 
research. Researchers are encouraged to use thick descriptions (Geertz 1973) to convey the events 
they are describing, to help learning set members (initially, but also anyone who may read the 
project later) understand the work. A description can be considered ‘thick’ when context and 
intention are conveyed sufficiently to allow others to make sense of the sequence of events 
(Greenblatt 1997); moreover, a thick description allows the reader to judge for themselves not only 
whether or not the narrative is plausible (Brinkmann’s epistemic criterion, noted earlier; truth), but 
also whether or not events conveyed are sufficiently resonant with their own experience (the 
aesthetic criterion; beauty) to mean that the subsequent analysis of the experience will be of 
interest and potential use (the moral criterion; goodness).  
The thickness of narratives is tested in the DMan community in different ways. In reading and 
commenting on each other’s work in the learning set, each researcher’s project work is continually 
being examined for consistency with what researchers come to know of each other’s interpretive 
tendencies and occupational contexts. As mentioned earlier, this starts with the very first DMan 
project, which situates analyses in subsequent projects, and against which the plausibility of 
accounts can be judged as the learning set members become more familiar with each other’s 
histories and organisational contexts. Objectivity for this kind of research is therefore primarily a 
matter of relational plausibility, which engages with the multiple subjectivities involved in making 
sense of experience. 
A further mitigation comes from the perspective of aspiring to being a credible researcher, which I 
think means that we are trying to inquire into our practice as faithfully as we can to come to new 
insights. In that case, it is not clear whose ends would be served by trying to deliberately mislead, 
given that researchers on the DMan are there of their own volition. I will come back to research 
ethics at the end of this chapter.  
There are also further benefits to working as a community of inquiry. The ongoing review of 
iterations of projects is an opportunity to identify relevant scholarship that addresses the themes 
emerging from the narrative – resources that may so far be unknown to the researcher. This 
therefore can also help to determine whether the questions that are emerging for the researcher 
have already been addressed elsewhere – a further indication of whether the topic is original and 
could be of interest to a wider research community. Further, that the members of learning sets tend 
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to be diverse (in my group, we come from different countries, have different academic backgrounds, 
and do reasonably different jobs) is also important: as mentioned about observation as a research 
tool, a diversity of perspectives helps to ensure that the ongoing process of sharing work with others 
widens the researchers’ perspectives. The residential weekends also offer opportunities to have 
work challenged, helping to mitigate the risks of groupthink in learning sets.  
I often experienced this level of scrutiny as quite challenging; however, this is a very important 
aspect of the research process. This is firstly because failure on Brinkmann’s measures drastically 
undermines the credibility of the ‘data’ presented and leaves any subsequent analysis wide open to 
the criticisms noted above; second, these challenges are new encounters with difference that, as an 
evolution of the researcher’s field of attention, increase the researcher’s responsive capacities not 
just in their research, but also in their work as they progress.  
The DMan also involves a different way of engaging with scholarship than tends to be used in more 
orthodox PhDs. Rather than starting with a systematic literature review that identifies a gap in the 
literature to be researched, DMan researchers use scholarship that relates to their emerging themes 
to deepen their inquiries. If reading suggests to the researcher that their emerging question is 
already well explored, then a new, less explored area may emerge in response. Pursuing these 
emergent topics enables researchers to be largely unconstrained in terms of their topics as they 
move through the programme, ideally leading to a topic that doesn’t appear to have been explored 
yet – what Alvesson and Kärreman term a mystery (2011) – which therefore presents an opportunity 
to make a new contribution to theory or practice. Towards the end of the programme, researchers 
tend to explore more formally the breadth of scholarship regarding their proposed contribution, to 
ensure that their research is indeed novel.  
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Critical and reflexive analysis 
Critical analysis, alone and with others 
If reported faithfully using thick descriptions, narratives are likely to reflect the researcher’s 
interpretive tendencies; so the first account of an experience, initial analyses and discussions in the 
learning set are the beginning of a process of deepening the researcher’s inquiry. The twentieth-
century French philosopher, Paul Ricœur, offers us two ways of thinking about the task of 
interpretation – distinguishing the hermeneutics of faith and the hermeneutics of suspicion – and 
these have been related to the process of qualitative research (e.g. Josselson 2004; Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2000). Josselson (2004) casts the former as a process of restoring meaning in the account 
provided, based on the intention of being faithful to the experience of the informant – in other 
words, the researcher aims to understand the participant’s experience as the participant 
understands it. The latter, by contrast, is a process of demystifying the account provided, which 
assumes that experience is deceptive in one way or another. Ricœur refers especially to Freud, Marx 
and Nietzsche highlighting how hidden libidinal drives, economic interests or power relations, 
respectively, may be uncovered through analysis; but we could similarly add any critical position to 
this set (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000). The intention of this kind of hermeneutics is to unmask and 
decode what is experienced to reveal meanings beyond the account, given that these are unlikely to 
be wholly apparent to the provider of the account because of their cultural situatedness.  
Both methods are relevant to the DMan research process, and probably in a much more iterative 
way than the binary distinction described above might suggest; indeed, Ricœur himself described 
these modes as ‘contours of the hermeneutic field’ rather than being truly distinct (Ricœur 1970: 9).  
Of course, one could conduct this exploration privately, and various methods are available for 
diversifying research inquiries (see, for example, Abbot 2004). Brinkmann (2012) suggests that 
phenomenological, critical and deconstructive stances are particularly relevant to the exploration of 
narratives: phenomenological stances draw attention from the object of inquiry to the process of 
inquiring; critical stances draw attention to potentially hidden meanings; deconstructive stances 
draw attention to ambiguity in the use of language, and to the contingency of our habitual 
interpretive tendencies.  
While these are undoubtedly useful activities (and part of progressing as a researcher is being 
increasingly able to reflect upon one’s experience using these kinds of approaches as a matter of 
course), the depth and breadth of analysis is enhanced even further by regularly sharing work with 
one’s learning set and the wider research group. As I inquire privately into my experience, engaging 
with the ‘broad scholarship’ (Alvesson and Kärreman 2011) in relation to my topic, arguably I am 
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looking to find new meanings in my writing that feel faithful to what happened. This can be 
animated by faith or suspicion, in Ricœur’s terms; but inevitably, the extent to which I am able to 
demystify my own experiences will be limited by my prejudices, which may involve defensive 
processes that unconsciously limit what I am able to notice. In sharing my work with my learning set, 
then, further connections may be found, and further meanings that I might be consciously or 
unconsciously avoiding can also become available. These processes are perhaps less likely to occur in 
solitary research. These alternative perspectives, while potentially uncomfortable or disturbing, can 
also lead to a sense of the account becoming more faithful to what happened; this iteration then 
becomes available again for further inquiry. For me, this demonstrates how both hermeneutical 
modes can dialectically widen and deepen the process of inquiry and, further, how this method 
emphasises reflexivity. I have already argued that this can be thought of as a moral process 
(Argument (v) in Chapter 3). 
Ongoing reflexivity as establishing plausibility  
As mentioned earlier, reflexivity in social research can have a number of definitions. I have been 
differentiating critical and self-reflexivity (Cunliffe and Jun 2005) as the destabilising of assumptions 
through exploring the contingency of general social conditions, and researchers’ own social histories, 
respectively. In social research, reflexivity arguably acts as a safeguard against social theory drifting 
into uncritical totalism that fails to account for the researcher’s own social history, the biases and 
power relations of the field of social research, and the tendency to privilege nomothetical 
idealisation over a more idiographic grounding (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Put more simply, to 
better understand experience, researchers need to account for why particular data and 
interpretations are chosen over others, because this helps to highlight that there may be other 
conclusions to be drawn from the same ‘source material’.  
It has recently been noted that, even though ethnography is becoming more fashionable as a 
method for organisational research, attention to the researcher’s biases and intentions is being 
somewhat neglected. Gherardi (2018) suggests that these inquiries are:  
often accompanied by a sort of innocence that overlooks the crisis of representation that 
grew out of a literary turn in the 1980s concerning textuality, disciplinary history, critical 
modes of reflexivity, and the critique of realist practices of representation. (ibid: 1) 
I have already argued that there is no definitive interpretation to be found for experience: as noted 
in my account of the instability of meaning (Argument (i) in Chapter 3), the process of inquiry is 
open-ended and may continue indefinitely (Gergen and Gergen 1991; Andrews 2008; Brinkmann 
2012). I think this creates even greater demands on organisational researchers to account for their 
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own prejudices and intentions on an ongoing basis as they undertake their research, and this is built 
into the structure of the DMan.  
As mentioned, Project 1 is a first attempt in reflexive analysis, and each subsequent project 
illuminates new aspects of the researcher’s experience. As an ongoing inquiry in which the 
researcher becomes increasingly aware of and able to account for the contingency of their own 
assumptions and interpretations, the whole DMan process could therefore be seen as an exercise in 
ongoing reflexivity: focussing on breakdowns that reveal more about the researcher’s interpretive 
tendencies and their working contexts helps to establish the plausibility of the conclusions that are 
ultimately drawn. Importantly, these can only be pragmatic resolutions that are open for further 
revision as researchers encounter further breakdowns in their experience.  
Project work therefore begins to function as a critical dialogue partner (Alvesson and Kärreman 
2011), with contributions to theory and practice arising from the (specifically) dialectical interplay of 
the researcher’s work and research. Arguably, the skill of the researcher is then based in being able 
to deal with these together. Geertz (1974) suggested that what we are striving for is: 
a continuous dialectical tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global of 
global structure in such a way as to bring both into view simultaneously. (ibid: 43) 
I think Geertz is drawing attention to the paradoxical relationship between generalities and their 
particular instances – again, highlighting the relevance of the methodology to some of the core 
concepts in the perspective of human interaction understood as complex responsive processes.  
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Research ethics  
The topic of research ethics in methods that uses autobiographical accounts is fraught with 
complexity (Ellis 2007; Lapadat 2017). On the one hand, by writing about our own experience rather 
than the experiences of others (as conveyed, for example, in interviews where informed consent can 
be actively sought), some of the common ethical issues that arise about anonymisation of research 
subjects might be regarded as avoidable. On the other hand, a core argument of the theoretical 
perspective taken up by the DMan research community is that individuals are social through and 
through, so even private experience is social in an important sense; further, and perhaps more 
practically, writing about what we are doing at work, and focussing on group processes, inevitably 
features other people.  
Writing about other people 
Due to the emergent nature of the inquiry involved in this method, researchers on the DMan are 
making ethical judgements all the time as we consider the implications of what we are writing about 
for those whom our accounts concern. This is partly because, unlike traditional social research, it is 
difficult to know in advance who will feature in the autobiographical accounts that form the basis of 
a researcher’s projects, especially if writing about breakdowns. It is also because it would hardly be 
practical to inform everyone I encounter that they may or may not feature in an account of the 
interaction that is about to happen (though I have taken the opportunity to do so if, for example, 
people ask about my research).  
I have attempted to deal with this for Projects 2–4, by informing the leaders of my organisation and 
my most immediate colleagues about how my research is conducted. Further, when I am initiating 
new pieces of work, I let the people I am working with know that I am writing about my practice and 
that they may feature in it in some way. Each individual who appears in my accounts is then 
pseudonymised so that they cannot be recognised by others; and where they might recognise 
themselves, were they to ever read my thesis, I have created opportunities to relate what I am 
writing about to the people involved, either at the time or later.  
For example, in writing about strategic planning as defences against anxiety and my ethical concerns 
in Project 2, I talked through what I was writing about with Jerome as I went along, and after I 
completed the project. This influenced how we went about subsequent phases of the work. 
Similarly, I have relayed relevant aspects of my conclusions from exploring the directorate away day 
I describe in Project 4 with the people involved, which is starting to change how we are working 
together. It is more difficult to feed back to those who feature in Project 1, because I am no longer in 
contact with them, and haven’t been for many years. As a result, I have paid particular attention to 
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pseudonymisation, trying to make sure that this doesn’t alter the content of what I am trying to 
draw attention to, but does protect identities; I have tested the success of this with my learning set.  
As I have already mentioned, telling the people I work with that I am doing research must have some 
effect on our relationships. This means that my research can perhaps only really be described as 
dealing with my experience as an internal consultant whom others know to be researching his own 
work. While this could be seen to limit the generalisability of my research, in a way, I think it is 
better to be transparent about this rather than imagining that I can somehow write myself out of the 
arguments I am trying to present; indeed, one might argue that to do so would undermine the value 
of being a researcher (Steier 1991) and perpetuate the very privileging of traditional notions of 
objectivity over subjectivity that I am arguing against.  
Writing about myself 
A further set of ethical concerns arises from the particular perspective of the autobiographer: while 
anonymisation in ethnography more generally can protect the identity of research subjects, here, by 
the fact of the thesis’ eventual publication under the researcher’s own name, the researcher cannot 
be similarly protected. This means that they become vulnerable in particular ways that other 
ethnographers may not. This may be through reliving the traumas they recount in their narratives, 
though the analytical process may also be therapeutic; equally troubling is the notion that the 
researcher may be stigmatised or may suffer consequences in terms of future employability due to 
the disclosures they make, however well-anonymised the accounts (Lapadat 2017).  
For these reasons, ethics remain a live issue throughout the process – assessments are made 
constantly about the competition between the potential impacts of using a narrative upon those 
described and on the researcher themselves, versus its importance for the deepening research 
inquiry. What should and should not be included in a project, taking into account the perspectives of 
others, is therefore being negotiated on an ongoing basis – informed by conscious and unconscious 
responses involving our interests and the power dynamics of our working environments – just as 
ethical judgements are made in everyday life as we interact and negotiate with others (Griffin 2002).  
This can be considered a further skill that is developed as part of the DMan process, as well as a 
further manifestation of how we can see selves as social through and through. As I have progressed 
in my research, talking regularly about ethical concerns with my fellow researchers and my 
colleagues, I have found it easier to produce accounts that I think I would be happy for those whom 
the narratives concern to read, which suggests a maturing approach to conducting this kind of 
research. This therefore also represents an evolution in the researcher’s field of attention, that 
incorporates these complex ethical considerations of writing about others as new sensitivities that 
are brought to bear as we consciously and unconsciously conduct our inquiries.  
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5. The contributions of this thesis 
Drawing on my arguments in Chapter 3, in this section, I conclude my thesis by stating the key 
contributions I believe my research offers to researchers and practitioners. 
Contribution to theory 
As described in detail in the final section of Chapter 3, I have presented a new conceptualisation of 
expertise based on a pragmatist critique of the contemporary scholarship on this topic. I believe this 
will be of interest to scholars interested in expertise, but also to policymakers or think tanks who are 
considering how their products are taken up in society.  
Drawing on the Meadian concept of the social object, I argue that expertise can helpfully be 
conceptualised as the continually evolving, population-wide expectations of the differential conduct 
of social actors in relation to accessing specialist knowledge resources in communities where this 
access is mediated – shared expectations that are present in the conduct of all social actors involved 
in such interactions. 
 This conceptualisation draws attention to how, rather than experts ‘having’ expertise, expertise can 
be regarded as ‘having’ experts, professional communities, educators and authorising bodies and lay 
people, as roles that dynamically and responsively emerge as aspects of wider patterns of society, 
shaping identities and producing, reproducing and transforming social orders.  
This conceptualisation extends existing thinking about expertise beyond its decentring from 
individuals to professional communities and those economically and intellectually invested in them. 
Most importantly, it construes expertise as an ongoing, responsive, social process, and as such 
begins to offer insights into the current ambiguity concerning the roles of those who may 
traditionally have been regarded as experts. 
Additional insights that arise from my thesis and might constitute further contributions to theory, 
but warrant further investigation, are also listed at the end of this chapter. 
Contributions to practice 
This thesis also makes two main contributions to OD practice that should be of interest to members 
of the OD community insofar as they are concerned with ethical practice. I think it will be especially 
relevant for those who are in the early stages of their careers who find themselves ‘getting it wrong’, 
or are worried about doing so.  
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The first of these challenges the common conception that OD practitioners can be neutral guides. 
While it is increasingly acknowledged that practitioners cannot be ‘outside’ the groups they work 
with, the literature, for example, on Use of Self and Self as Instrument (e.g. Rainey Tolbert and 
Hanafin 2006; Cheung-Judge 2012; Cheung-Judge and Holbeche 2015), tends to suggest that 
practitioners’ own interests, rather like the therapists’ own feelings in psychoanalysis, can be 
managed out of their work with organisations through ongoing reflexivity. Put another way, 
becoming more aware of habitual interpretive tendencies makes it less likely for those tendencies to 
play out unreflectively in practice.  
While I agree that reflexivity is important as a means to becoming more self-aware, I do not agree 
that the purpose of such reflexivity is to prevent one’s interests from interfering with OD work. This 
is because my research suggests that OD practitioners are always asserting their own agency even 
when they are trying to prioritise the agency of others. I contend instead that any action taken – for 
example, about how to interpret data, or which views to prioritise over others, or what interventions 
may help, or even inaction – all reflect the practitioner’s history, values, and conscious and 
unconscious intentions and assumptions about the groups they are working with, and the wider 
figurations in which they are involved. Further, these actions always promote the interests of some 
over others, including practitioners’ own interests, as affirmations of aspects of identity formation 
and the perpetuation of social orders, and this may be particularly pertinent for internal consultants 
who are more directly implicated in the changes they may be working on with teams. In that case, 
the reason I regard reflexivity as important is because it enables a richer awareness of experience 
and therefore more choice and thus freedom, which in turn better enables OD practitioners to take 
responsibility for themselves and the impact they inevitably have on others.  
In my own practice, this plays out as a greater awareness of my own interests when I am working 
with groups, which I try to increasingly to bring into conversation, rather that assuming that the 
interests of others are de facto more important. My intention remains to be helpful, but as I have 
become more used to expecting the unexpected, I find myself drawing attention to the potential 
implications – good and bad – that OD interventions may have, and my own preferences for how to 
proceed. I think that this is so that those with whom I am working and I, together, have the greatest 
possible opportunity to take responsibility for what we think we are doing, which for me arises from 
a desire to do right by others and being persuaded by Mead’s notion of morality. I appreciate that 
others may not share the same interests as I do, and this plays out in my interventions sometimes 
being met with resistance; I am becoming more skilled in judging whether to pursue riskier lines of 
inquiry, as ongoing processes of balancing the extent to which I feel at risk of exclusion, against the 
importance of being included and some kind of social betterment.  
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This brings me to my second contribution, about the importance of paying attention to shame in OD 
practice. It builds on the position just outlined, but strengthens further the focus on processes of 
inclusion and exclusion, and how these are moral processes. I have argued that for anyone 
interested in the impact they have on others, shame (thought of as a response to moral criticism 
whenever we challenge social norms and feel at risk of exclusion from communities that are 
important to us) should be an expected aspect of social life. For OD practitioners charged with 
catalysing helpful changes in patterns of interaction in organisations, challenging social norms or 
encouraging others to do so is part of everyday work. In that case, OD practitioners perhaps more 
than others can expect to experience ethical disturbances in their work. However, OD practitioners 
are involved in the production and reproduction of the same population-wide patterns as are others, 
which includes a strong tendency to avoid shame or try to overcome it. Indeed, this is the direction 
taken by much of the popular management commentary regarding shame.  
I would like to argue that bodily experiences of ethical discomfort – shame, or any of its emotional 
neighbours or associated manifestations (e.g. guilt, embarrassment, anger, contempt, envy, 
depression, grandiosity, or withdrawal) – that arise when things significantly do not go to plan, are 
signals that something of importance is at stake for the practitioner and/or the people they are 
working with. Reflexively inquiring into these breakdowns as they arise, in terms of the membership 
of real or imagined communities that are at stake, can help us to understand more about what is at 
risk; further, inquiring into how we and others have responded to these experiences may also help 
us to understand how identities or social orders are perpetuated.  
These activities may provide new options for action; however, the inherent uncertainty of social life, 
and the way that its associated anxiety is managed through routinised relational practices, means 
that there can be no prescriptions for what to do with these options: an intervention to change a 
pattern that seems to help one group may make things worse in another. When intervening in social 
processes, rather than relying solely on external standards or evidence, practitioners perhaps can 
really only rely on their own values and judgements; and these too must be acknowledged as 
changing over time, just as identities and social orders do. I believe that thinking about OD practice 
in this way places new responsibilities on practitioners who are interested in the impact they have 
on others, to act tentatively with as many perspectives, including their own, in view. While this may 
be difficult to bear, and sometimes it may not be possible for people to go on with each other, I 
argue that trying to do right by others, and ourselves, means taking this responsibility seriously.  
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Concluding remarks and areas for further research 
My research on the DMan has led me to new ways of being in my organisation. I now pay much 
closer attention to what I and others are saying and doing when we try to work together, and more 
naturally consider the possible social anthropological and psychodynamic aspects of what is going 
on; I am also much more aware of my affectual responses in interactions with others. In particular, I 
find myself responding to experiences of bodily disturbance, including shame, by tending to pause 
and reflect on what might be at stake, which I find gives me new ideas about what to do. As I learn 
more about myself, new disturbances seem to be both less frequent and more intense; and I have 
made reflecting on those experiences part of the ongoing development of my own OD practice.  
I have now started to discuss my ideas with the wider academic and practice community: I have 
contributed a book chapter on creating cultures of quality improvement to a new textbook for 
clinicians, which is due for publication in 2019; I have also been invited to conduct a seminar on the 
topic of shame as part of ethical OD practice at the Organisation Development Network – Europe 
Conference in May 2019 (Amsterdam).  
Further, I am in the initial stages of preparing two papers for submission to academic journals: one 
of these concerns the conception of expertise as a jointly performed relational practice involving 
experts, lay audiences, and professional bodies; the other concerns my arguments about the 
relationship between practice, anxiety, breakdowns and the avoidance of shame. 
In terms of areas for future research, some of the lines that open up from my thesis for further 
investigation are: 
• Further examination of shame and self-respect as an aspect of Mead’s paradox of self-
consciousness. This thesis offers a way of connecting Mead’s conception of self-consciousness – 
as a dialectical ongoing process of self-as-subject and self-as-object, or ‘I’/‘me’ – with the 
notions of self-respect and shame. I believe this adds to the literature on shame in pragmatic 
philosophy (e.g. Scheff 2000, 2003, 2014) and also in moral philosophy (e.g. Thomason 2018). If 
we regard shame as signalling the possibility of exclusion from real communities that are 
important to us, then it can be seen as arising from a concern or respect for the moral agency of 
others. In this sense, it arises in our interactions with others and is an aspect of maintaining 
social orders. However, if selves are social through and through and we interact with ourselves 
in the same way as we do with others (Mead 1934), then shame can also be seen as signalling 
risk to our ongoing identifications with imagined communities that are important to us; it can 
therefore be understood as arising from a concern or respect for ourselves as historical beings 
in the present.  
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This creates a paradoxical relationship between shame and self-respect as mutually constitutive 
aspects of an ongoing dialectical process of identity formation, just as Mead’s ‘I’ and ‘me’ are 
paradoxically related; and I am keen to test the theoretical basis of this claim through further 
research.  
• Further exploration of identity formation and social ordering as social practices of managing 
anxiety. This thesis offers a way of thinking about routinised relational activities as involving 
social processes of managing anxiety. I believe this offers a new dimension to practice theory by 
articulating more fully some of the psychodynamic processes, based on attachment theory, 
involved in the habitual reproduction of social orders. I am keen to investigate this further to 
elucidate some of the wider practical implications. 
• Further research into the impact of social media on experiences of shame. The proliferation of 
social media and global communications enables the formation of many more communities, 
both real (physical and virtual) and imaginary. By rendering social norms ambiguous and 
complexifying individuals’ fields of attention exponentially, this also affects the shame response 
which may be interesting to explore in relation to the dynamics of social mobilisation and 
political engagement. 
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